Wood Dale Fire Protection District v. Illinois Labor Relations Board

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Illinois » 2nd District Appellate » 2009 » Wood Dale Fire Protection District v. Illinois Labor Relations Board

State: Illinois

Court: 2nd District Appellate

Docket No: 2-08-0784 Rel

Case Date: 10/02/2009

Preview:No. 2--08--0784 Filed: 10-2-09 _________________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT _________________________________________________________________________________ WOOD DALE FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, ) On Petition for Administrative Review ) from the Illinois Labor Relations Board, ) State Panel. Petitioner, ) ) v. ) ILRB Case No. S--CA--08--037 ) ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ) STATE PANEL, and WOOD DALE ) PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS ) ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 3594, ) INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ) FIREFIGHTERS, ) ) Respondents. ) _________________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court: Petitioner, Wood Dale Fire Protection District, seeks administrative review of the order of respondent Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel (Board), awarding a default judgment against petitioner and in favor of respondent Wood Dale Professional Firefighters Association, Local 3594, International Association of Firefighters (Union). Petitioner argues that the Board's decision should be reversed because (1) the Board rule that precipitated petitioner's default is invalid, and (2) even if the rule is valid, the Board should have waived it in this case. Petitioner also argues that the Board's award of sanctions against petitioner was unwarranted. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Board's decision in part and vacate in part.

No. 2--08--0784 In August 2007, the Union filed with the Board an unfair labor practice charge against petitioner; in a position statement it submitted to the Board approximately one month later, petitioner claimed that its actions were warranted. On February 13, 2008, the Board issued a complaint against petitioner. The complaint indicated that, pursuant to the Board's rules, if petitioner did not file an answer within 15 days, petitioner would be deemed to have admitted all of the complaint's factual and legal allegations and waived any further hearing. Petitioner did not file an answer within 15 days, and, on March 19, the Union filed a motion asking the Board to issue an order stating that petitioner had defaulted its opposition to the Board's complaint. Nine days later, on March 28, petitioner filed an answer to the complaint; this answer was not accompanied by any request that the Board grant petitioner a variance from its rule requiring an answer to be filed within 15 days of a Board complaint. On April 4, the Board's administrative law judge (ALJ) issued to petitioner an order to show cause "as to why [petitioner] should not be found to have waived a hearing *** and deemed to have admitted all material facts or legal conclusions alleged in the Complaint." On April 21, along with its response to the order to show cause, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file its late answer to the Board complaint. Petitioner explained in its response that its counsel had misfiled the Board's complaint and thus inadvertently failed to answer it. The response also noted that petitioner's counsel had been responding simultaneously to several other matters, and it stated that the failure to answer the Board complaint was "predicated upon *** confusion as to the number of matters pending." Petitioner's motion for leave to file its answer echoed the assertions made in petitioner's response. The ALJ's recommended decision and order noted the untimeliness of petitioner's answer to the Board's complaint, and it rejected petitioner's arguments as to why petitioner was entitled to a

-2-

No. 2--08--0784 variance from the Board's 15-day default rule. Petitioner thereafter filed a bill of exceptions arguing that the Board should reject the ALJ's proposed order. In that bill of exceptions, petitioner argued that the proposed order was improper for several reasons. First, petitioner argued that the proposed order improperly assumed that petitioner's failure to answer the Board complaint constituted an admission of not only the factual matters alleged therein, but also the legal conclusions drawn therefrom; petitioner cited Mattoon Community Unit School District No. 2 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 193 Ill. App. 3d 875 (1990), for the proposition that the failure to file an answer does not constitute an admission of legal conclusions. Second, petitioner argued that the matter that precipitated the Board complaint--petitioner's demoting a union member after the union member spoke to the press about a personnel matter--was not protected speech under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 2008)) or the first amendment. Third, petitioner argued that the ALJ erred in recommending that petitioner not be granted a variance from the default rule. Fourth, petitioner argued that part of the recommended relief--reinstating the union member to his previous position--was impossible because the union member had since been terminated. The Union then filed a motion for sanctions against petitioner, on the basis that petitioner had taken "a frivolous position with respect to its failure to timely file its Answer." In its order, the Board observed that petitioner "raised several exceptions to the ALJ's determination, two of which [the Board would address in its written order], none of which [had] merit." The Board then went on to discuss, and reject, two of petitioner's arguments opposing the ALJ's recommended order. (Petitioner reprises neither argument before this court.) On the Union's request for sanctions, the Board reasoned that petitioner's exceptions were "singularly without merit." The Board called it "most troubling" that petitioner had argued against the "express language" of the

-3-

No. 2--08--0784 Board's default rule and instead relied on Mattoon, "omitting the extent of the court's ruling and failing to note the differences between the text of the Board's rules" and those applied in Mattoon. The Board thus concluded as follows: "We think it sufficiently plain that [petitioner] did not know, and chose not to research, the Board's caselaw on default, or it deliberately ignored those rulings. Either way, [petitioner's] conduct in that regard indicates that its defenses herein were not made in good faith. Likewise, the fact that its exceptions were stunningly devoid of merit highlights that they did not represent a debatable position. Accordingly, sanctions are appropriate." Petitioner now petitions to this court for administrative review. See 5 ILCS 315/11(e) (West 2008); 735 ILCS 5/3--113 (West 2008); 155 Ill. 2d R. 335. Petitioner's first argument is that the Board's order must be reversed because the Board rule underlying it is invalid due to its conflict with the Act, the statute from which the Board derives its authority. "An administrative agency possesses no inherent or common law powers, and any authority that the agency claims must find its source within the provisions of the statute by which the agency was created." Department of Revenue v. Civil Service Comm'n, 357 Ill. App. 3d 352, 363 (2005). "Accordingly, the authority of an administrative agency to adopt rules and regulations is defined by the statute creating that authority, and such rules and regulations must be in accord with the standards and policies set forth in the statute." Department of Revenue, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 363. "If an agency promulgates rules that are beyond the scope of the legislative grant of authority or that conflict with the statute, the rules are invalid." Department of Revenue, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 364. The issue of whether an agency rule conflicts with the agency's enabling statute presents a question of law,

-4-

No. 2--08--0784 to be reviewed de novo. See Strategic Energy, LLC v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 369 Ill. App. 3d 238, 251 (2006) (questions of statutory interpretation to be reviewed de novo).1 The Act directs the Board to adopt "procedural rules and regulations which shall govern all Board proceedings" (5 ILCS 315/5(I) (West 2008)). Pursuant to that authority, the Board adopted the rule that, whenever a Board complaint is issued, "the respondent shall file an answer within 15 days after service of the complaint." 80 Ill. Adm. Code

Download Wood Dale Fire Protection District v. Illinois Labor Relations Board.pdf