The relevant facts are as follows: On July 1, 1999, WestDundee annexed a parcel of property located in the District, southof Higgins Road, west of Sleepy Hollow Road, north of the Villageof Sleepy Hollow, and east of Randall Road. The property was ownedby Pulte. (See diagram in appendix.) Under section 20 of the FireProtection District Act (70 ILCS 705/20 (West 1998)), amunicipality's annexation of property automatically disconnects theannexed property from its current fire protection district,effective the first day of January following the annexation. 70ILCS 705/20 (West 1998). However, the fire protection districtmay, within 60 days of the annexation, file a petition to preventthe automatic disconnection on the grounds that (1) thedisconnection will cause the territory remaining in the fireprotection district to be noncontiguous; or (2) the disconnectionwill impair the ability of the fire protection district to renderadequate fire protection service to the territory remaining in thefire protection district. 70 ILCS 705/20 (West 1998). On August10, 1999, the District filed a petition to prevent disconnection ofthe Pulte property pursuant to section 20 of the Fire ProtectionDistrict Act, alleging that the disconnection would cause theterritory remaining in the District to be noncontiguous. The trialcourt granted Pulte leave to intervene in this action.

On February 5, 2000, Pulte initiated a separate actionpursuant to section 15 of the Fire Protection District Act (70 ILCS705/15 (West 2000)). Section 15 of the Fire Protection DistrictAct allows property owners or voters within a fire protectiondistrict to petition for an affirmative order of disconnection ongrounds that the property sought to be disconnected (1) does notmeet the requisite territorial qualifications described in section1 of the Fire Protection District Act; (2) is not reasonablyprotected by its current district; or (3) could receive a greaterbenefit of service from another district or other municipalcorporation. 70 ILCS 705/15 (West 2000). Disconnection undersection 15 is not permitted if it results in disrupting thecontiguity of the remaining territory in the fire protectiondistrict. 70 ILCS 705/15 (West 2000). The property sought to bedisconnected in Pulte's petition was the same property annexed byWest Dundee except for a portion in the northeast corner that wasapproximately 300 feet by 945 feet. The excepted parcel wouldcreate a physical connection between the two sections of theDistrict that otherwise would have been separated at that point byPulte's property, thereby purportedly satisfying the contiguityrequirement of section 15. Pulte's section 15 petition allegedthat its property would receive a greater benefit of service fromWest Dundee. The trial court granted West Dundee leave tointervene in this action. The two actions were thereafterconsolidated.

On July 11, 12, and 13, 2001, the trial court conducted abench trial. With respect to its petition, the District presentedvarious maps depicting its boundaries, the boundaries of WestDundee, and the boundaries of several other surrounding districtsand municipalities. The maps show that if the Pulte property wasannexed to West Dundee and disconnected from the District, aportion of the District's territory would be separated from therest of the District by Elgin and West Dundee. These maps alsoshow the Northwest Tollway (Interstate 90), which traverses theDistrict. At one point, the tollway is surrounded on both sides byElgin. Based on the scale provided on one of these maps, therelevant stretch of the tollway that passes through Elgin is at itsnarrowest about 275 feet wide and about 3,000 feet long. Thetollway, in effect, physically connects portions of the Districtthat would otherwise be separated by Elgin and West Dundee.

Additionally, the parties stipulated that, among other things,"[d]isconnection of the Annexed Property would block contiguity ofthe [District] between West Dundee and Elgin in the vicinity ofRoute 72." Route 72 runs east and west along the northernmostboundary of the Pulte property. The stipulation further providedthat "Pulte and West Dundee do not stipulate that disconnection ofthe Annexed Property will cause the territory remaining in the[District] to be noncontiguous." The parties also stipulated that"[d]isconnection of the Property Sought To Be Disconnected[pursuant to Pulte's section 15 petition] will not cause theterritory remaining in the [District] to be physicallynoncontiguous." This is because of the exclusion of the northeastcorner of the Pulte parcel from the annexation by West Dundee.

At trial, Rollyn Anderson, the District's fire chief,testified pertaining to the tollway, particularly the stretchrunning through Elgin. According to Anderson, the Districtprovides no fire protection service to the tollway. Elgin providesfire protection for the relevant portion of the tollway pursuant toa contract with the state. Anderson also testified that theDistrict receives notice anytime a municipality annexes a parcelwithin the District and that the District never received any noticeof Elgin or any other municipality annexing any portion of thetollway. Anderson also admitted, when asked hypothetically if thetollway was considered to be part of the District, that the tollwaywould physically connect the two otherwise separated portions ofthe District. When shown a map, Anderson further admitted that themap does not show the tollway as excluded from the District.

In its appellate brief, the District admits that "[w]hen [theDistrict] was formed in 1955, the land under the tollway was notyet acquired by the state and not constructed at that time, but wasoriginally included in the [District]." The citation followingthis admission is to plaintiff's exhibit 68, a court order datedSeptember 6, 1955, creating the District and describing itsboundaries.

On July 27, 2001, the trial court denied both the District'sand Pulte's petitions. With respect to the District's petition,the trial court found that the tollway, which runs from west toeast through the District, then through Elgin, and then backthrough to the District, provided contiguity to the District. Thus, the annexed property would be automatically disconnected fromthe District pursuant to section 20. With respect to Pulte'spetition, the trial court found that Pulte had failed to meet itsburden of proof. The District filed a timely appeal, and WestDundee and Pulte filed a timely cross-appeal.

We first address the propriety of the trial court's rulingregarding the District's petition objecting to the automaticdisconnection under section 20. The District's argument on appealin that regard is that the trial court erred in denying itspetition to prevent the disconnection of the Pulte propertybecause, if the Pulte property was disconnected, the District wouldnot be contiguous. The District argues that, contrary to the trialcourt's finding, the tollway would not provide contiguity. TheDistrict argues, therefore, that the disconnection of the Pulteproperty was improper.

The determination by the trial court as to whether contiguityor noncontiguity exists within the meaning of disconnection willnot be disturbed on review unless it is contrary to the manifestweight of the evidence. In re Petition to Disconnect CertainTerritory from the Frankfort District, 275 Ill. App. 3d 500, 502(1995). Contiguity is not defined within section 20, but thiscourt has borrowed from cases construing it under municipalannexation and disconnection statutes for its meaning in thiscontext. See In re Annexation to the Village of Downers Grove, 92Ill. App. 3d 682, 684 (1981). Thus, we have defined contiguity toexist "where the tracts of land touch or adjoin in a reasonablysubstantial physical sense." In re Annexation to the Village ofDowners Grove, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 684-85. Further, thedetermination of reasonableness in this context must be based onthe particular facts of each case. In re Annexation to the Villageof Downers Grove, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 685.

In the present case, while the Pulte property will physicallyseparate portions of the District, those portions will continue tobe connected by that portion of the District that is coextensivewith the tollway as it runs through Elgin. As the District admitsin its brief, prior to the tollway being constructed, the landwhere it currently lies was within the District. There is noevidence that anything has occurred to alter that fact. WhileElgin has annexed property on both sides of this part of thetollway, and while the territory within Elgin was consequently disconnected from the District, the land coextensive with therelevant stretch of the tollway has never been annexed. Thus, theDistrict includes a portion of land that measures at its narrowestapproximately 275 feet wide and about 3,000 feet long andphysically connects the two purportedly noncontiguous portions ofthe District. Therefore, the only remaining issue is whether sucha configuration constitutes a connection in a "reasonablysubstantial physical sense" rendering the two portions contiguous.

In deciding this question, we reiterate that each case must bedecided on its facts and that the decision of the trial court isnot to be altered unless it is against the manifest weight of theevidence. While we decide this case on its particular facts, wenote that this court has held in several annexation cases thatcontiguity existed where two areas of land have a common boundaryof 400 feet (People ex rel. Nash v. City of Loves Park, 59 Ill.App. 2d 297 (1965)), of 835 feet (In re Ordinance No. 491, 89 Ill.App. 2d 284 (1967)(abstract of op.)), and of 675 feet (In reAnnexation of Certain Territory to the Village of Buffalo Grove,128 Ill. App. 2d 261 (1970)). On the other hand, courts haverejected contiguity in annexation cases where a 50-foot strip ofland, which was a half-mile long, connected two parcels (Wild v.People ex rel. Stephens, 227 Ill. 556 (1907)), and where theproperty to be annexed was only touched by the municipal propertyfor 20 feet by a strip of land at least 1,276 feet in length(People ex rel. Cherry Valley Fire Protection District v. City ofRockford, 120 Ill. App. 2d 275 (1970)).

While the facts here fall in between these two factsituations, this case is much closer to those cases where we haveheld contiguity existed than to those cases holding it did not. More importantly, we cannot say under the evidence in this casethat the trial court's determination that the tollway constituteda reasonably substantial physical connection was against themanifest weight of the evidence. Thus, we affirm the trial court'sfinding of contiguity and its denial of the District's petitionobjecting to the automatic disconnection under section 20.

In doing so, we note that this case is different from asituation where a municipality seeks to annex land via a narrowstrip that provides its only source of physical contact with theannexed property. Here, the connecting land in question wasoriginally part of the District and is what remained afterdisconnection of various portions of the District's territory viaannexations by Elgin. This is significantly different from theaffirmative use of a narrow strip of land to acquire land thatwould not otherwise be contiguous to a municipality. Thisdifference further justifies the result in this case.

Finally, we are not persuaded by the evidence that theDistrict had no access via the tollway. Access is not thedeterminative factor in the context of contiguity of a District.Rather, it is the presence or absence of an actual territorialconnection that is controlling. See 70 ILCS 705/20 (West 2000). If access were the controlling factor in determining contiguity,the disconnection of the Pulte parcel would not render theremaining parts of the District noncontiguous because the Districtwould continue to have access via the public streets and roads that connect the two parts.

The parties direct our attention to People ex rel. Village ofSouth Barrington v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 30 Ill. 2d 385(1964). We conclude it is inapplicable to the circumstances here. In that case, the issue was whether a municipality can annex aparcel of land that would be contiguous but for the separation ofthat parcel from the municipality by a nonannexable tollway. Thatis not the same situation as here, where the tollway that createsthe contiguity occupies land originally within the District.

Because we affirm the trial court's ruling regarding automaticdisconnection, we do not decide the propriety of the trial court'sdenial of Pulte's section 15 petition.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuitcourt of Kane County.

Affirmed.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and BOWMAN, J., concur.