Victory Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. Village of Bensenville

SUPREME COURT CASES

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State: Illinois

Court: 2nd District Appellate

Docket No: 2-04-1040 Rel

Case Date: 07/12/2005

No. 2--04--1040

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

VICTORY AUTO WRECKERS, INC.,
KENNETH WEISNER, and KYLE
WEISNER,

Plaintiffs-Appellees and
Cross-Appellants,

THE VILLAGE OF BENSENVILLE;
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
COMMISSION; JOSEPH E. DUFFY, as
Acting Director of Planning, Zoning, and
Building; PATRICIA A. JOHNSON,
ARTHUR MARKOWSKI, LINDA M.
WILHELM, BRADLEY GIBBS, TOM
ZALESKE, and NORBERT BANASYNSKI,
as Commissioners of the Community
Development Commission; and ELIZABETH
HIBNER, DAVID WHITE, JACQUES
GOURGUECHON, JOHN LUSTRO,
FRANK KOSMAN, JACK BARBA, KEITH
TOMCZAK, RICHARD YOUNG, GEORGE
NOBEL, JOSEPH ABEL, ADAM LABKON,
DENNIS N. WONDERLICK, and DALE
KLESZYNSKI, as Parties of Record to the
Administrative Proceedings,

Defendants-Appellants and
Cross-Appellees.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court
of Du Page County.

No. 04--MR--20

Honorable
Bonnie M. Wheaton,
Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court :

In this zoning ordinance case, defendants, Village of Bensenville et al. (Bensenville), appeal the trial court's order reversing a decision by the Bensenville Community Development Commission (CDC) in favor of Bensenville and against plaintiff Victory Auto Wreckers (Victory). Initially, we note that Victory has abandoned its cross-appeal. We affirm.

The following facts are taken from the record. Victory has been in business in Bensenville at the same location since 1948. Until 2002, the use of the subject property was authorized under Bensenville's zoning ordinance in the I-3 heavy industrial district. The present owners of Victory are plaintiffs Kenneth Weisner and Kyle Weisner. On April 16, 2002, Bensenville amended its zoning ordinance to create a new zoning classification, I-4 general industrial district. The new ordinance contains an amortization provision, which in essence makes junkyards, incinerators, wrecking yards, and outdoor storage facilities nonconforming uses in I-3 districts and directs those uses to cease operation in I-3 districts within two years, except for the latter use, which must cease within five years.

On September 13, 2002, Bensenville notified Victory that it considered its use of the subject property to be as a wrecking yard and gave Victory until April 26, 2004, to terminate its current use of the property. No other property owner in the I-3 district was similarly notified.

On December 13, 2002, Victory requested a zoning-use interpretation. Bensenville, by its attorney, opined that Victory's principal use of the property was as either a junkyard, a wrecking yard, or an outdoor storage facility and, therefore, was subject to the amortization provisions of the new ordinance.

Victory appealed Bensenville's attorney's interpretation to the CDC and lengthy hearings followed. The relevant evidence from these hearings is contained in the discussion below.

After considering the evidence and arguments, the CDC issued a written opinion finding that Victory's use of the property was as a wrecking yard, a subset of junkyard, and not as a recycling center or outdoor storage facility. Victory then sought appeal in the trial court. The trial court reversed the CDC's judgment, finding that Victory's principal use of the subject property was as a recycling center and that the property was not subject to amortization under the Bensenville zoning ordinance. Bensenville filed this timely appeal.

On appeal, Bensenville urges this court to review the CDC's decision using the clearly erroneous standard. Victory argues that we should apply a de novo standard to the issues of law and a manifest weight standard to the issues of fact. We agree with Victory.

An administrative agency's findings on questions of law are not binding on the courts and are reviewed de novo. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998). Thus, we will give no deference to the CDC's determination of the meaning of the terms at issue in Bensenville's ordinance. An administrative agency's factual findings are deemed to be prima facie true and correct and may be set aside only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. 735 ILCS 5/3--110 (West 2000); Belvidere,181 Ill. 2d at 204. Factual findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence only where all reasonable and unbiased persons would agree it is clearly evident the administrative agency erred and should have reached the opposite conclusion. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 348 Ill. App. 3d 823, 828 (2004). In contrast, a clearly erroneous standard is applied to those cases that involve an examination of the legal effect of a given set of facts or a mixed question of law and fact. Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205.

In this case, the facts are not in dispute. The dispute before this court is which facts the CDC deemed pertinent in making its findings, how the CDC interpreted the Bensenville zoning ordinance, and how it applied the facts to the zoning ordinance. Thus, we will review de novo the CDC's interpretation of the Bensenville zoning ordinance, and then we will determine whether its application of the ordinance to the facts is clearly erroneous.

On appeal, Bensenville argues that the trial court erred by reversing the CDC's determination. Bensenville argues that the CDC properly found that Victory is subject to amortization under section 10--16--3H of Bensenville's zoning ordinance and properly found that the principal use of Victory's property is as a wrecking yard and a junkyard and not as a recycling center as those terms are defined by section 10--2--3 of Bensenville's zoning ordinance. Village of Bensenville Zoning Ordinance