Plaintiff, John M. Sorenson, appeals from an order of thecircuit court of Lake County dismissing his lawsuit againstdefendants, Theodore Poehlmann and the Law of Offices of TheodorePoehlmann, pursuant to section 2--619(a)(5) of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(5) (West 2000)) on the basis thatthe lawsuit was barred by the statute of repose for legalmalpractice actions (735 ILCS 5/13--214.3 (West 1994)). Plaintiffcontends that the trial court erred in ruling that the reposeperiod started to run at the time of defendant's alleged acts andomissions, because the injury they caused only occurred yearslater. We affirm.

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on February 18, 2000,and an amended complaint on May 31, 2000. Plaintiff alleged that in 1985 he was engaged to Rosemary Fulgenzi and he retaineddefendants to prepare an antenuptial agreement. No writtenretainer agreement was prepared, but plaintiff alleged that it wasan express condition of his oral agreement with defendants that theantenuptial agreement would be determined to be enforceable. Plaintiff alleged that due to various acts and omissions bydefendants, however, the agreement was not enforceable.

Plaintiff and Fulgenzi wed in 1985. An action to dissolve themarriage was initiated in 1994, and Fulgenzi challenged theantenuptial agreement as "unconscionable, vague, ambiguous,unenforceable and invalid." On February 20, 1998, plaintiffentered into a marital settlement agreement and a judgment wasentered dissolving his marriage to Fulgenzi. The maritalsettlement agreement required plaintiff to pay Fulgenzi more than$300,000--substantially more than he would have been obligated topay if the antenuptial agreement had been valid.

Defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that the lawsuit,filed in 2000, was not commenced within six years after theunderlying acts and omissions, which occurred in 1985, and wastherefore barred by the statute of repose in section 13--214.3(c)of the Limitations Act (735 ILCS 5/13--214.3(c) (West 1994)). Thetrial court granted the motion and this appeal followed.

The elements of a cause of action for attorney malpractice arean attorney-client relationship, a duty arising from thatrelationship, a breach of that duty, and actual damages or injuryproximately caused by that breach. Romano v. Morrisroe, 326 Ill.App. 3d 26, 28 (2001) Actual damages are an essential element ofthe cause of action: with no damages, no cause of action hasaccrued. Profit Management Development, Inc. v. Jacobson, Brandvik& Anderson, Ltd., 309 Ill. App. 3d 289, 308 (1999). Here,plaintiff argues that although defendants' acts and omissionsoccurred in 1985, he suffered no actual injury (and hence no causeof action accrued) until February 20, 1998, when he allegedly wasforced to settle his dispute with Fulgenzi over the validity of theantenuptial agreement.

Section 13--214.3 of the Limitations Act provides, inpertinent part, as follows:

"(b) An action for damages based on tort, contract, orotherwise (i) against an attorney arising out of an act oromission in the performance of professional services *** mustbe commenced within 2 years from the time the person bringingthe action knew or reasonably should have known of the injuryfor which damages are sought.

(c) [A]n action described in subsection (b) may not becommenced in any event more than 6 years after the date onwhich the act or omission occurred.

(f) This Section applies to all causes of action accruingon or after its effective date [January 1, 1991]." 735 ILCS5/13--214.3(b), (c), (f) (West 1994).

Section 13--214.3 sets forth two independent timingrequirements for legal malpractice actions: the two-year statute oflimitations in subsection (b) and the six-year statute of repose insubsection (c). The statute of limitations expressly incorporatesthe so-called "discovery rule," which tolls the limitations periodto the time when a person knows or reasonably should know of hisinjury. See Goodman v. Harbor Market, Ltd., 278 Ill. App. 3d 684,688 (1995). The discovery rule is a response to the "inherentinequities which arise if a plaintiff is unaware of otherwiseactionable negligence until after the applicable statute oflimitations has passed." Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 688. Thestatute of repose, however, is designed to place an outer limit onthe time for commencing an action. It has been stated that"[s]tatutes of repose generally operate to curtail the 'long tail'of liability that results from the discovery rule" (Meyers v.Underwood, 316 Ill. App. 3d 970, 985-86 (2000)) because absent thestatute of repose the statute of limitations would be "essentiallyopen-ended, or 'a limitations period without a limit.' " (Meyers,316 Ill. App. 3d at 986, quoting Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 691).

Plaintiff argues that the statute of repose's underlyingrationale--restricting the operation of the discovery rule to adefinite period--cannot apply before a cause of action has evenaccrued. In our view, however, it makes no difference whetherthere is "long tail" of liability because of delay in discoveringan injury or, as here, because the underlying acts and omissionsonly produce harm years after the fact. Statutes of repose "'represent a pervasive legislative judgment that justice requiresan adversary to be put on notice to defend for a specific period oftime, after which "the right to be free of stale claims in timecomes to prevail over the right to prosecute them [Order of R.R.Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349, 88 L.Ed. 788, 792, 64 S. Ct. 582, 586 (1944)]." ' " Ocasek v. City ofChicago, 275 Ill. App. 3d 628, 633 (1995), quoting Cargill FerrousInternational v. M/V Elikon, 857 F. Supp. 45, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1994). Contrary to plaintiff's argument, a statute of repose is notrelated to the accrual of any cause of action. Goodman, 278 Ill.App. 3d at 691. Hence " '[t]he injury need not have occurred, muchless have been discovered.' " (Emphasis added.) Goodman, 278 Ill.App. 3d at 691, quoting Bradway v. American National Red Cross, 992 F.2d 298, 301 (11th Cir. 1993). The effect of the expirationof the repose period is that "[t]he injured party no longer has arecognized right of action, and the harm that has been done isdamnum absque injura--a wrong for which the law affords noredress." Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 691.

By its plain language, section 13--214.3(c) provides that anaction "may not be commenced *** more than 6 years after the dateon which the act or omission occurred." 735 ILCS 5/13--214.3 (West1994). In arguing that the repose period does not begin until acause of action has accrued, plaintiff essentially asks us tosubstitute the word "injury" for the words "act or omission." TheGeneral Assembly used the word "injury" in subsection (b), thestatute of limitations, and could have used that word in thestatute of repose had it intended the result plaintiff advocates. This court has emphasized that for purposes of section 13--214.3 aninjury is conceptually distinct from the underlying negligent actor omission that causes it. Romano, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 28; ProfitManagement, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 308.

In Meyers, the statute of repose was applied to bar a legalmalpractice lawsuit before the cause of action accrued. In thatcase, the plaintiffs' malpractice claim arose out of legal servicesprovided in September 1986 in connection with the sale of acorporation in which the plaintiffs owned stock. In 1987, theplaintiffs were sued by other shareholders who obtained a judgmentof over $1.6 million in 1994. The plaintiffs commenced their legalmalpractice action in 1995, alleging that the defendant law firm'snegligence exposed them to the liability adjudicated in theshareholder suit. The Meyers court assumed for purposes of itsanalysis that the malpractice action accrued in 1994 whenplaintiffs suffered a judgment in the shareholder suit. The courtheld that the malpractice action was barred by the statute ofrepose as of September 1992, rejecting the plaintiffs' argumentthat it was "fundamentally unjust" to bar their claims before theyhad accrued. Meyers, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 985-86.

The Meyers court did observe that the plaintiffs could haveprevented the loss of the legal malpractice action by filing athird-party claim against the defendants under section 2--406(b) ofthe Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--406(b) (West 1992)) inthe 1987 shareholder lawsuit. See also Lucey v. Law Offices ofPretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, 301 Ill. App. 3d 349, 362-64 (1998). However, this observation in Meyers was not part of the ratiodecidendi. Accordingly, we need not consider whether plaintiff hada similar opportunity to preserve his malpractice claim in thiscase.

Plaintiff also argues that the parties orally agreed that theattorney-client relationship would be ongoing until theenforceability of the antenuptial agreement was determined(judicially or otherwise) in an actual dispute. Plaintiff furtherargues that the parties agreed that a determination that theantenuptial agreement was invalid would be considered an act oromission giving rise to the cause of action for limitations andrepose purposes. As to the first point--that the partiescontemplated an ongoing attorney-client relationship--we reiteratethat the statute of repose runs from the time of the acts oromissions alleged to have caused injury; the fact that theattorney-client relationship endures thereafter does not affect therepose period. See Witt v. Jones & Jones Law Offices, P.C., 269Ill. App. 3d 540, 544 (1995) (rejecting a "continuousrepresentation" rule). As to the second point--that the partiesagreed that a determination that the antenuptial agreement wasinvalid would be considered an "act or omission"--suffice it to saythat this characterization of the retainer agreement simply has nomeaningful foundation in the allegations of plaintiff's amendedcomplaint.

Plaintiff seeks recovery based on acts and omissions thatoccurred in 1985 and, accordingly, the period of repose expired in1991. We note, however, that courts have recognized a transitionalrule applicable to causes of action, such as this one, that accrueafter January 1, 1991, the effective date of the statute, but thatarise from acts or omissions that occurred before that date. Insuch cases, the plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable period oftime to file suit. See Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 695. However,the reasonable period can never be more than the repose perioditself, computed from the effective date of the statute. Meyers,316 Ill. App. 3d at 983. Because plaintiff did not file hislawsuit on or before January 1, 1997, he cannot take advantage ofthis transitional rule.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Lake County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

BYRNE and KAPALA, JJ., concur.