Because plaintiff is appealing from the dismissal of hiscomplaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant tosection 2--615(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--615(a) (West 2000)), we accept as true all well-pleaded facts inthe complaint and all reasonable inferences which can be drawnfrom those facts. See Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154Ill. 2d 1, 607 N.E.2d 201 (1992). Bethany is a licensed providerof child care services. Plaintiff was employed by Bethany as achild care worker in Moline, Illinois, from 1984 to 1994. In1993, Bethany suspended one of plaintiff's co-workers, AnthonyCampagna, for alleged abuse of a child. Investigators for theDepartment of Children and Family Services (DCFS) notifiedBethany that they wanted to speak to plaintiff, who had personalknowledge of the alleged incident of child abuse. Plaintiff toldhis supervisors at Bethany that the information provided byBethany to DCFS concerning Campagna was false, and plaintiff wasgoing to testify at an upcoming DCFS hearing on Campagna'sbehalf. Thereafter, in March of 1994, Bethany vice-presidentThomas Gehlsen told plaintiff that he should find another job andplaintiff was given a negative employee evaluation.

In October of 1994 Bethany made a report to DCFS concerningan incident where plaintiff, while restraining a resident minor,allegedly caused severe rug burns to the child's face, requiringmedical treatment. Plaintiff and two co-workers prepared reportsconcerning the incident but Bethany failed to provide the reportsto DCFS. In November of 1994, plaintiff told Bethany presidentGary Ulrich that the October allegation of child abuse was falseand plaintiff would testify that DCFS was not receiving true andcomplete information from Bethany. On December 6, 1994,plaintiff was fired based on a determination by DCFS that theOctober incident of alleged child abuse was "indicated."

Plaintiff filed a complaint for retaliatory dischargeagainst defendant which, after a number of interlocutory rulingsand various amendments, was dismissed by the trial court onJanuary 26, 2001. At issue in this appeal are counts II, V, VI,VII and VIII of plaintiff's third amended complaint.

As we indicated above, when reviewing the dismissal of acomplaint for failure to state a cause of action, all well-pleaded facts and inferences drawn therefrom are accepted astrue. Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d 1, 607 N.E.2d 201. Pleadings are tobe liberally construed with a view to doing substantial justicebetween the parties (735 ILCS 5/2--603 (West 2000)), and theallegations of the complaint should be interpreted in the lightmost favorable to the plaintiff (Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d 1, 607N.E.2d 201). The standard of review for a dismissal undersection 2--615 is de novo. Neppl v. Murphy, 316 Ill. App. 3d581, 736 N.E.2d 1174 (2000); Stebbings v. University of Chicago,312 Ill. App. 3d 360, 726 N.E.2d 1136 (2000).

The tort of retaliatory discharge is a limited and narrowcause of action that stands as an exception to the general rulethat an "at will" employee may be terminated at any time for anyreason or no reason. Paskarnis v. Darien--Woodridge FireProtection District, 251 Ill. App. 3d 585, 623 N.E.2d 383 (1993);see Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 568 N.E.2d 870(1991). To establish a cause of action for retaliatorydischarge, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he was discharged inretaliation for his activities; and (2) the discharge contravenesa clearly mandated public policy. Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga,P.C., 185 Ill. 2d 372, 706 N.E.2d 491 (1998). Although there isno precise definition of what constitutes clearly mandated publicpolicy, it

"concerns what is right and just and whataffects the citizens of the Statecollectively. It is to be found in theState's constitution and statutes and, whenthey are silent, in its judicial decisions. [Citation.] Although there is no preciseline of demarcation dividing matters that arethe subject of public policies from matterspurely personal, *** a matter must strike atthe heart of a citizen's social rights,duties, and responsibilities before the tortwill be allowed." Palmateer v. InternationalHarvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (1981).

A review of Illinois case law indicates that retaliatorydischarge actions have been allowed under two circumstances: (1)when the employee has been fired for filing a claim for worker'scompensation; or (2) where the employee is discharged inretaliation for reporting illegal or improper conduct, otherwiseknown as "whistle blowing." Jacobson, 185 Ill. 2d 372, 706N.E.2d 491. Plaintiff's claims are of the latter variety, and wewill consider them individually, mindful that the tort ofretaliatory discharge seeks to achieve a balance among theemployer's interest in operating a business, the employee'sinterest in earning a living, and society's interest in seeingits public policies carried out. Fellhauer, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 568N.E.2d 870.

Count II of plaintiff's third amended complaint alleges thatplaintiff was discharged in retaliation for his anticipatedtestimony on behalf of Anthony Campagna. Plaintiff asserts thathis discharge violated the public policy expressed in section 9.1of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (Reporting Act),which provides:

"