No. 2--01--0969

JUSTICE GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Larry Scassifero, appeals a jury verdict in favorof defendants, Scott E. Glaser, M.D., and Hinsdale AnesthesiaAssociates, Ltd. Plaintiff brought this medical malpractice actionalleging that Dr. Glaser negligently performed an epiduralinjection, causing plaintiff to develop an epidural abscess. Onappeal, plaintiff asserts that the trial court committed a varietyof evidentiary errors that justify reversal. For the reasons thatfollow, we reverse and remand the cause for a new trial.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 8, 1996, plaintiff underwent a discectomy to relievepain in his back. The surgery was performed by Dr. MichaelZindrick, an orthopaedic surgeon. The surgery provided plaintiffwith relief for only a couple of days. Dr. Zindrick referredplaintiff to Dr. Glaser, an anesthesiologist specializing in painmanagement and a partner in Hinsdale Anesthesia Associates, Ltd.

Dr. Glaser treated plaintiff on July 18, 1996, at HinsdaleHospital. At that time, plaintiff complained of lower back painradiating into his right buttock and right thigh. On an increasingscale of 1 to 10, plaintiff rated his pain at level 8. Dr. Glasertook a medical history from plaintiff and reviewed plaintiff'smedical records. Upon examination, Dr. Glaser noted that plaintiffwas in severe pain and had trouble walking. Plaintiff'sneurological examination and reflexes were normal and plaintiff wasnontender to palpation. Dr. Glaser observed no signs of infection. Dr. Glaser diagnosed plaintiff with ridiculer pain andsympathetically mediated pain.

Based on his diagnosis, Dr. Glaser decided that plaintiff wasa candidate for an epidural injection. Dr. Glaser attempted theprocedure using two different approaches. Initially, Dr. Glasertried the midline approach. Dr. Glaser began by administering ananesthetic. Dr. Glaser made numerous unsuccessful attempts to geta needle into the epidural space. Throughout the procedure, Dr.Glaser administered additional anesthesia as needed while theepidural needle was still in place. In attempting the injection,Dr. Glaser would "reangulate" the needle by partially withdrawingit to change the angle. Dr. Glaser made two or three reangulationattempts. However, he repeatedly struck bone, so he decided toabort the midline approach and try the paramedian approach.

Before commencing the paramedian approach, Dr. Glaser took abreak. The parties offered differing recollections of the detailsof the break. Dr. Glaser did not recall leaving the room duringthe break, which he estimated lasted only five minutes. Plaintifftestified that the break lasted 10 minutes and that Dr. Glaser leftthe room during the break. Evelyn Scassifero, plaintiff's wife,testified that she entered the room during the break, and Dr.Glaser was not present during the time she was in the room. JaniceStevenson, the nurse who assisted Dr. Glaser with the epiduralinjection, testified that she has no recollection of either Dr.Glaser or herself leaving the room during the procedure. Stevensonalso could not recall if Dr. Glaser even took a break. In anyevent, using the paramedian approach, Dr. Glaser was able to reachthe epidural space. Upon completion of the procedure, plaintiffexperienced significant pain relief. Based on a scale of 1 to 10,plaintiff rated his pain at level 2.

Within a few days of the procedure, plaintiff developed afever and began to experience pain in his back. Plaintiff soughtemergency medical treatment at Hinsdale Hospital, where he waslater admitted. Plaintiff was diagnosed with an epidural abscess. Following his discharge from the hospital, plaintiff was givenintravenous medication, including antibiotics that he injectedthrough a shunt in his arm. Plaintiff subsequently experienced asecond episode of fever. As a result, he was again hospitalizedand prescribed a more intense dose of antibiotics.

Plaintiff then filed the instant suit against Dr. Glaser andHinsdale Hospital. Plaintiff later amended his complaint to addHinsdale Anesthesia Associates, Ltd., as a defendant. In essence,plaintiff alleged that he developed the epidural abscess as aresult of Dr. Glaser's failure to properly perform the epiduralinjection and the failure to maintain a sterile field. Plaintiffalleged that Hinsdale Hospital and Hinsdale Anesthesia Associates,Ltd., were vicariously liable for Dr. Glaser's alleged negligence. Thereafter, Hinsdale Hospital (codefendant) settled with plaintiff,and the case proceeded to trial against Dr. Glaser and HinsdaleAnesthesia Associates, Ltd. (collectively, defendants). As notedabove, the jury returned a verdict in defendants' favor. Thisappeal ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Evidence Regarding Contamination of the Equipment Tray Plaintiff first argues that the trial court improperly limitedevidence regarding contamination of the sterile field. Morespecifically, plaintiff maintains that the trial court improperlyexcluded his expert witness, Dr. Steven Minore, from testifyingregarding the alleged contamination of the epidural equipment trayduring Dr. Glaser's alleged absence from the room where theinjection was performed.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that Dr. Glaser failed tomaintain a sterile field during the epidural injection, causing himto develop an abscess. During his discovery deposition, Dr. Minoretestified that Dr. Glaser breached the standard of care by leavingthe room during the procedure. Dr. Minore opined that under suchcircumstances there was no guarantee that the equipment tray usedfor the procedure remained sterile. Prior to trial, defendantsfiled a motion in limine seeking to bar Dr. Minore from renderingany opinions regarding potential contamination of the epiduralequipment tray during the alleged absence of Dr. Glaser from theprocedure room. At a hearing on the motion, defendants argued thatany testimony that the equipment tray was contaminated during Dr.Glaser's absence would constitute speculation because there was nofactual evidence that the tray was contaminated. Plaintiffcountered that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence tosuggest that the equipment tray was contaminated. The trial courtgranted defendants' motion, stating in relevant part:

"I'm going to grant that based upon the fact that it'ssubjective. There's no actual proof, theory that that's thecontamination.

Taking into account of having read the doctor'sdeposition indicating that it was a difficult situation, therewas no actual proof that he had left the room or thatprecautions were not taken, that apparently the Court learnedthat even the wife was brought into the room, anything couldhappen.

So, basically, the doctor or the expert, Dr. Minore, saidthat he merely went to the deposition, read the otherdeposition. He had no knowledge as to Dr. Glaser having leftthe room.

So at this -- I am going to grant that motion."

Following Dr. Minore's testimony at trial, and outside thepresence of the jury, plaintiff made an offer of proof with respectto Dr. Minore. Dr. Minore believed within a reasonable degree ofmedical certainty that, if Dr. Glaser left the examining room atany time while performing the epidural block on plaintiff, therewould have been a breach of the standard of care for two reasons. First, the sterile area around the patient could not be guaranteed. Second, the sterility of the surgery kit could not be guaranteed. Dr. Minore opined that the kit could become contaminated during thebreak if the patient coughs, sneezes, or if someone reaches overthe kit. He testified that the standard of care thus dictates thatif a physician takes a break from a procedure, he should reprepare,redrape, and use a fresh kit and medications. Dr. Minore alsotestified that, if the physician touched anything with his glovesduring the break, he should reglove. Finally, Dr. Minore testifiedthat, assuming Dr. Glaser and his nurse left the examining room fora period of time, came back, and proceeded with the epiduralinjection using the same tray and the same epidural needle, thebreach of sterility would be the proximate cause of plaintiff'sepidural abscess.

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in barring Dr.Minore's opinions regarding contamination of the epidural equipment tray. According to plaintiff, such testimony was admissiblebecause it had a sufficient basis both in the record and in medicaland scientific theory. Defendants counter that it was within thediscretion of the trial court to disallow such evidence becausethere was no evidence to support such testimony.

Expert testimony is admissible if the proffered expert isqualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,or education and the testimony will assist the trier of fact inunderstanding the evidence. Turner v. Williams, 326 Ill. App. 3d541, 552 (2001). The decision to admit expert testimony lieswithin the sound discretion of the trial court. Donaldson v.Central Illinois Public Service Co., 313 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1076(2000), aff'd, 199 Ill. 2d 63 (2002). Therefore, we will notreverse an erroneous ruling unless the error was prejudicial or theresult of the trial has been materially affected. Hiscott v.Peters, 324 Ill. App. 3d 114, 122 (2001).

Here, plaintiff sought to introduce testimony from Dr. Minorethat, if Dr. Glaser and his nurse left the examining room for aperiod of time, came back, and proceeded with the epiduralinjection using the same equipment tray, the breach of sterilitywould be the proximate cause of plaintiff's epidural abscess. Aspreviously noted, the trial court would not allow such testimony onthe basis that there was "no actual proof that [Dr. Glaser] hadleft the room or that precautions were not taken."

Although an expert cannot base opinions on mere conjecture orguess (Schuler v. Mid-Central Cardiology, 313 Ill. App. 3d 326, 335(2000); Carter v. Johnson, 247 Ill. App. 3d 291, 296 (1993)), anexpert may testify as to possible causes of an injury based onfacts assumed to be true (Conners v. Poticha, 293 Ill. App. 3d 944,950 (1997)). The admission of an expert's testimony requires theproponent to lay an adequate foundation establishing that theinformation upon which the expert bases his opinion is reliable. Hiscott, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 122. The trial court's decision todisallow Dr. Minore's testimony regarding contamination of theepidural equipment tray was based on its finding that Dr. Minorehad no knowledge of Dr. Glaser having left the room. However, ourreview of Dr. Minore's deposition testimony reveals otherwise.

At Dr. Minore's deposition, he testified that, in preparationfor his deposition, he reviewed plaintiff's medical records, Dr.Glaser's interrogatory answers, Dr. Glaser's deposition, andplaintiff's deposition. Dr. Minore then opined that, in leavingthe room, Dr. Glaser breached the standard of care because therewas no guarantee that the equipment tray remained sterile duringhis absence. Dr. Minore explained that, if Dr. Glaser had remainedin the room and was observing the equipment tray, the issue ofcontamination would be moot. However, Dr. Minore recalled thatthere was conflicting testimony as to whether Dr. Glaser left theroom where the injection was being performed. Dr. Minoreremembered plaintiff stating that Dr. Glaser left the room. Dr.Minore testified that his opinion was based on what he read inplaintiff's deposition. Indeed, according to plaintiff's discoverydeposition, Dr. Glaser took a 10-minute break, during which Dr.Glaser left the room. Plaintiff further testified that he did notrecall a nurse being in the room when Dr. Glaser returned. Thus,despite the trial court's finding to the contrary, there was anevidentiary basis for Dr. Minore's opinion.

Defendants argue that, even if Dr. Glaser left the room duringthe procedure, there was no evidence that Dr. Glaser did anythingduring his absence that could have resulted in contamination. However, the assumptions that support an expert's opinion may besupported by circumstantial evidence. Nelson v. Speed Fastener,Inc., 101 Ill. App. 3d 539, 544 (1981). In the present case, therewas ample circumstantial evidence to support Dr. Minore's opinionthat the sterile field was contaminated as a result of Dr. Glaser'sabsence. For instance, Dr. Minore testified at trial and in hisdeposition that plaintiff's medical records showed no indicationthat plaintiff was febrile prior to or at the time of theprocedure. Dr. Minore further testified that plaintiff's medicalrecords indicated that at the time the epidural injection wasperformed there was no indication of drainage at the surgicalincision from the July 8, 1996, surgery. In addition, plaintiffhad no complaints of localized back pain prior to the time of thesurgery that were suggestive of an infection. Dr. Minore stated inhis deposition that epidural abscesses usually develop within threedays of an invasive procedure. Here, just days after the epiduralinjection plaintiff developed a fever and began to experience backpain. Plaintiff testified that the pain differed from the pain heexperienced prior to the injection.

In light of this evidence, we are convinced that the trialcourt abused its discretion in barring Dr. Minore's testimonyregarding potential contamination. Dr. Minore's opinion was basedon facts assumed to be true which were supported by ample evidencein the record. Once this evidence was presented, it wasdefendants' burden to point out weaknesses in the expert'stestimony, and it was for the jury to decide what weight, if any,to give to the expert's opinion. Hawn v. Fritcher, 301 Ill. App.3d 248, 253 (1998). We are also convinced that the exclusion ofDr. Minore's opinion resulted in prejudice because it related toplaintiff's theory that the abscess was caused by a breach in thesterile field. Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff is entitledto a new trial.

Defendants cite two cases that they claim support theirargument that Dr. Minore's opinion regarding contamination is basedon sheer speculation. First, defendants cite Schuler, 313 Ill.App. 3d 326. In Schuler, the plaintiff alleged that the defendanthad instructed another physician to enter a diagnosis of"noncardiac chest pain" on the decedent's medical chart. At trial,the circuit court sustained the defendant's objection toplaintiff's expert's opinion that the defendant breached thestandard of care "if" he had given such an instruction. Theappellate court affirmed the trial court's decision on the basisthat there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, to supportthe proposition that such an instruction had been given. Schuler,313 Ill. App. 3d at 336. In Reed v. Jackson Park HospitalFoundation, 325 Ill. App. 3d 835 (2001), the other case discussedby defendants, the trial court granted the defendant's motion inlimine to bar the plaintiff's expert from testifying regarding theproximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. The appellate courtaffirmed, finding that the plaintiff's expert's opinions were basedon nothing more than an educated guess. In contrast to Schuler andReed, Dr. Minore's opinion regarding contamination of the epiduralequipment tray was not based on mere guess or conjecture. Rather,as we discuss above, there was a sufficient evidentiary basis tosupport Dr. Minore's opinion. As such, defendants' reliance onReed and Schuler is unpersuasive.

Although we are remanding this cause for a new trial, weaddress the remaining issues raised by plaintiff because they arelikely to arise on remand. However, we include only one of theseissues in the publishable portion of this opinion.B. Admission of Testimony of Expert Witnesses

Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred when it refused tobar the testimony of two of defendants' opinion witnesses, Dr.George Cybulski and Dr. Chris Costas.

In addressing plaintiff's arguments, we are guided by theIllinois Supreme Court rules on discovery. The discovery rules aremandatory rules of procedure that courts and counsel must follow. Warrender v. Millsop, 304 Ill. App. 3d 260, 265 (1999). Relevanthere are those rules pertaining to the timely disclosure of expertwitnesses and their opinions. The purposes of such rules are toavoid surprise and discourage tactical gamesmanship. Boland v.Kawasaki Motors Manufacturing Corp., 309 Ill. App. 3d 645, 651(2000); see also 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(g), Committee Comments, at xxx-xxxi. We note that the admission of such evidence is within thetrial court's discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuseof that discretion. Copeland v. Stebco Products Corp., 316 Ill.App. 3d 932, 937 (2000).

Supreme Court Rule 213(g) explicitly states that upon writteninterrogatory a party must disclose the subject matter,conclusions, opinions, bases, qualifications, and all reports of awitness who will offer opinion testimony. 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(g);Schuler, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 331. Rule 213(i) imposes on a partya duty to seasonably supplement discovery responses whenever new oradditional information becomes known to the party. 177 Ill. 2d R.213(i); Athans v. Williams, 327 Ill. App. 3d 700, 702 (2002). Alsopertinent to our discussion is Rule 218(c), which provides in part:

"All dates set for the disclosure of opinion witnesses and thecompletion of discovery shall be chosen to ensure thatdiscovery will be completed not later than 60 days before thedate on which the trial court reasonably anticipates the trialwill commence." 166 Ill. 2d R. 218(c).

Rules 213(g), 213(i), and 218(c) work together to ensure that, uponwritten interrogatory and no later than 60 days prior to theanticipated date of trial, the parties disclose the subject matter,conclusions, opinions, bases, qualifications, and all reports of awitness who will offer opinion testimony. 177 Ill. 2d Rs. 213(g),(i); 166 Ill. 2d R. 218(c); Warrender, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 266. With these considerations in mind, we turn to each of plaintiff'sarguments.

1. Testimony of Dr. George Cybulski

Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred when it refused tobar the testimony of Dr. George Cybulski, one of defendants' expertopinion witnesses. Plaintiff challenges the admission of Dr.Cybulski's testimony on two grounds. First, he claims thatdefendants failed to disclose Dr. Cybulski as an opinion witness ina timely manner. Second, plaintiff argues that defendantsneglected to provide the bases of Dr. Cybulski's testimony.

a. Timeliness

Initially, we note that plaintiff waived any argument that thedisclosure of Dr. Cybulski's testimony was untimely. A trialcourt's ruling on a pretrial motion is subject to reconsiderationthroughout the trial. Ford v. Herman, 316 Ill. App. 3d 726, 736(2000). Accordingly, a party who, prior to trial, unsuccessfullymoves to bar the introduction of certain evidence must then objectto the evidence when it is offered at trial. Ford, 316 Ill. App.3d at 736. In this case, plaintiff filed a pretrial motion seekingto bar Dr. Cybulski's testimony on the basis that defendants'disclosure of Dr. Cybulski as an opinion witness was untimely andprejudicial. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion. Plaintiffdid not renew his objection on these grounds when Dr. Cybulski wascalled to testify at trial. Therefore, plaintiff waivedconsideration of this issue on appeal.

Nevertheless, waiver is an admonition on the parties and nota limitation of this court's jurisdiction. People v. McKay, 282Ill. App. 3d 108, 111 (1996). The issue raised by plaintiff,whether a litigant may supplement its answers to a Rule 213interrogatory to name a witness previously identified by a co-litigant who is no longer a party to the litigation, appears to bean issue of first impression. Accordingly, we elect to address ithere.

Plaintiff complains that Dr. Cybulski's testimony should havebeen barred because defendants did not disclose his testimony untilOctober 6, 2000, just 31 days before the date the matter wasoriginally set for trial on November 6, 2000.

We conclude, however, that defendants timely disclosed Dr.Cybulski as an opinion witness by (1) divulging their intention torely on the Rule 213(g) disclosures of codefendant HinsdaleHospital within the time frame set by the trial court and (2) latersupplementing their disclosures pursuant to Rule 213(i).

The record discloses that on April 27, 2000, the trial courtentered an order setting a trial date of November 6, 2000. At thattime, the court also ordered Dr. Glaser, Hinsdale Hospital, andHinsdale Anesthesia Associates, Ltd., to answer Rule 213(g)interrogatories by September 6, 2000. On July 27, 2000, the trialcourt, apparently with the consent of plaintiff's attorney, enteredan order extending the date for defendants and codefendant HinsdaleHospital to answer the Rule 213(g) interrogatories until September20, 2000.

The record suggests that defendants filed their answer toplaintiff's Rule 213 interrogatories separately from HinsdaleHospital. Plaintiff concedes that defendants and Hinsdale Hospitaltimely filed their answers on September 20, 2000. In theiranswers, Dr. Glaser and Hinsdale Anesthesia Associates, Ltd.,identified three expert witnesses: Dr. Glaser, Dr. Jeffrey Vender,and Dr. Chris Costas. In addition, defendants stated that they"adopt[] and rel[y] upon the Rule 213(f) and (g) witnesses andtheir respective opinions as disclosed by the codefendant in thismatter." Although we have been unable to locate HinsdaleHospital's answers to plaintiff's Rule 213(g) interrogatories inthe record, the record does contain Hinsdale Hospital'ssupplemental answers to plaintiff's Rules 213(f) and (g)interrogatories. The supplemental answers contain the followingparagraph:

"At the time of trial of this matter, Thorek Hospital[sic] may call the following witnesses to testify on itsbehalf. In addition to the retained opinion witnesses, GeorgeCybulski, M.D., Daniel Mather, M.D., and Ruth Ramsey, M.D.,whom [sic] have been identified through [Rule] 213(g)Supplemental answers to Opinion Interrogatories, thisDefendant identifies the following [Rules] 213(f) and (g)witnesses who may be called to testify at trial." (Emphasisadded.)

At some point, plaintiff and Hinsdale Hospital began negotiationsthat culminated in a settlement. On October 6, 2000, defendantsinformed plaintiff that they were supplementing their Rule 213(g)disclosure to include Dr. Cybulski.

On October 17, 2000, plaintiff filed a motion seeking to barDr. Cybulski's testimony on the basis that defendants' disclosureof Dr. Cybulski as an opinion witness was untimely and prejudicial. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion. However, the trialcourt continued the trial date until January 17, 2001, and allowedplaintiff to retain a rebuttal witness to address the causationissues raised by Dr. Cybulski. Dr. Cybulski testified at trial ondefendants' behalf.

Based on this evidence, we find that defendants' disclosure ofDr. Cybulski was timely. At the time defendants submitted theiranswers to plaintiff's Rule 213(g) interrogatories, the trial courtreasonably anticipated commencing trial on November 6, 2000. See177 Ill. 2d R. 213(i). For that reason, the court set September 6,2000 (60 days before the trial date), as the final date fordisclosing opinion witnesses. The court later extended the date ofdisclosure to September 20, 2000. Plaintiff concedes that thisextension was granted with his consent and that defendants filedtheir answers on September 20, 2000. Moreover, since defendantsalso clearly stated in their answers to plaintiff's Rule 213(g)interrogatories their intention to rely on Hinsdale Hospital's Rule213(g) witnesses, Dr. Cybulski was timely disclosed. We furthernote that defendants later supplemented their answers toplaintiff's Rule 213(g) interrogatories to specifically identifyDr. Cybulski. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(i). Under such circumstances,the purpose of Rule 213 disclosures was satisfied, and plaintiffcannot claim he was surprised.

Plaintiff, however, insists that the disclosure of Dr.Cybulski's opinions cannot be considered a "supplementation"because his opinions were never initially disclosed prior toOctober 2000. It is true that defendants did not disclose Dr.Cybulski's opinions. However, the reason for their failure to doso is evident. Defendants intended to rely on Hinsdale Hospital'sanswers to plaintiff's Rule 213(g) interrogatories. It appearsfrom the record that, once it became clear that Hinsdale Hospitaland plaintiff began negotiating a settlement, defendants promptlyfiled a Rule 213(i) supplement to their answers to specificallyname Dr. Cybulski and to disclose his opinions. Accordingly, wefind that defendants' answer identifying Dr. Cybulski as an opinionwitness constituted a supplementation for purposes of Rule 213(i). See Henderson v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 114 Ill. App. 3d754, 757 (1983) (holding that it was error for the trial court tobar the testimony of one of the defendant's expert witnesses wherethe defendant did not decide to call the witness until after theplaintiff's request to supplement an interrogatory and where thedefendant promptly and completely replied to the supplementalinterrogatory).

Moreover, we note that the trial court alleviated anypotential prejudice to plaintiff by granting him the opportunity tocall a rebuttal witness in response to Dr. Cybulski's testimony andby extending the trial date. Accordingly, we conclude that thetrial court's decision not to bar Dr. Cybulski's testimony on theground that he was not timely disclosed did not constitute an abuseof discretion.

b. Bases

Plaintiff further asserts that the trial court improperlyallowed Dr. Cybulski's testimony because defendants failed toprovide the bases for the doctor's opinions.

In their answers to plaintiff's Rule 213(g) interrogatories,defendants stated that Dr. Cybulski's would testify that "it ismore probably true than not true" that plaintiff's infection pre-existed Dr. Glaser's treatment and that plaintiff's infection wasnot causally related to the epidural injection. In addition,defendants stated:

"Dr. Cybulski's opinions are based on his knowledge,education, training and experience in the field ofneurosurgery. Dr. Cybulski has also reviewed all ofplaintiff's pertinent medical records, including records fromHinsdale Hospital, Dr. Glaser and Dr. Zindrick."

Dr. Cybulski was the subject of a discovery deposition; however,his deposition is not part of the record. At trial, Dr. Cybulskiopined that plaintiff's epidural abscess was present before Dr.Glaser performed the epidural injection on July 18, 1996. Dr.Cybulski relied on plaintiff's medical records, specifically notingthat (1) on or about April 6, 1996, plaintiff began experiencingflank pain, which involved more than one nerve root; (2) plaintiffsuffered from pain and numbness in his groin and the lateralportion of his thigh, which would involve several lumbar nerveroots; (3) tests done at the time demonstrated that plaintiff didnot have a kidney stone or tumor; (4) plaintiff then underwentsurgery for a possible hernia; (5) although a hernia was not found,a benign growth was removed; (6) despite the surgery, the painpersisted, and plaintiff underwent surgery to remove a herniateddisc; and (6) following the discectomy, the pain did not resolveand, in fact, worsened.

We find that plaintiff has failed to properly preserve thisissue for review. The failure to object to allegedly improperevidence operates as a waiver to consider the issue on appeal. People v. Mindham, 253 Ill. App. 3d 792, 798 (1993). In this case,defendant never objected that the bases for Dr. Cybulski's opinionwere inadequately disclosed. Indeed, although the record indicatesthat plaintiff interposed an objection when Dr. Cybulski wastestifying about the bases for his opinion, the objection was not on the ground of inadequate disclosure. Thus, this issue has beenwaived. Even absent waiver, we would not find Dr. Cybulski'stestimony improper. The Rule 213(g) interrogatories indicate thatDr. Cybulski reviewed plaintiff's medical records, and Dr. Cybulskibased his opinion at trial on plaintiff's medical records.2. Testimony of Dr. Chris Costas

Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by allowingundisclosed testimony from Dr. Chris Costas, an expert witness whotestified on defendants' behalf.

In their answers to plaintiff's Rule 213(g) interrogatories,defendants asserted that Dr. Costas would:

"opine regarding the issue of prophylactic antibiotics inrelation to the treatment rendered by Dr. Glaser to[plaintiff] on July 18, 1996. Specifically, Dr. Costas willopine that from an infectious disease perspective, thestandard of care in 1996 did not require the use ofprophylactic oral and/or IV antibiotics for an epiduralinjection."

Defendants did not supplement their Rule 213(g) responses toinclude additional opinions to be rendered by Dr. Costas. AlthoughDr. Costas was deposed, his deposition was not made part of therecord.

At trial, Dr. Costas testified that the standard of care in1996 did not require Dr. Glaser to prescribe prophylacticantibiotics to plaintiff in connection with the epidural injection. On redirect, Dr. Costas testified that Dr. Zindrick placedplaintiff on a short course of prophylactic antibiotics at the timehe performed plaintiff's discectomy. Defense counsel then askedDr. Costas whether a course of antibiotics such as thatadministered by Dr. Zindrick could suppress a preexisting butunknown infection in another part of plaintiff's body. Plaintiffobjected on the basis that defendant never disclosed that Dr.Costas would be offering such opinion testimony. The trial courtoverruled plaintiff's objection on the basis that plaintiff openedthe door to such testimony. Dr. Costas then testified thatadministering antibiotics could have suppressed a preexisting butunknown infection in another part of plaintiff's body.

As we have previously noted, the purpose of Rule 213 is toavoid surprise and permit litigants to ascertain and rely upon theopinions of experts retained by the opposing party. Becht v.Palac, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1036 (2000). As such, Rule 213(g)(177 Ill. 2d R. 213(g)) requires a party to disclose the subjectmatter, conclusions, opinions, bases, qualifications, and allreports of a witness who will offer opinion testimony. Schuler,313 Ill. App. 3d at 331. In addition, Rule 213(i) provides inpertinent part:

"If a deposition of an opinion witness is taken, thewitness' testimony at trial will be limited to the opinionexpressed therein, in addition to those opinions identified inanswers to Rule 213(g) interrogatories." 177 Ill. 2d R.213(i).

A witness may elaborate on a disclosed opinion as long as thetestimony states logical corollaries to the opinion, rather thannew reasons for it. Barton v. Chicago & North WesternTransportation Co., 325 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1039 (2001). In otherwords, the testimony at trial must be encompassed by the originalopinion. Prairie v. Snow Valley Health Resources, Inc., 324 Ill.App. 3d 568, 576 (2001). The trial court's ruling admitting suchevidence will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse ofdiscretion. Barton, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1039. In addition, we mayaffirm for any reason supported by the record regardless of thebasis relied upon by the trial court. Goldberg v. Michael, 328Ill. App. 3d 593, 597 (2002).

It is the burden of the appellant to present a sufficientlycomplete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim oferror, and in the absence of such a record on appeal, it will bepresumed that the order entered by the trial court was inconformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis. Foutch v.O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). Any doubts that may arisefrom the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against theappellant. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392. In this case, the recordindicates that the parties deposed Dr. Costas. However, plaintiffhas not included a copy of Dr. Costas's deposition in the record. Rule 213(i) provides that an opinion witness may testify at trialto those opinions disclosed during the witness's interrogatory orhis deposition. 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(i). Thus, without Dr. Costas'sdeposition testimony, we cannot determine whether the complained-ofopinion was previously disclosed. Accordingly, there is no basisto hold that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Dr.Costas's testimony regarding the effect of antibiotics on apreexisting infection.

[Nonpublishable material under Supreme Court Rule 23 removedhere.]

III. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the judgment of thecircuit court of Du Page County and remand the cause for a newtrial.

Reversed and remanded.

O'MALLEY and BYRNE, JJ., concur.