United City of Yorkville v. Village of Sugar Grove

SUPREME COURT CASES

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State: Illinois

Court: 2nd District Appellate

Docket No: 2-06-0649 Rel

Case Date: 09/24/2007

Preview:No. 2--06--0649 Filed: 9-24-07 _________________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT _________________________________________________________________________________ THE UNITED CITY OF YORKVILLE and STANDARD BANK AND TRUST, as Trustee under a certain agreement dated 4/1/04 and known as Trust No. 18190, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. ) ) ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ) v. ) No. 05--MR--447 ) THE VILLAGE OF SUGAR GROVE, ) Honorable ) Michael J. Colwell, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. _________________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant, the Village of Sugar Grove (Sugar Grove), negotiated two independent jurisdictional boundary line agreements, one with plaintiff the United City of Yorkville (Yorkville) and one with the Village of Montgomery (Montgomery). Yorkville and Montgomery do not have a boundary line agreement, and Montgomery is not a party to this action. Sugar Grove, which is in Kane County, is north of Yorkville, which is in Kendall County. Montgomery, which is in Du Page County, is east of Sugar Grove and Yorkville. In general, the agreements barred the respective parties from attempting to annex land beyond the boundary lines negotiated and set in the agreements. The two boundary lines partially overlap so that Yorkville and Montgomery are barred from attempting to annex the same area of land north of the Kane and Kendall county line. However, at one point, the boundary line set in the agreement

No. 2--06--0649 with Montgomery (Montgomery Agreement) turns north and then northeast, thereby permitting Montgomery to annex land that is off limits to Yorkville under its agreement (Yorkville Agreement). The parties discovered the difference in the agreements when plaintiff Standard Bank & Trust (Standard) and another property owner attempted to develop a parcel that straddles Yorkville and Montgomery. Yorkville and Standard filed a four-count complaint against Sugar Grove for a declaratory judgment and for rescission or reformation of the Yorkville Agreement. Yorkville believes that it has at least an equal right to annex the land currently available to Montgomery. The complaint seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that the creation of the Montgomery Agreement invalidated the Yorkville Agreement, under section 11--12--9 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Municipal Code) (65 ILCS 5/11-12--9 (West 2006)); (2) a rescission of the Yorkville Agreement, for failure of consideration; (3) a rescission of the Yorkville Agreement, based on mutual and unilateral mistake; and (4) a reformation of the Yorkville Agreement, to allow each party to exercise jurisdiction over territory that was formerly under the jurisdiction of the other party. Sugar Grove moved for dismissal of the complaint and for summary judgment under section 2--619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--619.1 (West 2006)). Section 2-619.1 of the Code provides that motions prescribed by section 2--615, section 2--619, and section 2--1005 may be filed together as a single motion but that a combined motion shall be divided into parts that are limited to and specify the single section of the Code under which relief is sought. 735 ILCS 5/2--619.1 (West 2006). On February 24, 2006, the trial court granted Sugar Grove's motion to dismiss Standard as a party, under section 2--615. The court also granted Sugar Grove's motion to dismiss Yorkville's claims for rescission and reformation.

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No. 2--06--0649 On June 1, 2006, the trial court addressed the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on the enforceability of the Yorkville Agreement, under section 11--12--9 of the Municipal Code. The court granted Sugar Grove summary judgment on Yorkville's claim for a declaratory judgment. Yorkville and Standard filed a timely notice of appeal on June 29, 2006. FACTS Section 11--12--9 of the Municipal Code permits corporate authorities such as Sugar Grove, Yorkville, and Montgomery to enter into agreements to mark the boundaries of the jurisdiction of each of the corporate authorities. 65 ILCS 5/11--12--9 (West 2006). On April 27, 2000, Sugar Grove and Yorkville entered into the Yorkville Agreement. The parties agreed that the boundary line between the two municipalities would be the county line separating Kane County to the north and Kendall County to the south. Among other things, each party agreed not to annex territory or exercise similar jurisdictional acts in the other's jurisdiction. The relevant sections of the Yorkville Agreement provide as follows: "1. That the VILLAGE OF SUGAR GROVE shall have jurisdiction north of a certain boundary line and the UNITED CITY OF YORKVILLE shall have jurisdiction south of a certain boundary line ***. The Boundary Line shall be the boundary between Kane and Kendall Counties. 2. The parties shall not attempt to exercise authority by annexing, zoning, or performing any other similar acts in territory lying within the jurisdiction of the other municipality. ***

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No. 2--06--0649 4. All future annexation Ordinances adopted by the corporate authorities of both Cities shall be adopted in such form as to conform with the provisions of this Agreement. Each City hereby agrees that it shall not act to annex or exercise any zoning authority or subdivision control authority beyond the Jurisdictional Boundary Line established in this Agreement. *** 8. Nothing contained herein shall require either municipality to make improvements to Baseline Road[, which runs along the Boundary Line]. In the event that either municipality has an owner or developer along Baseline Road seeking Baseline Roadway improvements, said improvements shall be constructed by this owner or developer. A Recapture Ordinance for 50% of the cost of said roadway If and when

improvements with interest shall be enacted by the other municipality.

development occurs adjacent to the improved Baseline Road, then appropriate payment shall be made to the initial investor. *** *** 12. This Agreement shall be in full force and affect [sic] from and after its adoption and execution by the Village of Sugar Grove and by the United City of Yorkville and shall continue in full force and affect [sic] for a period of twenty (20) years. The term of this Agreement may be extended, renewed or revised at the end of the initial term or extended terms hereof by further agreement of the municipalities. 13. Major repairs or maintenance to Baseline Road to which both municipalities are contiguous at the time of repair shall be on a 50/50% cost sharing basis. Both municipalities

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No. 2--06--0649 shall agree as to the nature and extent of the major repairs or maintenance. Additionally, local costs for signalizations on said roads shall be allocated based upon the number of intersection quadrants located in each municipality." On March 26, 2001, Sugar Grove and Montgomery entered into the Montgomery Agreement. Sugar Grove and Montgomery established a boundary line that runs along the Kane and Kendall county line, Route 47, and Jericho Road. The relevant sections of the Montgomery Agreement provide as follows: "1. That the boundary line between the two municipalities for the unincorporated area lying between them, for annexation and municipal government planning, subdivision control, official map, ordinances, and other municipal purposes shall be *** described as follows: Beginning at the intersection of the centerline of Prairie Street and the centerline of the Commonwealth Edison Right-of-Way ***, thence southerly along the centerline of the said right-of-way to the centerline of Jericho Road; thence westerly along the centerline of said Jericho Road to the centerline of Illinois Route 47 to the Kane and Kendall County line; thence westerly along the Kane and Kendall County line to the termination point at the centerline of Ashe Road ***. 2. Except as otherwise provided herein, Montgomery shall have jurisdiction with respect to property lying easterly and southerly of the above-described boundary line, and Sugar Grove shall have jurisdiction of the property lying westerly and northerly of the abovedescribed boundary line. On or after the date of this Agreement, neither party shall annex territory which lies within the jurisdiction of the other municipality as established by such

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No. 2--06--0649 boundary line, nor shall it exercise or attempt to exercise or enforce any zoning, subdivision control, official map, or other municipal authority or ordinance. *** 7. This Agreement is not one intended to benefit a third party, and no third party beneficiary shall be deemed created hereby. This Agreement is binding only upon Sugar Grove and Montgomery, and their respective successors and assigns. Nothing herein shall be construed as a limitation on the right of either party with respect to its boundaries with any other municipality or unit of local government. *** 11. This Agreement shall be in full force and effect for a period of fifteen (15) years from the date hereof and for such further and additional time as the parties hereto may hereafter agree by amendment to this Agreement." The Montgomery and Yorkville Agreements established for a short distance a shared boundary line along the Kane and Kendall county line, but the line in the Montgomery Agreement turns north at Route 47 and then northeast at Jericho Road, thereby permitting Montgomery to attempt to annex property east and south of that boundary line. The area available to Montgomery under the Montgomery Agreement comprises land that Yorkville had been barred from annexing under the Yorkville Agreement. Sugar Grove characterizes this area as a "buffer zone between its boundary line with Yorkville and where it set its boundary line with Montgomery." Plaintiffs allege that Standard owns 36 acres in unincorporated Kane County north of the Kane and Kendall county line, south of Jericho Road, and east of Route 47. According to the complaint, Standard's property exists simultaneously within Sugar Grove's jurisdiction under the

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No. 2--06--0649 Yorkville Agreement and Montgomery's jurisdiction under the Montgomery Agreement. Believing that the boundary line agreements are unenforceable under section 11--12--9 of the Municipal Code, Standard and another property owner, who owns land south of and adjacent to Standard's parcel, filed a joint petition with Yorkville to annex and develop the properties as a single planned unit development in Yorkville. The Yorkville Plan Commission scheduled a public hearing on the petition for September and October 2005. Sugar Grove threatened to file suit to enjoin the hearing. Standard and the other property owner voluntarily abandoned their petition for annexation, and plaintiffs filed their complaint in circuit court on October 19, 2005. Plaintiffs' complaint seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that the creation of the Montgomery Agreement invalidated the Yorkville Agreement, under section 11--12--9 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11--12--9 (West 2006)); (2) a rescission of the Yorkville Agreement, for failure of consideration; (3) a rescission of the Yorkville Agreement, based on mutual and unilateral mistake; and (4) a reformation of the Yorkville Agreement, to allow each party to exercise jurisdiction over territory that was formerly under the jurisdiction of the other party. On November 21, 2005, Sugar Grove moved to dismiss Standard as a party, under section 2--615 of the Code. Sugar Grove argued that "[i]f, as the Bank argues, the [Yorkville] Agreement is invalid, then the Bank cannot possibly have third-party beneficiary status and would not have standing in the present suit." Sugar Grove argued further that Standard lacks standing because the Yorkville Agreement does not mention Standard; nothing rebuts the presumption that the agreement was intended solely for the direct benefit of Sugar Grove and Yorkville; and Standard, as a property owner, has no claim of entitlement to annexation to a given municipality and could not rely on the

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No. 2--06--0649 Yorkville Agreement. On February 24, 2006, the trial court granted Sugar Grove's motion and dismissed Standard from the action. On November 22, 2005, Sugar Grove moved for dismissal of the complaint and for summary judgment against Yorkville. First, pursuant to section 2--1005 of the Code, Sugar Grove argued that it is entitled to summary judgment on Yorkville's claim for declaratory judgment, because section 11-12--9 of the Municipal Code does not operate retroactively to invalidate the Yorkville Agreement. Second, pursuant to section 2--619 of the Code, Sugar Grove sought dismissal of the claims for rescission, arguing that the corporate limits of Sugar Grove and Yorkville have changed substantially since the formation of the Yorkville Agreement and, because it is impossible to restore the parties to the status quo ante, rescission is inappropriate. Third, pursuant to section 2--615, Sugar Grove sought dismissal of the claim for reformation, arguing that Yorkville had failed to allege the existence of a prior agreement from which a variance in the written agreement could be created. Fourth, pursuant to section 2--615, Sugar Grove sought dismissal of the claim for rescission based on mutual and unilateral mistake, arguing that Yorkville failed to adequately allege an actual mistake of fact. Fifth, pursuant to section 2--1005, Sugar Grove argued that it is entitled to summary judgment on Yorkville's claim for rescission for failure of consideration, because the creation of the Montgomery Agreement does not negate the consideration for the Yorkville Agreement. Sixth, pursuant to section 2--1005, Sugar Grove argued that it is entitled to summary judgment on Yorkville's claim for reformation, because there is no prior agreement from which a variance in the written agreement could be created and because there is no mistake of fact. Also on November 22, 2005, Yorkville filed an opposing motion for summary judgment on its claim for a declaration of its rights under section 11--12--9 of the Municipal Code. Primarily,

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No. 2--06--0649 Yorkville relied upon the current version of section 11--12--9, which provides in relevant part as follows: "An agreement that addresses jurisdictional boundary lines shall be entirely unenforceable for any party thereto that subsequently enters into another agreement that addresses jurisdictional boundary lines that is in conflict with any of the terms of the first agreement without the consent of all parties to the first agreement." 65 ILCS 5/11--12--9 (West 2006). However, the amendment that added the relied-upon provision was not enacted until July 29, 2005, which was five years after the Yorkville and Montgomery Agreements were executed. The trial court concluded that the amendment did not apply retroactively, and the court granted summary judgment for Sugar Grove on Yorkville's claim for a declaratory judgment of rights under section 11-12--9. The court further granted Sugar Grove a dismissal of the remaining counts. This timely appeal followed. ANALYSIS Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court's orders granting Sugar Grove summary judgment on Yorkville's claim under section 11--12--9, dismissing Standard from the action, and dismissing the remainder of the complaint. On appeal, the parties renew the arguments they presented in the trial court. A. Section 11--12--9 of the Municipal Code First, Yorkville asserts that section 11--12--9 of the Municipal Code applies retroactively to render the Yorkville Agreement unenforceable, and therefore, the trial court erred in granting Sugar Grove summary judgment on the issue. Summary judgment is proper if, when viewed in the light

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No. 2--06--0649 most favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 2006). "The interpretation and applica[tion] of legislation present questions of law resolvable through summary judgment." Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 330 (2006). A circuit court's grant of summary judgment is subject to de novo review, which likewise guides our consideration of the meaning and effect of a statutory provision. Allegis, 223 Ill. 2d at 330. In interpreting a statute, this court's primary objective is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature, the best indicator of which is the language of the statute. In re Marriage of Golden, 358 Ill. App. 3d 464, 472 (2005). When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it ordinarily must be given effect as written. Golden, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 472. Our supreme court has recently restated the rule that "[i]t is never proper for a court to depart from plain language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent." People v. Hari, 218 Ill. 2d 275, 292 (2006). "Statutes should be construed, if possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless." Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994). At the time the agreements were executed, section 11--12--9 provided in relevant part as follows: "If unincorporated territory is within one and one-half miles of the boundaries of two or more corporate authorities that have adopted official plans, the corporate authorities involved may agree upon a line which shall mark the boundaries of the jurisdiction of each of the corporate authorities who have adopted such agreement. On and after September 24,

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No. 2--06--0649 1987, such agreement may provide that one or more of the municipalities shall not annex territory which lies within the jurisdiction of any other municipality, as established by such line. In the absence of such a boundary line agreement, nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as a limitation on the power of any municipality to annex territory. In arriving at an agreement for a jurisdictional boundary line, the corporate authorities concerned shall give consideration to the natural flow of storm water drainage, and, when practical, shall include all of any single tract having common ownership within the jurisdiction of one corporate authority. *** Any agreement for a jurisdictional boundary line shall be valid for such term of years as may be stated therein, but not to exceed 20 years, and if no term is stated, shall be valid for a term of 20 years. The term of such agreement may be extended, renewed or revised at the end of the initial or extended term thereof by further agreement of the municipalities. In the absence of such agreement, the jurisdiction of any one of the corporate authorities shall extend to a median line equidistant from its boundary and the boundary of the other corporate authority nearest to the boundary of the first corporate authority at any given point on the line. This amendatory Act of 1990 is declarative of the existing law and shall not be construed to modify or amend existing boundary line agreements, nor shall it be construed to create powers of a municipality not already in existence." 65 ILCS 5/11--12--9 (West 2000). On July 29, 2005, the legislature enacted Public Act 94--374 (Pub. Act 94--374,

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