In 1990 Coyne submitted to a psychological evaluation by DoctorRip O'Keefe to determine his fitness for a promotion to the rank ofpolice sergeant. Doctor O'Keefe indicated that, from a psychologicalstandpoint, Coyne was sound and suffered no impediments that wouldhinder his performance as a sergeant. Coyne received the promotion.

After he filed his application for pension benefits, theVillage of Milan (the Village) petitioned to intervene in theproceedings. The Village cited two bases for intervention: aninterest in the expenditure of its pension funds; and a similaritybetween the facts of Coyne's claim and the facts of a pendinggrievance filed by the police union on his behalf. The Village'spetition to intervene was granted.

The pension hearing occurred in June of 1998. At the outset ofthe hearing, Coyne's counsel raised a conflict-of-interest issuebecause two of the Board's members held other positions with theVillage. The challenged board members were Don Wall (villagetrustee) and Barbara Lee (elected village clerk). Counsel asked Walland Lee to recuse themselves, stating that he was not questioningtheir impartiality but merely asserting a "legal question" he feltobligated to raise. Ensuing discussions revealed that Wall hadvoting power on the Village's taxing authority the Village used togenerate pension funds; however, Lee had no financial decision-makingpower for the Village. Wall voluntarily recused himself, but Leedeclined to step down.

In response to pointed questioning, Lee affirmed that: she wascapable of rendering a fair and impartial decision based solely onthe evidence presented at the hearing; she harbored no preconceivednotions and had not judged the case beforehand; and her position asvillage clerk, in combination with the Village's status as anintervener, would not influence her decision in any way. TheVillage's attorney advised that the Board had no authority todisqualify Lee from service. Although Coyne's counsel persisted inhis conflict-of-interest objection, he agreed to proceed with Lee onthe Board. Counsel again explained that his objection was notdirected at Lee personally; rather, he believed recusal wasappropriate "just by [her] position."

The first witness to testify at the hearing was Dennis Baraks,Chief of Police in the Milan Police Department. Baraks said Coyne'sjob performance began declining in late 1994 or early 1995. Beforethat time, Coyne exhibited no problems and performed above-averagework. The first sign of problems occurred when Baraks requested anexplanation for Coyne's excessive speed while driving his squad car. According to department records, Coyne was responsible for 80% of theinstances where an officer drove above 80 miles per hour. Uponreceiving the request, Coyne "charged into [Baraks'] office" andclaimed he deserved special consideration because he performed themost work in the department. Baraks acknowledged that Coyne had been"very active" on the police force and was extremely dependable inhigh-stress situations. However, after their confrontation on thespeeding issue, Coyne became sullen, unreceptive to personalconversation, vindictive, and hostile.

In May of 1995 Baraks wrote a letter to Coyne expressingconcern about his psychological fitness to perform police work. Baraks advised that Coyne's conduct was inappropriate and that hewould be sent for a psychological evaluation if the conductcontinued. The conduct did continue, and Baraks wrote another letterwarning Coyne of a possible suspension or psychological review. InOctober of 1995 Baraks wrote a third letter advising Coyne: "[F]orthe past year your conduct has been irrational." He noted that Coynewas performing his duties at a fraction of his ability.

Baraks testified that as of November, 1995, he did not believeCoyne was fit for police duty. His primary concern was not how Coynewould perform in the field, but rather the negative effect Coyne'spresence would have on the department internally.

Coyne was the only other witness to testify at the hearing. Hesaid he suffered psychological impairment from being traumatized byseveral incidents at work. During one of the incidents, a drunkdriver ran a red light in May of 1994 and hit the driver's door ofCoyne's car. Coyne missed work for three months while recoveringfrom injuries he sustained in the accident. During a secondincident, an 18-year old boy brandished a knife in March of 1995 andstruggled with Coyne while trying to disarm his holstered serviceweapon. Realizing that his job could have required killing ateenager, Coyne became convinced that he was incapable ofappropriately responding to violent acts (especially discharging hisfirearm). From that point on, he worked with no ammunition in hisfirearm. During a third incident, Coyne responded to a motor vehicleaccident in November of 1995 where he crawled into an overturned carto assist a trapped motorist. He said the experience caused aflashback to his own accident with the drunk driver. While rescuingthe motorist, he experienced extreme claustrophobia and had seriousdifficulty staying inside the overturned car.

In addition to these incidents, Coyne described several othertraumatic experiences including a canoe accident where two personsdrowned, several suicides, and a motorcycle accident where a youngman was killed. Coyne was good friends with the parents of the youngman who died in the motorcycle accident. He tried to perform CPR atthe scene, but on the first compression his hand broke through theyoung man's chest.

After the incident with the trapped motorist, Coyne went homeand wrote a suicide note, laid out his funeral clothes, sat in thebathtub, and nearly shot himself while holding a loaded gun in hismouth. The next day he sought help from Doctor O'Keefe. He choseDoctor O'Keefe's office because the department had sent him there in1990 for his sergeant's evaluation. The doctor suggested in-patientmental health treatment, but Coyne refused to be committed andinstead commenced a course of outpatient treatment. He did notreturn to work.

Coyne testified that when he left active duty he was depressedand felt like everyone was "out to get [him]." He described himselfas "a time bomb waiting to go off." His symptoms includedsleeplessness, nightmares, inattentiveness, uncontrolled anger, afluctuating appetite, loss of energy, and paranoid thoughts. He saidhis nightmares often involved replays of "ugly calls" and priortraumatic events on the job. Other dreams involved situations wherehe had to defend himself against an oncoming assailant. Sometimes inthose dreams he could not pull the trigger on his weapon; other timeshe pulled the trigger and then reached out to grab the bullet becausehe wanted it back.

According to Coyne, Doctor O'Keefe saved his life by helpinghim gain enough control to prevent him from harming himself orothers. In addition to Doctor O'Keefe's psychological treatment,Coyne also received psychiatric treatment from Doctor G. Narayan. Both doctors advised him to leave police work and find a job where hecould keep busy with accomplishable tasks. Accordingly, he acquireda truck and began driving as an independent contractor. He saidtruck driving satisfied the doctors' recommendation because it didnot involve public interaction or high pressure. He simply picked uploads and dropped them off without any employee-supervisorrelationship.

Coyne testified that he needed additional treatment from DoctorO'Keefe but could not afford it. He was $70,000 in debt fromstarting his trucking business, and the business was just breakingeven. Additionally, his health insurance through the Village onlycovered 50% of the bills from his mental health treatment. Healready had an outstanding balance of $2,500 to $3,000 with DoctorO'Keefe.

Coyne testified that his last visit to Doctor O'Keefe wassometime in 1997, and that he treated with Doctor Narayan throughlate 1997 or early 1998. He said he followed all the instructionsthe doctors gave him, and he was still taking prescriptionmedication. Sometimes, however, he did not take his medicationbecause it made him feel "real blah." He said he was not capable ofperforming police work because he could not respond appropriately tostressful and violent situations.

In addition to written records from Doctors O'Keefe andNarayan, the evidence included records from three doctors appointedby the Board to evaluate Coyne. The doctors were Henry Conroe,Jonathan Kelly, and Richard Harris. The evidence also included areport from Doctor Eric Ostrov, whom Coyne visited on a referral fromDoctor Kelly.

Doctor O'Keefe's records show that Coyne drafted threememoranda outlining numerous events leading to his psychologicaldisability. The events ranged from disagreements with Chief Baraksto incidents where Coyne witnessed deaths. In January of 1996 DoctorO'Keefe wrote:

"It is my opinion that Sgt. Coyne is currently unable tofunction as a police officer. He poses a significant riskto himself and to the well being of others. He is placedon medical leave from his employment as a police officerdue to job related stress factors. I believe the MilanPolice Department should proceed to evaluate Sgt. Coynefor a job related disability retirement."

Doctor O'Keefe's ultimate diagnosis was post-traumatic stressdisorder stemming from "a series of work-related stressors" causingCoyne to "progressively deteriorate[] from his ability to do policework." The doctor advised that in all likelihood Coyne would neverbe able to resume such work.

Doctor Narayan also diagnosed Coyne with post-traumatic stressdisorder and said: "[i]t is further advisable that he can not returnto his duties as a police officer [because] the renewed stress couldbe detrimental to his safety and the safety of other people." Commenting on the cause of Coyne's disorder, Doctor Narayan observed:"Mr. Coyne has gone through significant traumatic experiences throughout [sic] ten years as a police officer."

Doctor Conroe diagnosed Coyne with major depressive disorder,describing his condition as "the cumulative effect of witnessing andexperiencing events involving death, the threat of death or seriousinjury." The doctor further stated that Coyne could not control hisemotions and judgment sufficiently to work as a police officer.

Doctor Kelly diagnosed Coyne with major depression, describinghis condition as a "response to traumatic incidents he was exposed toon his job as a policeman." According to the doctor, Coyne waspsychiatrically disabled from working as a police officer, but withproper treatment he could overcome his depression and resume suchwork.

Doctor Ostrov diagnosed major depression and stated that Coynecould not work as a police officer.

Doctor Harris opined that Coyne did not suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and was not disabled from performing policework. In rendering this opinion, the doctor made multiple referencesto a conversation he had with Doctor O'Keefe. Doctor Harris' writtenreport reads:

"Sgt. Coyne does not have a severe impairment renderinghim unable to perform the duties of a police officer. Hehad an acute problem which was treated quickly andsuccessfully. He currently has no signs of the symptomsnecessitating treatment in November 1995. His acutedisorder was largely a function of long-standing problemsin interpersonal relationships stimulated by the notinfrequent, volatile quality of the manager-manageerelationship."

Doctor O'Keefe reviewed Doctor Harris' report and respondedwith a letter reiterating his position that, "based upon many hoursof treatment of Sgt. Coyne, *** he is disabled from police work and[the disability] is *** work-related." Doctor O'Keefe stated thatDoctor Harris "misse[d] the point" and "went out of his way to focusonly on that information that proved his conclusion." He also saidDoctor Harris reported their conversation accurately but notcompletely. In particular, Doctor Harris omitted Doctor O'Keefe'sfirm position that Coyne is disabled as a result of work-relatedactivities, and that the disability is complete and likely permanent.

Coyne testified that Doctor Harris was arrogant and obnoxious,and that they "didn't hit it off" during his evaluation. He saidthey spent little time discussing his work-related incidents becausethe doctor's questions did not elicit that information. Rather,according to Coyne, Doctor Harris spent most of his time asking aboutsex (Coyne's sex life and the sex lives of his co-workers).

After considering the foregoing evidence, the Board deniedCoyne's pension application. The Board specifically found that Coynefailed to prove: a disability rendering him incapable of performingpolice work (a necessary element for both a line-of-duty and a non-duty pension), and a disabling condition resulting from an act ofpolice duty (necessary for a line-of-duty pension). Additionally,the Board found two bases for denying pension benefits even if Coynehad satisfied the necessary elements: his purported refusal toundergo reasonable medical treatment, and a lack of unanimity amongthe three board-appointed doctors regarding whether he was disabledfrom performing police work.

On administrative review, a judge from the Rock Island Countycircuit court upheld two of the Board's findings: that Coyne failedto prove a disabling condition resulting from an act of police duty,and that he refused to undergo reasonable medical treatment. Accordingly, the judge affirmed the Board's decision although shedisagreed with its remaining findings. Coyne then filed this appeal.

In administrative cases our role is to review the decision ofthe administrative agency, not the decision of the circuit court. Board of Education of Round Lake Area Schools v. State Board ofEducation, 292 Ill. App. 3d 101 (1997). We do not re-weigh theevidence or make an independent determination of the facts; rather,we ascertain whether the factual findings made by the administrativeagency are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Abrahamsonv. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76(1992). Factual findings are against the manifest weight of theevidence only where "it is clearly evident the [agency] erred andshould have reached the opposite conclusion." Board of Education ofRound Lake, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 109.

Coyne's first issue pertains to Barbara Lee's presence on theBoard. Because of her position as village clerk, Coyne claims herservice as a board member created "a hopeless conflict of interest"and denied his right to a fair and impartial hearing. The assertedconflict allegedly placed Lee in a "squeeze play" where a voteagainst pension benefits was desirable because it benefitted theVillage financially. In Coyne's view, one of three things wasnecessary to make the proceeding fair: Lee should have recusedherself, the Board should have disqualified her, or the Villageshould have withdrawn as a party to the action.

There is no question that a claimant in an administrativeproceeding is constitutionally entitled to fair and impartialadjudication. Klomann v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 284Ill. App. 3d 224 (1996). However, establishing impartiality requiresmore than merely stating why an adjudicator might have harbored bias. Persons serving on administrative tribunals are presumed to be fairand honest. Jackson v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuityand Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 293 Ill. App. 3d 694 (1997). To prove bias or prejudice, a claimant must show that such personswere incapable of judging the controversy fairly and on the basis ofits own circumstances. Flaherty v. Retirement Board of thePolicemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 311 Ill.App. 3d 62 (1999).

The case of Danko v. Board of Trustees of the City of HarveyPension Board, 240 Ill. App. 3d 633 (1992), demonstrates properapplication of these principles. In Danko the chairman of a pensionboard was also the claimant's former boss. The chairman had beenintricately involved in the events leading up to the pension hearing,and during the hearing he called the claimant a "liar." He alsoasserted that the claimant should have taken a light-duty position he(the chairman) had offered. Under these circumstances, the chairmanwas found to have harbored bias that violated the claimant's right toa fair hearing. Danko, 240 Ill. App. 3d 633; see A.R.F. Landfill,Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 174 Ill. App. 3d 82 (1988) (when anadministrative officer's conduct indicates that he or she hasadjudged the case before actually hearing it, bias should be found).

The only evidence Coyne offers against Lee is the mere fact ofher simultaneous service as village clerk and a member of the Board. Beyond stating that fact, Coyne's argument is essentially aninducement to reach negative conclusions based merely on assumptionsabout Lee's thought process. Such argument does not establishreversible error. Unlike the chairman in Danko, Lee's conduct didnot signal a predetermined decision of the case. She openly assertedthat she would be impartial, and her subsequent conduct did notindicate otherwise. Coyne has not overcome the presumption that Leewas fair and impartial.

The United States Supreme Court case of Ward v. Village ofMonroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 34 L. Ed. 2d 267, 93 S. Ct. 80 (1972), isalso instructive. In Ward a defendant was convicted of two municipaltraffic offenses in a court where the judge was also the villagemayor. The defendant argued that his due process rights wereviolated by the mayor's service as judge. The Supreme Court agreedbecause the mayor possessed "wide executive powers" (includingresponsibility for village finances), and "[a] major part of villageincome [was] derived from the fines, forfeitures, costs, and feesimposed by him in his mayor's court." Ward, 409 U.S. at 58, 34 L.Ed. 2d at 269-70, 93 S. Ct. at 82. Under such circumstances, theCourt observed, the mayor perforce occupied two practicallyinconsistent positions; one involving partisanship to generatevillage revenue, and the other involving neutrality to fairly judgethe case.

In reaching its decision, however, the Court distinguished itsprior holding in Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61, 72 L. Ed. 785, 48 S. Ct.439 (1928). Dugan also involved a mayor who sat as a judge inmunicipal court. However, unlike the mayor in Ward, he possessed"very limited executive authority" and had but one vote on a five-member city commission. Ward, 409 U.S. at 60, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 271,93 S. Ct. at 83. Under such circumstances, the Court observed, "theMayor's relationship to the finances and financial policy of the citywas too remote to warrant a presumption of bias toward conviction inprosecutions before him as judge." Ward, 409 U.S. at 60-61, 34 L.Ed. 2d at 271, 93 S. Ct. at 83.

In the instant case, Lee was not similarly situated with themayor in Ward. In fact her position was even more benign than theposition of the mayor in Dugan. The record from the pension hearingshows that Lee had absolutely no financial decision-making power forthe Village. Her duties were merely clerical. Accordingly, herconnection to the Village's financial policy was too remote towarrant a presumption of bias toward denying pensions. In light ofher ostensible impartiality, we see no basis for finding that herpresence on the Board rendered the pension hearing unfair.

As noted above, to receive either a line-of-duty pension or anon-duty pension, a claimant must prove that he suffers from adisability preventing him from performing police work. See 40 ILCS5/3--114.1, 3--114.2 (West 1996). In the instant case, the Boardfound that Coyne failed to prove such disability.

The record shows that six doctors evaluated Coyne and renderedopinions on his disability status. Doctors O'Keefe, Narayan, Conroe,Kelly, and Ostrov all stated that Coyne was disabled and could notperform police work. The opinions of Doctors O'Keefe and Narayan areespecially noteworthy because, unlike the appointed evaluators, theyhad the benefit of assessing Coyne's situation through an extendedcourse of treatment. Additionally, the testimony from Chief Baraksand Coyne himself supports the five doctors' opinions that Coyne wasunfit to work in the police department.

Against this evidence, Doctor Harris stood alone in opiningthat Coyne was not disabled. The Board found that Doctor Harris wasmore credible than the other doctors and chose to adopt his opinion. However, the Board gave no explanation for this finding. Instead theBoard merely stated: "[We choose] to place greater weight on thepsychiatric report of Dr. Richard Harris, M.D. and for purposes ofthis Decision and Order adopt[] the following findings contained inDr. Harris' January 23, 1997 report."

The circuit judge expressed concern over this matter. Duringoral arguments in the circuit court, the following colloquy occurredbetween the judge and the Board's counsel:

"THE COURT: Let me ask you a question as Mr. Marquis[Coyne's counsel] pointed out we didn't hear the doctorstestify they just filed written reports so *** the Boardcould not assess the credibility of these physicians, andI believe in the Pension Board's opinion it states [theyfound] Dr. Harris' report more persuasive but I don'tbelieve the opinion states why they found it morepersuasive.

MR. PUCHALSKI [Board's counsel]: Well, I don't knoweither, but I think again that's within the purview of theBoard *** to determine when they have conflicts like theydo in this type of case which way they're going to go, andI think if that report is in evidence and it's in therecord and the Board indicates that is the report they'rerelying on I think the inquiry stops there, it's validevidence. *** If the Board chooses to believe Harris thenthis court is bound under the manifest weight standard ofreview."

We disagree with counsel's interpretation of the manifestweight standard. Despite the existence of Doctor Harris' report, westill have an obligation to review the evidence and ascertain whethera conclusion opposite the Board's decision is clearly apparent fromthe record. C.f., Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon, 405 Ill. 384 (1950)(noting that the manifest weight standard is not a mere stamp ofapproval for agency decisions).

In light of the considerable evidence against Doctor Harris'opinion, the circuit judge reversed the Board's finding on thisissue--flatly concluding that it was against the manifest weight ofthe evidence. We certainly understand the judge's concerns. However, we are also mindful of the injunction against appellatecourts re-weighing the evidence and making independent factualdeterminations. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d 76. Our standard of reviewgives the Board the benefit of the doubt. But with no articulationof the findings upon which the Board based its determination, wecannot extend that benefit in an informed manner. An administrativeagency's prerogative undoubtedly includes making credibilitydeterminations between doctors who render competing opinions. Butwhen the evidence weighs heavily against a single doctor, and theagency chooses to adopt that doctor's opinion, the agency mustarticulate the findings underlying its choice to facilitatemeaningful review.

Considering the nature of our role as an appellate court, webelieve the appropriate course is to remand with instructions for theBoard to conduct further proceedings consistent with the foregoingobservations.

Under section 3--114.1 of the Illinois Pension Code (the Code),a police officer is entitled to a line-of-duty pension if hisdisability results from "the performance of an act of duty." 40 ILCS5/3--114.1 (West 1996). In cases involving claims of duty-relatedstress, the officer must prove disability resulting from a specific,identifiable act of duty unique to police work. Robbins v. Board ofTrustees of the Carbondale Police Pension Fund of the City ofCarbondale, Illinois, 177 Ill. 2d 533 (1997). Accordingly, a line-of-duty pension is not allowed for disability resulting from"generalized police stress of multiple origins." Robbins, 177 Ill.2d at 543; see Trettenero v. Police Pension Fund, 268 Ill. App. 3d 58(1994) (noting that where an officer's disability is traceable onlyto the general nature of police work rather than a specific act ofpolice service, a line-of-duty pension is denied).

The officer in Robbins claimed his psychological disabilitystemmed specifically from witnessing a suicide where a man shothimself in the face with a shotgun. The doctors who treated andexamined the officer agreed that his stress was related to his policework; however, they did not connect the stress to any specific act heperformed in the line of duty. For example, one doctor attributedthe officer's stress to "[h]is continuous exposure to possibleviolence, as well as the pace of his duties in general." Robbins,177 Ill. 2d at 544. In light of this evidence, the pension boarddenied the officer's request for line-of-duty benefits, and theIllinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial. Robbins, 177 Ill. 2d533.

The facts of the instant case call for the same result. Therecord is replete with evidence that Coyne's psychological disorderresulted from the cumulative effect of traumatic duties he performedover his career as a police officer. The medical evidence shows thatno specific act of his employment caused the disorder; rather, hedeveloped problems over time in response to stressful work-relatedsituations. This scenario does not satisfy the "act of duty"requirement in section 3--114.1. Accordingly, the Board's decisionto deny a line-of-duty pension on this ground is not against themanifest weight of the evidence.

Regardless of the type of pension a claimant seeks, acompensable disability will not be found if he unreasonably refusesnecessary medical treatment. Mulack v. Hickory Hills Police PensionBoard, 252 Ill. App. 3d 1063 (1993). In other words, the term"disability" excludes conditions that can be remedied withoutsignificant danger or extraordinary suffering, and when medicalopinion offers a reasonable prospect for relief. Mulack, 252 Ill.App. 3d 1063. However, medicine is not an exact science, and if aclaimant's refusal of treatment is within the bounds of reason, hisfreedom of choice should be preserved even though the treatment mightmitigate the employer's damages. Mulack, 252 Ill. App. 3d 1063.

On this issue the Board based its decision solely on DoctorKelly's May 9, 1997, report. Doctor Kelly opined that "[a]dditionalpsychiatric treatment is reasonably expected to result in OfficerCoyne being in full remission of his depression, and to be able toreturn to full and unrestricted police duties." The doctor's reportcontinued:

"When interviewed on January 16, 1997, Officer Coynestated that his medication and his visits with Dr. O'Keefedid benefit him, and had helped his symptoms. He admittedthat he needed to increase the frequency of hisappointments to once per week. (He said he was seeing Dr.O'Keefe every two to three weeks and recently once perweek, and he saw Dr. Narayan infrequently, every threemonths.) Records indicate that Officer Coyne hasresponded to medications ***. Records also indicate thatOfficer Coyne admits he has stopped medications on his ownat times ***. In his interview on January 16, 1997,Officer Coyne admitted to being resistant to takingmedications[:] you're supposed to be a man, a policeman,not let anything bother you... Dr. O'Keefe wanted me togo in the hospital, but I don't like hospitals and I'm notcrazy, to be put in a looney-toon bin, be locked up. Doctor Narayan has changed the doses of medications...maybe he lowered them too much. I ain't going on pills mywhole life. Records (13) indicate that Officer Coyne hasbeen treated with low doses of antidepressant medications(Zoloft 50 mg. Trazodone 50 mg.) His partial response tomedication (as reflected in the persistence of depressivesymptoms) is likely relat[ed] to lack of sufficient doseof antidepressant medications and lack of compliance intaking medication on the part of Sergeant Coyne."

After reproducing this report in its written decision, theBoard merely stated: "[Coyne] has given no plausible reason for hisrefusal to follow the prescribed treatment regimen recommended by hisown physicians. *** [T]he weight of the psychiatric evidenceestablishes that a reasonable treatment regimen exists, withoutunreasonable risk that would allow [Coyne] to return to fullunrestricted police duties, if followed by [Coyne]. *** Since [Coyne]has refused, he is not disabled as that term is contemplated underthe *** Pension Code."

This analysis is insufficient to sustain a denial of pensionbenefits. By relying entirely on Doctor Kelly's report, the Boardlimited itself to the information contained in that report--most ofwhich stemmed from an interview in January of 1997. We cannot simplydraw a line between 1996 and 1997 and then conclusively declare,based on events preceding the line, that Coyne's conduct disqualifieshim from receiving pension benefits. By doing so, the Boardeffectively ignored the year's worth of treatment Coyne underwent in1997. Before the Board can conclusively determine whether Coyne'streatment choices disqualify him from pension eligibility, it mustconsider the entire course of his treatment. This observation isparticularly apt considering the above-stated rule that if aclaimant's treatment choices are reasonable, his freedom of choiceshould be preserved even if he declines treatment that might mitigatethe employer's damages. Mulack, 252 Ill. App. 3d 1063. The Boardapparently never even considered whether the treatment Coyne opted toundergo was reasonable (choosing instead to focus merely on the factthat he declined some treatment). Such analysis is incomplete.

Furthermore, when the Board adopted Doctor Kelly's report, itrepeated the omission we discussed above in connection with DoctorHarris' report. Based on Doctor Kelly's opinion, the Board statedthat "the weight of the psychiatric evidence showed that Coyne, withfurther treatment, could resume unrestricted police duties. Yet theBoard did not provide any explanation for its conclusion regardingevidentiary weight. Such an explanation is incumbent under theinstant facts, where among the five doctors who concluded that Coynewas disabled, Doctor Kelly stood alone in opining that he could berehabilitated and resume unrestricted police work as a policeofficer. In fact, both of Coyne's treating physicians advised him toget out of police work altogether.

On remand the Board is instructed to conduct furtherproceedings consistent with these observations.

Section 3--115 of the Code reads:

"A disability pension shall not be paid unless there isfiled with the board certificates of the police officer'sdisability, subscribed and sworn to by the police officerif not under legal disability, or by a representative ifthe officer is under legal disability, and by the policesurgeon (if there be one) and 3 practicing physiciansselected by the board. The board may require otherevidence of disability." (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/3--115 (West 1996).

In its written decision, the Board interpreted this language asrequiring a unanimous declaration from its three appointed doctorsthat Coyne was disabled for police work. Since Doctor Harris opinedthat Coyne was not so disabled, the Board summarily denied benefits.⁽¹⁾

The circuit judge disagreed with this interpretation of section3--115, finding that the relevant statutory language was ambiguous. After examining the language (including the constitutionalramifications of the Board's interpretation), the judge construedsection 3-115 as requiring three medical certificates addressingCoyne's disability status. Since all three of the certificates metthis standard, the judge concluded that Doctor Harris' opinion didnot ipso facto disqualify Coyne from receiving pension benefits.

We agree with the judge's conclusion. The key inquiry in ourcertificate analysis involves the meaning of the qualifying label "ofdisability."

Our dictionary search has revealed no fewer than 21 nuances forthe word "of." Possible definitions range from "[d]erived or comingfrom" to "[d]uring or on a specified time." The American HeritageCollege Dictionary 964 (4th ed. 2002). This range injects ambiguityinto the pivotal statutory language. In fact, several legitimatedefinitions for the word "of" directly contradict the Board'sposition. Three such definitions are "[c]entering on" or "directedtoward," "[w]ith reference to" or "about," and "[i]n respect to." TheAmerican Heritage College Dictionary 964 (4th ed. 2002). Thesedefinitions easily encompass a certificate addressing a claimant'sdisability status generally, regardless of the doctor's ultimateopinion about whether the claimant can perform police work.

The meaning of the word "disability" is also instructive. Adescription of someone as merely "disabled" conveys only generalmeaning because it says nothing about the degree of the person'sincapacity. Disabilities come in various shapes and sizes. Forinstance, in prescribing workers' compensation benefits thelegislature has articulated at least three different categories ofdisability: temporary total incapacity, permanent partial incapacity,and permanent total incapacity. See 820 ILCS 305/8 (West 2002).

The legislature also recognized varying degrees of disabilityin the Pension Code. Section 3--114.2 reads:

"A police officer who becomes disabled as a result ofany cause other than the performance of an act of duty,and who is found to be physically or mentally disabled soas to render necessary his or her suspension or retirementfrom police service in the police department, shall beentitled to a [non-duty] disability pension ***." 40 ILCS5/3--114.2 (West 1996).

This statute prescribes a two-step process. First, the policeofficer suffers a disability; then the pension board decides whetherthe degree of the disability is sufficient to trigger pensionbenefits. See also 40 ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 2000) (where the officerfirst suffers a sickness or injury, and then the board determines ifthe resulting condition meets the elevated disability standard fortriggering pension benefits).

In the certificate provision of section 3--115, the legislaturereferenced "disability" in a general fashion without elevating theterm as it did in section 3--114.2. This fact, combined with theabove-mentioned range of definitions for the word "of," results inambiguity regarding the content of the required certificates. Whenfaced with such ambiguity, we employ established tenets of statutoryconstruction. One primary tenet requires construction in a mannerthat avoids absurd or unconstitutional results. See In re Loss, 119Ill. 2d 186 (1987).

We believe the Board's interpretation of section 3--115 yieldsa result that is both absurd and unconstitutional. Although theBoard adjudicated several issues other than the certificaterequirement, such action was superfluous if the Board'sinterpretation of that requirement is carried to its logicalconclusion. As a threshold matter in all cases, the three physiciansspecified in section 3--115 would each have to certify that theapplicant was disabled for police work. The opinion of a loneminority dissenter like Doctor Harris (five contrary opinionsnotwithstanding) would ipso facto defeat a pension claim, thusrendering section 3--115 a virtual summary dismissal provision. Apension board would have no use for an evidentiary hearing in suchcases because, regardless of the weight of the claimant's evidence,and regardless of any credibility issues pertaining to the lonedissenting physician, the outcome of the case would be predeterminedby the mere existence of a disagreement between witnesses. We cannotbelieve the legislature would establish the adjudicatory processoutlined in the Pension Code expecting that the process would be soeasily precluded.

On this point, the dissent states: "There is nothing in thestatutory language to stop a claimant from petitioning the Board toappoint a fourth physician to examine him in an effort to try to getthe necessary three certificates of disability." This assertion istroublesome because it transforms legislative silence intoauthorization for unspoken acts. There are many things thelegislature did not explicitly address in the Pension Code (one wayor the other). According to the dissent's reasoning, all such thingsare allowed.

From a constitutional standpoint, membership in a governmentpension system creates an enforceable contractual relationship wherebenefits cannot be diminished or impaired. Ill. Const. 1970, art.XIII,