Arla Abrell filed a complaint against Employers Insurance ofWausau ("Wausau") seeking a declaration that she was covered undera Wausau commercial automobile insurance policy for an accident inwhich she was injured. After a bench trial, the trial judge ruledthat Abrell was not covered under the terms of the policy becauseshe was not "occupying" the motor vehicle at the time of theaccident. We reverse and remand.

Abrell was employed as a manager of a seasonal Hickory Farmsstore opened in a mall for the holiday season. As part of her job,Abrell was in charge of a manager's "kiosk box" that containedpaperwork regarding the store's operation. When the season ended,Hickory Farms prepared to move the equipment from the mall, andAbrell was instructed to bring her kiosk box to the mall for themove. Abrell brought the box to her supervisor to be placed intoa moving van. After the box was placed in the rear of the van,Abrell and her supervisor began checking some of the paperwork. They stood at the back of the van for ten to fifteen minutes,retrieving various papers from the box, laying the papers out inthe bed of the van and reviewing them. While Abrell and hersupervisor were working on the back of the van, a car hit the vanfrom behind, struck Abrell and pinned her knee between the car andthe moving van's bumper.

At the time of the accident, Hickory Farms had an insurancepolicy with Wausau that covered the moving van. The policyprovided coverage to anyone "occupying" a covered vehicle, anddefined "occupying" as "in, upon, getting in, on, out or off." Abrell filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declarationthat she was covered under the policy.

Following a bench trial, the trial judge found that Abrell wasnot "occupying" the vehicle at the time of the accident. He heldthat, although Abrell had physical contact with the van, she wasnot using the vehicle as a means of transportation. Therefore, hegranted judgment to Wausau.

In construing the provisions of an insurance policy, we mustexamine the terms used to ascertain the intentions of the parties. Mathey v. Country Mutual Insurance Company, 321 Ill. App. 3d 805,809 (2001). If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous,we must give them their plain and ordinary meaning, and they mustbe applied as written unless they contravene public policy. Mathey, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 809.

If the facts of the case are undisputed, the question ofwhether the injured party falls within the coverage provided by theinsurance policy is a matter of interpretation and is strictly aquestion of law for us to decide. Indiana Insurance Company v.Liaskos, 297 Ill. App. 3d 569, 574 (1998). Here, Abrell onlychallenges the trial court's construction of the policy, withouttaking issue with its factual findings. Thus, we are presentedwith a question of law that is subject to de novo review. IndianaInsurance, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 574.

In Mathey, the court examined the language of an insurancepolicy with the same definition of "occupying" a vehicle. Thecourt found that "in, upon, getting in, on, out or off" areeveryday words defining broad factual situations (Mathey, 321 Ill.App. 3d at 312) and are clear and unambiguous. The court ruledthat the only elements necessary to impose liability on the insurerunder this broad definition are 1) some nexus or relationshipbetween the injured party and the covered automobile, and 2) actualor virtual physical contact between the injured party and theinsured vehicle. Mathey, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 811.

Abrell has proved both of these elements. First, as the trialcourt correctly noted, the issue of "physical contact" was concededhere; undoubtedly, Abrell was in contact with the moving van at thetime of the accident. Second, there was a nexus or relationshipbetween her and the vehicle. Abrell was working with her manager,using the rear of the vehicle as a makeshift desk, leaning into thevan to retrieve more papers and working with those papers on thevan's bed. Thus, under the broad interpretation of the policylanguage adopted by the courts of this state, she was "occupying"the vehicle.

Although the trial court found that "transportation" of theinjured party in the vehicle was a condition of having a nexus orrelationship with a vehicle, the cases do not require it. In fact,it had never been considered a deciding factor. See Mathey, 321Ill. App. 3d 805 (students who had been riding in a bus but werelined up several feet away from it at the time of the accident were"occupying" the bus); Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company v.Norris, 15 Ill. App. 3d 95 (1973) (girl who had ridden in a car,but was merely sitting on the fender at the time of the accident,was "occupying" the vehicle); Wolf v. American Casualty Company, 2Ill. App. 2d 124 (1954) (plaintiff, returning to his car after anaccident, was struck six feet from vehicle, but was close enough tobe "entering into" the car). On the contrary, the Mathey courtspecifically held that use of the vehicle for transportation is notnecessary for the injured party to be "occupying" the vehicle. Mathey, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 812-14.

The decisions in the above-cited cases are compelling. It isnot difficult to envision situations in which a person may beinjured while "in" or "upon" a vehicle without ever intending touse the vehicle for transportation. For instance, a person couldbe sitting inside a vehicle looking for something in the glovecompartment; a party could be injured while standing inside the bedof a truck, or while sitting on the hood of a car. Certainly thoseparties would be considered "in" or "upon" the respective vehicles.

The language of the policy was not restricted to those in orupon the vehicle solely for the purpose of transportation. Thepolicy provides inclusive coverage without limitation; we will notcarve out an exception to the clear and unambiguous language ofthis contract. Abrell must be granted coverage under the Wausaupolicy.

The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County isreversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

BARRY and HOLDRIDGE, JJ., concur.