Modified filed:  January 22, 2002

No. 3--01--0258

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2002

Katina Benson filed a small claims action against AlvinAbbott and Dale Ganaway to recover damages arising from anautomobile accident. Ganaway filed a two-count cross-claimagainst Abbott and was awarded a judgment of $7,348.91. Abbottappeals the amount of the award. We reduce the award to $5,000and remand for further proceedings.

The plaintiff, Katina Benson, was a passenger in a cardriven by one of the defendants, Dale Ganaway. Ganaway wasdriving behind a car driven by the other defendant, Alvin Abbott. When the two cars collided, Benson and Ganaway were injured. Benson filed a small claims action against Ganaway and Abbottseeking monetary damages for her injuries.

Ganaway brought a cross-claim against Abbott allegingAbbott's negligence as the proximate cause of the accident. InCount I of his cross-claim, Ganaway sought recovery for damagesto his vehicle in the amount of $4,064.11. In Count II, Ganawayoriginally sought $8,000 for personal injury damages, but movedto reduce that amount to $5,000 just before trial. At trial, thecourt awarded Ganaway $4,063.91 for property damages and $3,285for personal injury damages. The total amount of damages awardedGanaway was $7,348.91.

Abbott filed a posttrial motion to reduce damages to $5,000. The court denied Abbott's motion and Abbott appeals.

The sole question before this court is whether the circuitcourt had authority to award Ganaway more than $5,000 in damageson his two-count small claims complaint against Abbott. Abbottargues that the total amount of damages in a small claims actioncannot exceed $5,000. Ganaway, on the other hand, argues thateach count of his cross-claim constituted a separate cause ofaction, and that his individual awards were within the smallclaims limit.

Supreme Court Rule 281 provides that: "[A] small claim is acivil action based on either tort or contract for money not inexcess of $5,000, exclusive of interest and costs, or for thecollection of taxes not in excess of that amount." 166 Ill. 2dR. 281. Judicial interpretation of a Supreme Court Rule is aquestion of law. State Farm Insurance Co. v. Kazakova, 299 Ill.App. 3d 1028, 1031, 702 N.E.2d 254, 257 (1998). This courtreviews questions of law de novo. State Farm, 299 Ill. App. 3dat 1031, 702 N.E.2d at 257.

The specific question raised in this case has not beenaddressed in Illinois caselaw; however, there are related casesthat aid our analysis. Ganaway maintains that the case of Tomasov. Sestak, 321 Ill. App. 363, 53 N.E.2d 134 (1944), supports hisposition. In Tomaso, a plaintiff sought relief for personalinjuries and property damage in the municipal court of Chicago. At that time, damage awards for personal injury could not exceed$1,000 in that court. However, there was no limit on propertydamage awards. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiffcould bring both claims in the same action, but that theplaintiff could not receive a judgment in excess of $1,000 forpersonal injuries.

Ganaway points out that the Tomaso court treated theplaintiff's claims for personal injury and property damage asseparate actions. Ganaway argues that this holding should extendto the case at bar. However, the weight of authority does notfavor Ganaway's contention that his two negligence claims areseparate causes of action. Notably, in Rice v. Burnley, 230 Ill.App. 3d 987, 992, 596 N.E.2d 105, 107 (1992), a plaintiff setforth multiple counts seeking recovery for negligence, but thecourt held that the separate counts did not amount to separateactions. See also River Park, Inc., v. City of Highland Park,184 Ill. 2d 290, 703 N.E.2d 883 (1998) (holding that for purposesof res judicata, separate claims will be considered the samecause of action if they arise from a single group of operativefacts, regardless of whether they assert different theories ofrelief.)

Ganaway also points to Ras v. Allan Anthony Electric Corp.,55 Ill. App. 2d 176, 204 N.E.2d 797 (1965), in support of hisargument, but the facts before the court in Ras are not parallelto the circumstances we face in this case. Because the plaintiffin Ras sued three separate defendants in three separate counts,the trial court held that each count was a separate cause ofaction. Since each award against each defendant was below theauthorized limit, the lower court's judgment was affirmed. Ras,55 Ill. App. 2d at 182, 204 N.E.2d at 801.

Although separate causes of action existed in Ras, the sameis not true in this case. Ganaway's two counts are against asingle defendant and arise out of a single occurrence.Consequently, we hold that Ganaway's two negligence claims arepart of the same cause of action.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 281 a court may not award aplaintiff more than $5,000 in a small claims action. Because thecourt lacked the authority under Rule 281 to award Ganaway morethan $5,000 in damages, we reduce the award from $7,348.91 to$5,000 pursuant to our authority set forth in Supreme Court Rule366(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)).

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Rock Island County ismodified in accordance with this opinion. We remand this causeto the Circuit Court for proper apportioning of the award.

Affirmed as modified; remanded with directions.

BRESLIN, J., and LYTTON, P.J., concurred.