| LAURI BUCHNA, | ) | Appeal from the Circuit Court |
| ) | of the 10th Judicial Circuit, | |
| Petitioner-Appellant, | ) | Peoria County, Illinois |
| ) | ||
| v. | ) | |
| ) | ||
| ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF | ) | |
| EDUCATION; RONALD J. GIDWITZ, | ) | |
| MARILYN McCONACHIE, CONNIE | ) | |
| ROGERS, VINCENT J. SERRITELLA, | ) | |
| MARJORIE B. BRANCH, JANET | ) | No. 01--MR--126 |
| STEINER, and BEV TURKAL, in | ) | |
| their official capacities as | ) | |
| members of Illinois State | ) | |
| Board of Education; DAVID | ) | |
| L. G. JACOBS, hearing officer; | ) | |
| and BOARD OF EDUCATION OF | ) | |
| ILLINOIS VALLEY CENTRAL UNIT | ) | |
| SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 321, | ) | Honorable |
| ) | John A. Barra | |
| Respondents-Appellees. | ) | Judge, Presiding |
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the opinion of the court:
Lauri Buchna, a third-grade teacher for the Illinois ValleyCentral Unit School District No. 321 (District), was terminatedfor failing to successfully remediate under Article 24A of theSchool Code (Code) (105 ILCS 5/24A--1 et seq. (West 1996)). Shesought administrative review before a hearing officer appointedby the Illinois State Board of Education. The hearing officeraffirmed the District's termination decision. Buchna thenappealed to the Peoria County circuit court, which confirmed thehearing officer's decision. She now brings this appeal,claiming: (1) the hearing officer applied an incorrect legalstandard in upholding her termination, (2) the evidence does notsupport the hearing officer's decision, and (3) the circuitcourt's order is against the manifest weight of the evidence andcontrary to law. We reverse.
Section 24A--1 of the Code "requir[es] that all certifiedschool district employees be evaluated on a periodic basis andthat the evaluations result in remedial action being taken whendeemed necessary." 105 ILCS 5/24A--1 (West 1996). Buchna wasevaluated during the 1997-98 school year and received a rating of"Does not Meet District Expectations." The only other ratingavailable in the District's evaluation scheme was "Meets orExceeds District Expectations." Because of her rating, Buchnawas placed on a one-year remediation plan.
The plan called for remediation in 10 areas where Buchna hadbeen found deficient during her evaluation. The District issuedfour quarterly reports during the remediation period. In itsfirst two reports, the District gave Buchna an overall rating of"Does not Meet District Expectations." In its third report, theDistrict failed to give an overall rating; but the fourth reportagain specified an overall rating of "Does not Meet DistrictExpectations." The District thus terminated Buchna's employment,and she sought administrative review of the decision.
During the proceedings before the hearing officer, Buchnamoved for a directed verdict on several grounds. One of herclaims was based on subsection 24A--5(c) of the Code, whichrequired the District to conduct its pre-remediation evaluationusing three ratings: excellent, satisfactory, and unsatisfactory. 105 ILCS 5/24A--5(c) (West 1996). Since the District'sevaluation scheme only used two ratings ("Meets or ExceedsDistrict Expectations" and "Does not Meet DistrictExpectations"), and since the ratings did not follow thestatutory terminology, Buchna argued that her termination wasimproper because the District failed to comply with the mandatorylanguage of subsection 24A--5(c). The hearing officer denied themotion for a directed verdict, stating that the District hadsubstantially complied with subsection 24A--5(c). The circuitcourt confirmed the hearing officer's decision in its entirety,finding that the decision was neither against the manifest weightof the evidence nor contrary to law.
In her first claim, Buchna argues that the hearing officererroneously applied a substantial compliance standard. Shecontends that the officer was required to "strictly construe,"inter alia, "[the District's] statutory obligation to prove ***the legality of [its] evaluation plan." Of course, this claiminvolves a question of statutory construction. When construing astatute, our primary objective is to effectuate the legislature'sintent. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198 (2002). We first turn tothe statute's language--the most reliable indicator oflegislative intent. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96(2001). Where that language is clear and unambiguous, we applythe statute as written without resorting to other aids ofconstruction. C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198. Our review is de novo. C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198.
In the instant case, the relevant statutory language appearsin section 24A--5, which reads:
"Evaluation of teachers whose positions do notrequire administrative certification shall be conductedby an administrator qualified under Section 24A--3 ***and shall include at least the following components:
(c) rating of the teacher's performance asexcellent, satisfactory or unsatisfactory.
(f) within 30 days after completion of anevaluation rating a teacher as unsatisfactory,development and commencement by the district *** of aremediation plan designed to correct deficienciescited, provided the deficiencies are deemed remediable.***
(g) participation in the remediation plan by theteacher rated unsatisfactory, a district administratorqualified under Section 24A--3 ***, and a consultingteacher *** of the teacher who was ratedunsatisfactory, which consulting teacher is aneducational employee ***, has at least 5 years'teaching experience and a reasonable familiarity withthe assignment of the teacher being evaluated, and whoreceived an excellent rating on his or her most recentevaluation. ***
(h) quarterly evaluations and ratings for oneyear(1) immediately following receipt of anunsatisfactory rating of a teacher for whom aremediation plan has been developed; ***
(i) *** reinstatement to a schedule of biennialevaluation for any teacher who completes the 1-yearremediation plan with a satisfactory or better rating,unless the district's plan regularly requires morefrequent evaluations; ***
(j) dismissal *** of any teacher who fails tocomplete any applicable remediation plan with asatisfactory or better rating." 105 ILCS 5/24A--5(c),(f) through (j) (West 1996).
This language clearly states that use of the three-tieredrating system from subsection 24A--5(c) is mandatory. Yet theDistrict has gone to great lengths to convince us that themandatory word "shall" really only means "may." We decline toadopt this position. As noted above, if a statute's language isclear and unambiguous, we will interpret the statute according toits plain meaning without resorting to other aids ofconstruction.
In the fourth paragraph of section 24A--5, the legislaturewrote:
"The plan may provide for evaluation of personnelwhose positions require administrative certification byindependent evaluators not employed by or affiliatedwith the school district. The results of the schooldistrict administrators' evaluations shall be reportedto the employing school board ***." (Emphasis added.) 105 ILCS 5/24A--5 (West 1996).
By using both the words "may" and "shall" in adjoining sentences,the legislature demonstrated independent signification ofpermissive and mandatory scenarios. Then in the very nextsentence the legislature applied the mandatory word "shall" tosubsection 24A--5(c), which requires school districts to giveteachers one of three ratings: excellent, satisfactory, orunsatisfactory. The directive is clear and unambiguous. Thelegislature even enclosed each rating in quotation marks tounmistakably articulate the required categories. Yet in theinstant case, the District ignored the requirements and evaluatedBuchna under a scheme using only two ratings--neither of whichemployed the statutory language.
The remediation and dismissal provisions of section 24A--5 only apply to teachers who have received an "unsatisfactory"rating. Since Buchna never received that rating, she was neverrightfully subject to remediation, and her dismissal wasimproper.
We appreciate the District's argument that its two ratingsessentially represent the legislature's three ratings (with"Meets or Exceeds District Expectations" being a combination of"excellent" and "satisfactory," and "Does not Meet DistrictExpectations" being "unsatisfactory"). We have also consideredthe District's various other arguments (e.g., that Buchna was notprejudiced by its two-tiered rating system). However, thesearguments sidestep the threshold issue of noncompliance. Wesimply cannot sanction disregard for clear statutory directives. Aside from the simple issue of compliance, such disregardthreatens the legislature's intended application of section 24A--5. For instance, the requisite consulting teacher must have"received an excellent rating on his or her most recentevaluation." 105 ILCS 5/24A--5(g) (West 1996). This provisionsignals the legislature's intent to exclude mere "satisfactory"teachers from being consulting teachers. Yet the District'srating scheme does not distinguish between "satisfactory" and"excellent" teachers. Thus, when a consulting teacher is chosenfrom the District's highest rated teachers, there is still aquestion of whether that teacher meets the legislature'sprescribed criteria.
Nevertheless, the District argues that it was only requiredto substantially comply with the procedures of section 24A--5. The District supports this argument by citing the followingstatement from the Appellate Court, Fifth District:
"When this court reviews any decision of a circuitcourt which has handed down an opinion under theAdministrative Review Act it is confronted with twoquestions: (1) Does the record show that the steps andprocedures required by law were taken, and (2) If so,is or is not the decision of the board oradministrative agency against the manifest weight ofthe evidence? If, upon examination of the recordregarding the first question, the court concludes thatthere were failures or omissions which substantiallyaffect the rights of the party against whom theproceedings are taken, it has no choice but toreverse." (Emphasis added.) Waller v. Board ofEducation of Century Community Unit School District No.100, 13 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1058 (1973).
The Waller court did not cite any authority for this proposition. Furthermore, the issue in Waller was different from the issuepresently before us. The facts of the instant case invoke clearand unequivocal statutory language, and we are obligated toeffectuate that language.
Section 5 only authorizes remediation if certainrequirements are followed. The Board lost its remedial authoritywhen it failed to comply with one of those requirements. Thelegislature meant what it said when it used the mandatory word"shall." This conclusion is further supported by the lastsentence of Section 5, which reads: "Failure to strictly complywith the time requirements contained in [this section] shall notinvalidate the results of the remediation plan." 105 ILCS 5/24A--5 (West 1996). The need to disavow a strict compliance standardin this specific instance signals that the standard is otherwisegenerally applicable.
Finally, the District places much weight on the fact thatits two-tiered rating system resulted from collective bargainingwith the teachers' union. Since such bargaining is mandatory onprocedural matters (see 105 ILCS 5/24A--4 (West 1996); 115 ILCS5/10(a) (West 1996); see also Alton Education Ass'n, IEA-NEA v.Alton Community Unit School District No. 11, 9 Pub. Employee Rep.for Illinois