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Laws-info.com » Cases » Illinois » 2nd District Appellate » 2008 » Village of Kildeer v. Munyer
Village of Kildeer v. Munyer
State: Illinois
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-07-0316 Rel
Case Date: 07/01/2008
Preview:No. 2--07--0316 Filed: 7-1-08 ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE VILLAGE OF KILDEER, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Lake County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Nos. 06--TR--168180 ) 06--TR--168182 v. ) 06--TR--168184 ) TERRY R. MUNYER, ) Honorable ) George D. Strickland, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court: The defendant, Terry R. Munyer, was charged in three separate cases with reckless driving (625 ILCS 5/11--503 (West 2004)). The defendant agreed to be tried on all three charges at a single bench trial. After the Village of Kildeer presented its evidence, the defendant moved for a directed finding. The trial court granted the defendant's motion with respect to two of the cases but sua sponte ruled that it was going to consider the evidence presented on those charges as evidence of the defendant's motive and intent on the remaining charge. Following the presentation of the defendant's evidence, the trial court found the defendant guilty of reckless driving and sentenced him to one year of conditional discharge, plus fines and costs. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) it was error for the trial court to admit the other-crimes evidence sua sponte; (2) the admission of the othercrimes evidence was improper; and (3) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of reckless driving. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

No. 2--07--0316 I. Background The defendant was charged with reckless driving (625 ILCS 5/11--503 (West 2004)) in three separate cases. In case No. 06--TR--168184, the defendant was charged with reckless driving against Ellen Filley and Amy McAuley on September 18, 2006 (the September 18 case). In case No. 06--TR--168182, the defendant was charged with reckless driving against Todd Williams on October 7, 2006 (the October 7 case). In case No. 06--TR--168180, the defendant was charged with reckless driving against Kaitlin Williams on October 9, 2006 (the October 9 case).1 The parties agreed that, although the three incidents occurred on different days and involved different witnesses, the court would hear all three cases together. A bench trial took place on December 20, 2006. According to the bystander's report, the following facts were adduced at trial. Todd Williams testified that on October 7, 2006, at approximately 3:15 p.m., he was driving his vehicle on Oak Ridge Lane when the defendant, who was driving a red truck, approached his vehicle from the opposite direction. The defendant swerved his truck toward Williams' vehicle, forcing Williams to leave the road to avoid being struck by the defendant's truck. Williams did not call the police. There had been bad feelings between himself

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The bystander's report states that "Case number 06 TR 168180 charged the Defendant with

Reckless Driving on October 19, 2006 against the Complainant Kaitlin Williams." However, all of the testimony with respect to this incident indicates that it occurred on October 9, 2006. (Although the bystander's report states that copies of the complaints are attached, they are not in the record.) Therefore, we will assume that the October 19, 2006, date is a typo and that the incident took place on October 9, 2006. -2-

No. 2--07--0316 and the defendant for some time, and he believed that there were problems between the defendant and other people in the neighborhood. Kaitlin Williams, Todd Williams' daughter, testified that she was 16 years old. On October 9, 2006, at approximately 10 a.m., she was driving the family car east on Pheasant Hill Road, which is a neighborhood road with no center line, when she saw the defendant approaching her from the west in a Cadillac Escalade. The defendant's son was in his vehicle. The defendant's vehicle was partially on Kaitlin's side of the road, causing her to steer off the road to avoid being struck by the defendant. Two of her vehicle's wheels left the road. There was no contact between the two vehicles. Ellen Filley and Amy McAuley testified to an incident that allegedly occurred on September 18, 2006, at approximately 11:30 a.m. Both testified that they live in the same neighborhood as the defendant and the Williamses. On September 18, Filley and McAuley were driving their vans toward each other near the intersection of Oak Ridge Lane and Pheasant Hill Road, and they stopped at the intersection to talk. While stopped at the intersection, with the open driver-side windows of their vehicles next to each other, they saw the defendant drive his vehicle in their direction. They did not move. They thought the defendant was going to strike their vehicles, but he pulled his vehicle away at the last minute to avoid striking them. The defendant's vehicle left the road to avoid striking them. Thereafter, the prosecution rested. The defendant moved for a directed finding in each case, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that the complaints were inadequate for failing to give factual descriptions of the alleged acts sufficient to support the charges. On the latter ground, the court granted the defendant's motion with respect to the October 7 case and the October 9 case.

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No. 2--07--0316 Nevertheless, the court stated that it would consider the testimony in those cases in determining whether the defendant was guilty in the September 18 case. Defense counsel asked the court on what legal basis it was doing so. The court stated that it would consider the evidence in regard to the defendant's motive and intent. The defendant testified that he was a self-employed contractor and that he lived in the same neighborhood as the prosecution witnesses. The defendant denied committing any of the alleged acts. With respect to the September 18 case, the defendant testified that on September 18, 2006, from 11 a.m. to 12:15 p.m., he was repairing shelves at the Toma-Rosa restaurant in Arlington Heights. The defendant submitted a work order in support of his testimony. Prior to leaving the restaurant, the defendant ordered a sandwich to take with him. The defendant submitted a receipt for payment showing a time stamp of 12:16 p.m. The restaurant is approximately 10 miles from his neighborhood, and it is about a 20-minute drive away. The defendant testified that he was not at the intersection of Oak Ridge Lane and Pheasant Hill Road at 11:30 a.m. With respect to the October 7 case, the defendant testified that on October 7, 2006, he was working at the home of John Nerlinger in Arlington Heights between the hours of 1 and 4 p.m. When he finished the job, he drove home, arriving at approximately 5 p.m. He was not on Oak Ridge Lane at 3:15 p.m., and he did not commit any of the acts alleged by Todd Williams. With respect to the October 9 case, the defendant testified that on October 9, 2006, he left his house at 9 a.m. with his son, and they went to breakfast at Alemar's Restaurant in Arlington Heights. The defendant was driving a red truck. They finished breakfast shortly before 10 a.m., and they proceeded to the Arlington Coin and Card Shop, where the defendant purchased two coins. The defendant submitted a receipt from the Arlington Coin and Card Shop. The defendant and his son

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No. 2--07--0316 left the store at approximately 11 a.m. The defendant was not in the area of the alleged incident at 10 a.m., and he never forced Kaitlin Williams' vehicle off the road. Tommy Munyer, the defendant's son, testified that he was 10 years old. He was with the defendant on October 9, 2006, because it was a school holiday. They went to breakfast and then to a coin store, where the defendant purchased two coins. They rode in the defendant's red truck, and they returned home around 11 a.m. He never saw the defendant force anyone off the road. Rose McCarthy testified that she owned the Toma-Rosa Restaurant. On September 18, 2006, the defendant worked at the restaurant from 11 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. Before leaving, the defendant ordered a hamburger to take with him. The work order and the food receipt submitted by the defendant were true and accurate copies of the bill for the work performed and the receipt for the food ordered on September 18, 2006. Frank Starkey testified that he owned the Arlington Coin and Card Shop. He was present on October 9, 2006, when the defendant and his son came into the store. He knew the defendant and his son from previous visits to the store. They arrived at approximately 10 a.m. and stayed for about half an hour. While there, the defendant purchased coins. The receipt submitted by the defendant was a true and accurate copy of the receipt Starkey wrote for the coins. When the defendant and his son left the store, Starkey saw them enter a red pickup truck. John Nerlinger testified that he hired the defendant to do some repairs at his home. On October 7, 2006, the defendant arrived at his house at approximately 1 p.m. and stayed until 4:30 p.m. The defendant was at his house at 3:15 p.m. that day. The trial court found the defendant guilty of reckless driving, and it sentenced the defendant to one year of conditional discharge with driving school, plus fines and costs. The defendant moved

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No. 2--07--0316 for a new trial, arguing that the court erred in considering the evidence presented on the October 7 and October 9 cases. The defendant also argued that the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty. In support of this argument, the defendant attached photos of the street where the alleged incident occurred. The defendant argued, based on the photos and the fact that Filley and McAuley were blocking the entire road with their vehicles, that the defendant had to leave the road to avoid a collision. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant timely appealed. II. Discussion A. Admission of Other-Crimes Evidence We first address the defendant's contention that the admission of the other-crimes evidence was improper. Evidence of other crimes is admissible if its probative value outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. People v. Gwinn, 366 Ill. App. 3d 501, 515 (2006). Other-crimes evidence is admissible to prove any material fact relevant to the case (People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170 (2003)), but it is inadmissible if it is relevant only to demonstrate a defendant's propensity to engage in criminal activity (People v. Hendricks, 137 Ill. 2d 31, 52 (1990)). Such evidence may be admissible when it is relevant to show, among other things, motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake or accident, modus operandi, or the existence of a common plan or design. People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127, 135-36 (2005). " ''[B]efore such evidence is admitted, the State must first show that a crime took place and that the defendant committed it or participated in its commission.' " (Emphasis omitted.) Gwinn, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 515, quoting People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 455 (1991). "Proof that the defendant committed the crime, or participated in its commission, need not be beyond a reasonable doubt, but it must be more than a mere suspicion." Gwinn, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 515; see also People

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No. 2--07--0316 v. Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d 926, 938 (2001) (the standard for admissibility of other-crimes evidence has not been clearly established in Illinois; it is more than mere suspicion, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Osborn, 53 Ill. App. 3d 312, 322 (1977) (noting that "acquittal of the prior offense does not necessarily render evidence thereof incompetent," the court allowed a witness to testify about the details of an attempted rape committed against her by the defendant, even though after a preliminary hearing the attempted rape charge was dismissed for no probable cause). In addition, "if another crime has a tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence to the determination of the case more probable than it would be without that evidence, then it is relevant and admissible regardless of whether the other crime occurred before or after the crime charged." People v. Kimbrough, 138 Ill. App. 3d 481, 489 (1985); see also People v. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 294, 312-14 (1983). The other-crimes evidence in this case was relevant to demonstrate the defendant's intent to commit the charged offense. To prove that the defendant committed reckless driving, the State had to show that the defendant drove his "vehicle with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." 625 ILCS 5/11--503(a)(1) (West 2006). Thus, reckless driving requires proof of a willful or wanton mental state. People v. Paarlberg, 243 Ill. App. 3d 731, 735 (1993). In Paarlberg, the Third District broke down reckless driving cases into three categories: (1) cases involving "the commission of multiple traffic offenses which together demonstrate the driver's willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons and property"; (2) cases involving "a driver's conscious disregard for the particular surroundings and circumstances that rises to the level of willfulness and wantonness"; and (3) cases "where willful and wanton conduct is based, in part, upon the driver's intoxication." Paarlberg, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 735-36 (and cases cited therein). In this

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No. 2--07--0316 case, the first and third categories are inapplicable--there was no evidence that the defendant committed multiple traffic offenses or was impaired on September 18. This leaves the second category of cases. According to the defendant, "[i]t would be a stretch for the court to find that Defendant's acts were willful and wanton with a conscious disregard to the safety of others." It is true that the required mental state is often implied by the manner in which a defendant operated his vehicle. See People v. Stropoli, 146 Ill. App. 3d 667, 671 (1986) (evidence that the defendant rapidly backed his vehicle six car lengths for no apparent reason and then made a wide turn around the corner at a fast rate, causing the car to fishtail and point momentarily toward a 3
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