JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

The circuit court of Du Page County entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoiningdefendants-appellants, Hinsdale Elementary School District 181 and various of its officials (SchoolDistrict), from enforcing the School Board's decision to expel plaintiff-appellee, Blake Wilson (thestudent), for the remainder of the school year. The School District brings this interlocutory appealof that order, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 307(d)).

On March 1, 2004, the assistant principal of Clarendon Hills Middle School discovered thatthe student, an 11-year-old sixth grader, brought to school two compact discs (CDs) containing asong created and performed by the student and a friend. The song was titled "Gonna Kill Mrs. Cox'sBaby." Mrs. Cox is the student's science teacher and was pregnant during the time period relevantto this case. Because the lyrics of the song were for the most part unintelligible, the student, wheninstructed to do so, wrote down the following lyrics:

"Gonna Kill Mrs. Cox's baby, gonna Kill Mrs. Cox's baby. I don't care, I don't care. GonnaKill Mrs. Cox's baby, gonna kill Mrs. Cox's baby, (squeal), rock n' roll. I love Detroit, man.

I'm done. We're done."

The student admitted that he sang the lyrics in the recording, "burned" the song onto two CDs, andwrote the words "Gonna Kill Mrs. Cox's Baby" on one of the CDs. The student also admitted thathe gave the CDs to two students on March 1, 2004. One of those students shared the title of thesong with other students and played the song two times on a computer in the school's computer lab. On March 2, 2004, the student and his parents were advised that the student was not to return toschool and that the student was suspended from school from March 2, 2004, to March 15, 2004.

On March 16, 2004, a hearing officer appointed by the School Board held an expulsion hearing. The student was represented by legal counsel at the hearing. The School District allegedgross disobedience and misconduct on the student's part as grounds for his expulsion. The SchoolDistrict presented the testimony of the school's principal and assistant principal who, in addition totestifying about the student's misconduct on March 1, 2004, and the subsequent investigation, relatedthat the student was generally an "A student" with no previous behavioral problems. The assistantprincipal explained that when he asked the student why he created the CD, the student said that hewas uncomfortable with Mrs. Cox's pregnancy and that he did not like the way that she taught. TheSchool District also presented various documents, including the School District's violence policy andthe Clarendon Hills Middle School Handbook, which contains a section prohibiting student violenceincluding threats of violence.

At the expulsion hearing, the student called seven witnesses. Officer Ted Jenkins of theClarendon Hills police department testified that he interviewed the student in connection with hisinvestigation of the incident. According to Officer Jenkins, the student was remorseful andcooperative, but a bit upset, and in fact cried at a couple of points. Officer Jenkins found no evidencethat the student had the intention to actually harm Mrs. Cox, and he found no evidence that thestudent ever conveyed any kind of threat to Mrs. Cox. The officer opined that the student was notdangerous and did not intend to harm Mrs. Cox.

Chris Wilson, owner of the music studio where the student takes guitar lessons, testified thatthe student is a serious musician, and is generally polite and respectful. She said that she has neverseen or heard of the student engaging in any type of violence. She opined that such behavior wouldbe out of character for the student.

Alan O. Sykes, professor of law at the University of Chicago Law School, testified that thestudent is a good friend of his daughter. Professor Sykes said that he has never seen the studentengage in any acts of violence or lose his temper. Professor Sykes opined that the student would notuse violence against a teacher.

Michael Bradburn, pastor at Redeemer Lutheran Church in Hinsdale, testified that he hasknown the student for 10 years and has never seen the student engage in any type of violence, losehis temper, or threaten anyone. Pastor Bradburn also spoke of the student's involvement at churchand his contribution of his musical skills to the worship band. Pastor Bradburn opined that thestudent would never do anything to hurt anyone and said that he was surprised that the student madea CD with inappropriate lyrics.

Susan Francis, a social worker, testified that she spent an hour and 15 minutes with thestudent the day before the expulsion hearing. Francis opined that the student is not the type of boywho is likely to harm someone or to commit an act of violence against someone.

Lanny Wilson testified that he is the student's father and an obstetrician and gynecologist. Dr.Wilson related that he did not think for even one second that his son actually intended to threaten orharm Mrs. Cox or her baby. Dr. Wilson has never seen his son commit any act of violence.

Cher Geiger, the student's mother, testified that she has never seen her son engage in any actof violence or threaten anyone with violence. Geiger related that she is a psychologist and that, basedon both her professional experience and her personal experience with her son, she believed that herson was merely expressing frustration and had no intention to threaten or harm Mrs. Cox. Geigertestified that a clinical psychologist, whom she does not know personally, evaluated her son andconcluded that he has no early warning signs of a likelihood to engage in acts of violence. Geigeropined that her son would not be a danger to any student or to school personnel were he allowed toreturn to school.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the proceedings before the hearing officer, theprincipal recommended that the student be expelled for the remainder of the school year. Theprincipal also said that, based on the student's academic performance, he would be allowed to enterthe seventh grade at Clarendon Hills Middle School the following fall. Counsel for the studentrecommended that he be suspended for 15 days.

The hearing officer submitted a fact-finding report dated March 19, 2004, in which he foundthat the student did the acts outlined by the School District, including writing, singing, and recordinga song that contained threatening lyrics, titled "Gonna Kill Mrs. Cox's Baby"; frightening a staffmember; distributing the song on CD; and disrupting the school's educational program. The SchoolBoard considered the hearing officer's fact-finding report at its March 22, 2004, meeting and votedto expel the student for the rest of the school year (approximately 50 days) in accordance with section10--22.6 of the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/10--22.6 (West 2002)).

On March 24, 2004, the student filed a verified complaint for injunctive relief, requesting thatthe trial court temporarily and permanently enjoin the School District from expelling the student fromschool and conducting any further disciplinary proceedings. The complaint also requested an orderimmediately reinstating the student in Clarendon Hills Middle School. On the same day, the studentfiled an emergency petition for a temporary restraining order. In the petition, the student contendedthat the School Board's decision to expel him on the evidence gathered at the hearing was arbitrary,unreasonable, and capricious.

On March 25, 2004, the trial court entered the following order:

"Upon full hearing on petition for TRO, the court finds that plaintiff has establisheda protectable interest in Blake's right to a public education, that plaintiff has no adequateremedy at law and Blake will suffer irreparable harm if he is prohibited from attending schoolas Blake cannot make up for days lost due to the expulsion, that plaintiff has established astrong likelihood of success on the merits based on the following factors: (1) Blake's conductwas not so egregious because he did not directly cause any disruption at school; rather thedisruption resulted from the investigation; (2) Blake has no history of disciplinary problems;(3) [there is] no evidence in the record that anything resulted in a failure to deliver educationalservices to the students; (4) expulsion is the most severe punishment; (5) the interests ofBlake favor not expelling him; and (6) base [sic] on Blake's age (11), he is not held to theunderstanding of a 16 or 17 year-old student. Accordingly, the court enters a TemporaryRestraining Order prohibiting defendants from expelling Blake Wilson from school and ordersthat he be allowed to attend Clarendon Hills Middle School. This TRO enters without bondas no evidence exists of damages or potential damages to defendants.

Case continued to April 13, 2004; 10:00 a.m. [courtroom] 2007 for hearing on [themotion for] preliminary injunction without further notice."

The School District timely appeals the above order.

On appeal, the School District contends that the trial court abused its discretion in grantingthe TRO because it failed to balance the hardships of the parties, and because it improperly concludedthat the student had a likelihood of success on the merits. The student has failed to file a respondingmemorandum pursuant to Rule 307(d)(2) (188 Ill. 2d R. 307(d)(2)). However, we find that therecord and issues involved are simple enough that we can decide the appeal. See First CapitolMortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976). We agree with theSchool District's second contention and, therefore, hold that the student was not entitled to a TROin view of the student's likely lack of success on the merits.

A TRO is an emergency remedy issued to maintain the status quo until the case is disposedof on the merits. Passon v. TCR, Inc., 242 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264 (1993). A trial court's ordergranting or denying a TRO is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Stocker Hinge Manufacturing Co.v. Darnel Industries, Inc., 94 Ill. 2d 535, 541 (1983). A party seeking a TRO must establish, by apreponderance of the evidence, that (1) he or she possesses a certain and clearly ascertainable rightneeding protection, (2) he or she has no adequate remedy at law, (3) he or she would sufferirreparable harm without the TRO, and (4) he or she has a likelihood of success on the merits. Lov. Provena Covenant Medical Center, 342 Ill. App. 3d 975, 987 (2003).

"School discipline is an area which courts enter with great hesitation and reluctance--and rightly so. School officials are trained and paid to determine what form of punishmentbest addresses a particular student's transgression. They are in a far better position than is ablack-robed judge to decide what to do with a disobedient child at school. They can bestdetermine, for instance, whether a suspension or an after-school detention will be moreeffective in correcting a student's behavior. Because of their expertise and their closeness tothe situation--and because we do not want them to fear court challenges to their every act--school officials are given wide discretion in their disciplinary actions." Donaldson v. Boardof Education for Danville School District No. 118, 98 Ill. App. 3d 438, 439 (1981).

Where no deprivation of a constitutional right is alleged, a decision to suspend or expel astudent will be overturned only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, or oppressive. Lusk v.Triad Community Unit No. 2, 194 Ill. App. 3d 426, 427 (1990); Clements v. Board of Education ofDecatur Public School District No. 61, 133 Ill. App. 3d 531, 533 (1985); Wilson v. CollinsvilleCommunity Unit School District No. 10, 116 Ill. App. 3d 557, 561-62 (1983); Donaldson, 98 Ill.App. 3d at 439. The punishment imposed on a student must be sufficiently egregious in order tocome within the narrow concept of arbitrary or capricious official conduct that justifies theextraordinary intervention by the court in the operation of a public school of this state. Clements, 133Ill. App. 3d at 537.

Thus, in order for the student to obtain a TRO temporarily enjoining the School District fromenforcing the decision to expel him, he needed to show, inter alia, that he is likely to establish, by apreponderance of the evidence at the upcoming proceeding on his complaint to permanently enjointhe expulsion, that the School Board's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, or oppressive. As an appellate court reviewing the trial court's entry of this TRO, it is our role to decide whetherthe trial court abused its discretion in determining that the student was likely to succeed on the meritsof his action to permanently enjoin his expulsion. See Stocker Hinge Manufacturing Co., 94 Ill. 2dat 541. In other words, we must decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in determiningthat the student was likely to show that the School Board's disciplinary decision was unreasonable,arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitraryor exceeds the bounds of reason. Prairie v. Snow Valley Health Resources, Inc., 324 Ill. App. 3d568, 571 (2001). Because we find that it exceeds the bounds of reason to conclude that the studentshowed that he was likely to succeed on the merits of his claim for a permanent injunction, we holdthat the trial court abused its discretion in entering the TRO.

The trial court applied the five factors stated in Robinson v. Oak Park and River Forest HighSchool, 213 Ill. App. 3d 77, 82 (1991), in making its determination that the School Board's decisionin this case would likely be found to be unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive. TheRobinson factors are (1) the egregiousness of the student's conduct; (2) the history or record of thestudent's past conduct; (3) the likelihood that such conduct will affect the delivery of educationalservices to other children; (4) the severity of the punishment; and (5) the interest of the child. Robinson, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 82.

With regard to the first of the Robinson factors, the trial court found that the student'sconduct was not so egregious because he did not directly cause any disruption at school; rather thedisruption resulted from the investigation. We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that thedisruption of the educational process was not the result of the student's misconduct. Simply stated,had the student not composed, performed, and then distributed at school the song, "Gonna Kill Mrs.Cox's Baby," there would have been no disruption whatsoever. Unfortunately, at this point in timewe live in a society where horrific violence in the schools of our country is all too common. SeePeople v. Pruitt, 278 Ill. App. 3d 194, 202 (1996), citing Basstian & Taylor, U.S. Department ofJustice, "School Crime: A National Crime Victimization Survey Report" (NCJ-131645 1991)("Judges cannot ignore what everybody else knows: violence and the threat of violence are presentin the public schools. The situation has worsened in the past 11 years. School children are harmingeach other with regularity"). Consequently, it is unreasonable to suggest that, in order to avoid adisruption at school, the administration should have turned a blind eye upon its discovery of studentsin possession of CDs containing a song, the title of which and chorus of which are an unambiguousstatement that a teacher's baby was going to be killed. Even counsel for the student, in his openingremarks to the trial court at the hearing on the petition for the TRO, made the point that "whenevera circumstance presents itself to a school administration where there's any type of potential forviolence that conduct or circumstance has to be thoroughly investigated."

Moreover, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the student's conduct was egregious enoughto result in the 50-day expulsion irrespective of any disruption of the educational process. It is notimportant to decide whether the student's conduct caused such disruption, because the threat aloneconstituted "gross disobedience or misconduct." That the student's conduct constituted an expellableviolation of school rules is not in dispute. Section 10--22.6 of the School Code empowers schoolboards to "expel pupils guilty of gross disobedience or misconduct." 105 ILCS 5/10--22.6 (West2002). According to the School District's policy:

"Behavior constituting gross disobedience or misconduct includes, but is not limited to, thefollowing:

10. Use of any form or type of aggressive behavior that does physical or psychological harmto someone else and/or urging other students to engage in such conduct. Prohibitedaggressive behavior includes, without limitation, the use of violence, force, noise, coercion,threats, intimidation, fear, bullying, or other comparable conduct."

Also, the Clarendon Hills Middle School Handbook contains a section entitled, "Student Violence -Board Policy," which provides in pertinent part:

"Student violence and/or threat of student violence against any student, district staff member,and/or district property will not be tolerated.

Types of violent/threatening conduct include but are not limited to:

***

-threatening, planning, or conspiring with others to engage in a violent activity.

-joking about engaging in violent acts against others, or otherwise making statements, threats,or intimidating remarks (bullying) which might reasonably be interpreted by others asindicating a threat or plan to engage in some type of violent activity.

Students violating any provision of this policy will be subject to appropriate discipline, up to and including suspension and expulsion." (Emphasis in original).

Clearly, the student committed a violation of school rules that subjected him to possible expulsion. What is in dispute in this case is the propriety of the penalty chosen by the School Board. Morespecifically, in the context of the petition for the TRO to enjoin the expulsion, the issue is whetherit is likely that the student will be able to show in the upcoming proceedings to determine whetherhe is entitled to a permanent injunction that the School Board's choice of penalty was unreasonable,arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive.

In the proceedings before the School Board's hearing officer, as well as those before the trialcourt, much was made of the fact that there was no evidence showing that the student had anyintention to carry out his threat of violence against Mrs. Cox or her baby. Threats of violence inschool are not permitted, serious or not. Undoubtedly, a threat made in jest is less egregious thanone that the threatener earnestly intends to carry out. However, a threat of violence is no lessegregious at the time it is made simply because it is subsequently shown that the threatener had nointention to carry out his threat. When a threat of violence like the one in this case is made, there isno way to immediately determine whether the threatener intends to carry it out or has made it forsome other reason, such as intimidation or simply because he is an adolescent lacking good judgment. For these reasons, we believe that it was an abuse of discretion to conclude that, in the proceedingson the student's request for permanent injunctive relief, it will likely be determined that the student'sconduct was not egregious enough to warrant the penalty imposed by the School Board.

With respect to the second Robinson factor, we agree with the trial court's conclusion thatthe student has no history of disciplinary problems. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor ofchoosing a lesser sanction from the range of permissible penalties for the student's conduct.

The third Robinson factor is the likelihood that the student's conduct affected the delivery ofeducational services to other children. On this point the trial court said, "there's no indication thatanything other than the buzz that surrounded this entire situation was in any way detrimental to thedelivery of educational services." We disagree. The evidence shows that Mrs. Cox required a dayoff of work to recuperate from her emotional distress, thereby depriving her pupils of her services forthat day; the Clarendon Hills police department was called in to investigate the incident; concernedteachers were briefed by the administration regarding what had occurred and what action the schoolwas taking; and parents of students telephoned the school to find out what was happening. Thestudent's misconduct, at a minimum, took administrators away from their regular duties so that theycould perform investigative functions and inform concerned employees and parents that the schoolwas handling the situation. These occurrences were the direct result of the student's conduct. It isuntenable to conclude that, in the future proceeding seeking a permanent injunction, it is likely thatthese occurrences will not be deemed to have affected the delivery of educational services.

With regard to the fourth Robinson factor, the severity of the punishment, the trial courtfound that expulsion is the most severe punishment. While it is true that expulsion is the most severeform of punishment, it is important to recognize that the student did not receive the most severeexpulsion that state law permits. A school board can expel a student for up to two calendar years ifthe student has engaged in disobedience or gross misconduct. 105 ILCS 5/10--22.6(d) (West 2002). In contrast, a suspension from school can be for no longer than 10 days. 105 ILCS 5/10--22.6(c)(West 2002). Accordingly, an expulsion from school can be for as short a duration as 11 days andas long a duration as 2 calendar years. In this case, the School Board expelled the student for theremainder of the school year, approximately 50 school days. At the expulsion hearing, counsel forthe student recommended a suspension for 15 days, which, for that duration, could only be anexpulsion. Since school officials are given wide discretion in their disciplinary actions (Donaldson,98 Ill. App. 3d at 439), it would be difficult to conclude that an expulsion for either of these periodswould be unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive. An expulsion for a period longer than50 days, for example the remainder of this school year and all of next year, although also within therange of permissible expulsion periods, may have been an unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, oroppressive punishment. However, we cannot accept the conclusion that a 50-day expulsion will likelybe deemed unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive in the student's action seeking apermanent injunction. This is especially true where the School Board's selection of a 50-dayexpulsion demonstrates a measured decision on the School Board's part and not simply the impositionof the most serious penalty it could impose on the student. Moreover, the possibility that thestudent's sixth-grade marks will be detrimentally affected by the expulsion adds little to the severityof the punishment. The record demonstrates that the student will be allowed to return to school nextfall as a seventh-grader. Additionally, it has been observed that a middle school student is not a highschool student whose "grades are usually thought of as being more important and can affect astudent's educational and employment prospects after he leaves public school." Donaldson, 98 Ill.App. 3d at 440.

The fifth and final Robinson factor is the interest of the child. The trial court found that theinterest of the student favors not expelling him. The trial court's finding at this stage of theproceedings is a holding that it is likely that in the proceedings seeking a permanent injunction, theduration of the expulsion determined by the School Board will be deemed unreasonable, arbitrary,capricious, or oppressive because it is not in the student's interest. We disagree. Certainly reasonableminds could conclude that the student is better off in school than he is elsewhere for the last 50 daysof his sixth-grade school year. However, it is also reasonable to conclude that expulsion from schoolfor a 50-day period will impress upon the student the seriousness of his misconduct and theimportance of altering his behavior.

The trial court added a sixth factor to its analysis, the age of the student. The trial court said,"I think the Court must look at the wisdom and judgment of an 11-year-old which is obviously lessthat it would be in a 16- or 17-year-old." We fail to appreciate how the age of the student factorsinto the analysis of the issue facing the trial court, specifically, whether it is likely that the SchoolBoard's decision as to the penalty it chose was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive. Itwould certainly be arbitrary and unreasonable to punish a middle school student with penaltiesdesigned to punish only high school students' misconduct. That, however, is not what occurred here. The rules applicable to students at Clarendon Hills Middle School prohibit threats of violence. Thestudent made such a threat and was expelled from school for 50 days, a sanction that was within thepermissible range of penalties applicable to middle school students for such misconduct.

Having determined that all but one of the five Robinson factors will likely weigh in favor ofconcluding that the decision of the School Board to expel the student for the remainder of the schoolyear was not unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive we hold that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in finding a strong likelihood of the student's success on the merits. Thus, we hold that thetrial court abused its discretion in issuing the TRO. Our determination that the student is not likelyto succeed on the merits of his complaint for permanent injunctive relief does not foreclose thepossibility that he may ultimately prevail on the complaint.

The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County granting the student's petition for a TROis reversed and the TRO is vacated.

Reversed; order vacated.

BYRNE, J., concurs.

JUSTICE McLAREN, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The standard of review is whether the trial court's findings of fact areagainst the manifest weight of the evidence and whether the trial court's exercise of discretion basedupon those facts is an abuse of discretion. "An abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable personwould take the position adopted by the lower court." McKenzie Dredging Co. v. Deneen River Co.,249 Ill. App. 3d 694, 700 (1993). The test is not whether the appellate court agrees with the trialcourt's decision, but whether the lower court " 'acted arbitrarily without the employment ofconscientious judgment or, in view of all the circumstances, exceeded the bounds of reason andignored recognized principles of law so that substantial prejudice resulted.' " Zurich Insurance Co.v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 213 Ill. App. 3d 591, 594-95 (1991), quoting In re Marriage of Aud, 142Ill. App. 3d 320, 326 (1986); see also American Federation of State, County and MunicipalEmployees, Council 31 v. Schwartz, 343 Ill. App. 3d 553, 559 (2003); In re J.S., 267 Ill. App. 3d145, 148 (1994); Kaden v. Pucinski, 263 Ill. App. 3d 611, 615 (1994).

Considering the trial court's grant of a temporary restraining order in the perspective set forth above,I am constrained to determine that other reasonable minds could or would also grant the temporary restraining order.

I tend to believe that the majority, rather than applying the appropriate standard outlinedabove, has considered the appeal as if it were an appeal from a final hearing on the merits, and hasnot given the trial court's judgment the deference to which it is entitled in matters relating totemporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions.

It is quite possible that the final resolution of the cause will result in expulsion. However, thatis not the issue at this stage of the proceedings, unless that determination is based upon a belief thatno reasonable individual would disagree, based upon the record as it exists today, that there is noprobability of success on the merits. The student is not seeking total immunity from punishment, asindicated by his suggestion that he be suspended for 15 days. He is seeking a lesser punishment. Inthat regard, in my opinion, there is a probability of success on the merits.