JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Oakbrook Hilton Suites and Garden Inn, appeals thedenial of its motion to involuntarily dismiss with prejudice the complaint brought by plaintiff, Cathy Terrill. Defendant contendsthat the trial court erred in concluding that section 3(f) of theHotel Operators' Occupation Tax Act (Act) (35 ILCS 145/3(f) (West2000)) barred plaintiff from directly suing defendant.

The pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and exhibits establishthe following undisputed facts. Plaintiff rented a room fromdefendant for the night of November 25, 1999. The sign-in formstates that rates are "subject to applicable sales, occupancy orother taxes." On November 26, 1999, plaintiff received and paidthe bill from defendant for renting the room.

The bill is the only document that defendant provided toplaintiff that purports to list all of the charges, including thetelephone charge, that defendant asked plaintiff to agree to pay. The bill states that the contractually agreed-upon "Nightly RoomRate," excluding taxes and other variable incidental charges, suchas telephone or room service charges, is $99. The bill designatesa single tax line item entitled "Room Occupancy Taxes," which showsa total of $8.91. Plaintiff paid the full amount of the billwithout an objection, including the $8.91 listed as taxes.

Defendant kept the $99 room rate, and from the $8.91 billed as"taxes," forwarded 6% of the room rate in tax liability to thestate, 1% in tax liability to the City of Oakbrook Terrace(Oakbrook Terrace), and 2% to Oakbrook Terrace pursuant to anagreement between defendant and Oakbrook Terrace, in whichdefendant had agreed to pay 2% of its gross revenue as a servicefee to Oakbrook Terrace in exchange for daily city policesurveillance of the hotel.

The sign-in document that was presented to plaintiff on thenight of November 25, 1999, does not state that the $99 rate (plusapplicable taxes) is subject to a municipal security fee or anymunicipal service charges. The sign-in document contains nolanguage wherein the customer expressly agrees to pay a securityfee or any type of municipal service charge. Nor does it state ordisclose that a security fee will later be included as part of the"Room Occupancy Tax" line item in the bill. Based on thestandardized documents and information that defendant provided toher, at all relevant times plaintiff understood that she wasagreeing to pay a $99 daily room rental charge, applicable taxes,and usage charges she incurred for itemized services such astelephone calls and room service. Room charges, taxes, and useagecharges would be tabulated and agreed to by plaintiff when she paida final truthful and accurate bill. Because it was concealed fromher, plaintiff did not know that defendant was including a securityfee, which was not a tax, in the tax line item in her bill, andtherefore she could not protest or voluntarily pay such charge.

Plaintiff brought a class action suit against defendant forbreach of contract and consumer fraud. Defendant filed, interalia, a motion to dismiss the complaint under section 2--619(a)(9)of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West2000)), arguing that section 3(f) of the Act and supreme courtprecedent barred plaintiff from directly suing defendant for the 2%charge.

The circuit court disagreed and denied defendant's motion. The court then certified the following question pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)):

"Does 35 ILCS 145/3(f) bar a direct action by a consumeragainst a retailer when the retailer has collected a securityfee under the guise of a hotel tax and remitted the securityfee to Oakbrook Terrace for payment of security services, anon-tax obligation, and where the consumer did not request arefund prior to the time the payment was remitted to the hoteland to Oakbrook Terrace?"

Defendant timely filed an application for leave to appeal andwe granted the application. Because this appeal concerns aquestion of law certified by the circuit court pursuant to Rule308, because it presents a question of statutory interpretation,and because it arose in the context of an order denying a section2--619 motion to dismiss, our review is de novo. See Weatherman v.Gary-Wheaton Bank of Fox Valley, N.A., 186 Ill. 2d 472, 480 (1999). Before we address the certified question, we must address amotion to supplement the record brought by plaintiff, which weordered to be taken with the case. Plaintiff requests that wesupplement the record with (1) a letter from plaintiff's counsel tothe trial judge and (2) plaintiff's response to defendant's Rule308 motion. Upon review of the motion, we deny the motion tosupplement the record with the letter from plaintiff's counsel butallow the motion to supplement the record with plaintiff's responseto defendant's Rule 308 motion. Accordingly, the motion is grantedin part and denied in part.

Turning now to the certified question on appeal, we begin ouranalysis by looking at the language of the applicable statute. Section 3(f) provides:

"If any hotel operator collects an amount (howeverdesignated) which purports to reimburse such operator forhotel operators' occupation tax liability measured by receiptswhich are not subject to hotel operators' occupation tax, orif any hotel operator, in collecting an amount (howeverdesignated) which purports to reimburse such operator forhotel operators' occupation tax liability measured by receiptswhich are subject to tax under this Act, collects more from the customer than the operators' hotel operators' occupationtax liability in the transaction is [sic], the customer shallhave a legal right to claim a refund of such amount from suchoperator. However, if such amount is not refunded to thecustomer for any reason, the hotel operator is liable to paysuch amount to the Department." 35 ILCS 145/3(f) (West 2000).

The legislature's intent in enacting a statute is bestdetermined by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutorylanguage. In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 193(1997). When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must give it effect without resorting to other aids ofconstruction. Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 193. Courts should read statutes so as to yield logical and meaningfulresults and to avoid constructions that render specific languagesuperfluous or meaningless. Rochelle Disposal Service, Inc. v.Pollution Control Board, 266 Ill. App. 3d 192, 198 (1994).

Defendant essentially raises the same arguments on appeal asit did before the circuit court. Defendant contends that thestatute mandates that all persons who have been overtaxed "howeverdesignated" must claim a refund from the hotel in order to obtainrestitution. Defendant asserts that, if the customer fails toobtain a refund "for any reason," the hotel is obligated to pay theentire tax collected to the Department of Revenue. Defendantasserts that the supreme court in Adams v. Jewel Cos., 63 Ill. 2d336 (1976), specifically held that, once the retailer remits theovertax to the Department, the overtaxed customer cannot sue theretailer directly. Adams, 63 Ill. 2d at 346. Because defendantremitted the overcharge to Oakbrook Terrace, which defendantasserts is synonymous with the Department, defendant contends thatthe statute applies to bar plaintiff's claim against defendant.

Plaintiff counters that section 3(f) only frees a hotel fromliability from tax overcharges when it passes the entire overcharge to the Department of Revenue as a tax payment and is not thereby unjustly enriched. Plaintiff asserts that section 3(f) deals withpayments to the Department for which the only monies due are taxpayments. Plaintiff argues that, in this case, Oakbrook Terrace,unlike the Department, collects monies from defendant for nontax aswell as tax liabilities. As such, defendant did in fact benefitfrom the overcharge since it used it to pay a nontax liabilityafter charging its customers more than the contractually agreed-upon room charge. Under these circumstances, where the taxovercharge was not passed on to the taxing authority in the form ofa tax payment, plaintiff contends that section 3(f), by its expresslanguage, is inapplicable.

We agree with plaintiff that section 3(f) covers circumstancesinvolving tax overcharges, as a portion of the statute clearlyallows reimbursement where the hotel, in collecting an amount"which purports to reimburse" the hotel for its "operators'occupation tax liability measured by receipts which are subject totax under this Act, collects more from the customer" than theamount of the tax liability transaction. 35 ILCS 145/3(f) (West2000). However, it is equally clear that another portion ofsection 3(f) also encompasses situations involving nontaxablecharges as well.

Here, defendant charged and collected from plaintiff asecurity fee under the guise of a hotel tax. To paraphrase thestatute, once defendant included the nontaxable security fee chargewithin the same line as the charge designated "Room OccupancyTaxes," defendant collected an amount that purported to reimbursedefendant for its operators' occupation tax liability measured byreceipts that were not subject to defendant's occupation tax. See35 ILCS 145/3(f) (West 2000).

While we find that the statute encompasses nontaxable chargesas well as tax overcharges, defendant's interpretation of themeaning of "Department" and its subsequent conclusion that thestatute therefore bars plaintiff's suit against it is untenable atbest. Defendant asserts that Oakbrook Terrace is a municipalgovernment with the power to collect local taxes. Defendantcontends that it complied with the statute because it paid plaintiff's "overtax funds" to Oakbrook Terrace and therefore thestatute and Adams apply to bar plaintiff's claims. Defendant,however, ignores that the statute expressly states that "if suchamount is not refunded to the customer for any reason, the hotel isliable to pay the overcharge to the Department." The Act defines"Department" as the "Department of Revenue" (35 ILCS 145/2(7) (West2000)). Oakbrook Terrace is not the Department of Revenue.

We note that, when a hotel operator incorrectly designates aservice fee under the guise of a hotel operators' tax, if suchamount is not refunded to the customer, the hotel operator isresponsible for remitting this to the Department of Revenue. See35 ILCS 145/3(f) (West 2000). By rendering the hotel operatorliable for the disputed amount if the occupant does not collect therefund, the legislature removes the hotel's incentive toovercharge, thereby ensuring the underlying legislative policyagainst unjust enrichment.

In this case, plaintiff alleges that defendant used her moneyto pay a nontax liability and charged her more than shecontractually agreed upon. Under the plain meaning of the statute, because defendant never remitted the nontaxable charge to theDepartment, plaintiff has a legal right to claim a refund. Assuch, defendant cannot rely on section 3(f) of the Act to bar plaintiff from suing defendant.

We find that the case of Adams, relied on by defendant, has nobearing on the present case. Adams involved a question pertainingto a consumer's right to proceed against a retailer for anovercharge in taxes that was remitted by the retailer to theDepartment of Revenue. The supreme court interpreted the languageused in section 3 of the Use Tax Act (35 ILCS 105/3 (West 2000)(formerly Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, par. 439.3)) to determinethat the plaintiffs could not directly sue the retailer-defendantsfor the remitted excessive taxes. Unlike in the present case,where the 2% nontax charge for security services was never remittedto the Department of Revenue, in Adams, the entire tax overchargewas passed on to the Department of Revenue. The distinctionbetween a nontaxable charge and a tax overcharge is not relevantunder the statute. Instead, the case turns on whether the retailertenders the disputed amount to the Department, as in Adams, or thevendor, as in the present case. Moreover, unlike the situationhere, in passing the entire tax overcharge to the Department, theretailer in Adams was no longer directly liable for the overchargebecause it did not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of theconsumer.

It is clear, given the facts of this case, that defendantmisapprehends the concept of accountability. Because defendantremitted the 2% service fee to Oakbrook Terrace instead of theDepartment, defendant cannot use the Act or case law to shielditself from direct liability. Unjust enrichment principles arebased on the idea that no one ought to enrich himself unjustly atthe expense of another. See Village of Bloomingdale v. CDGEnterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 500 (2001). This basic conceptwas illustrated in Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill. 2d532 (1959), in which the court cited the following example:

" 'A purchases goods from B, it being agreed that B is topay a supposed sales tax thereon with money supplied by A. Apays B $1,000, in addition to the purchase price, to pay thetax. No tax is due. A is entitled to restitution.' "Harrison, 15 Ill. 2d at 536-37, quoting Restatement ofRestitution