Curto v. Illini Manors, Inc.

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Illinois » 3rd District Appellate » 2010 » Curto v. Illini Manors, Inc.

State: Illinois

Court: 3rd District Appellate

Docket No: 3-10-0260 Rel

Case Date: 12/07/2010

Preview:No. 3--10--0260 _________________________________________________________________ Filed December 7, 2010 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2010 MARILEE CURTO, an Administrator of the Estate of Charles Curto, Deceased Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, ) Tazewell County, Illinois, ) ) v. ) No. 09--L--116 ) ILLINI MANORS, INC., an ) Illinois Corporation, and ) PEKIN MANORS, ) Honorable ) Michael E. Brandt, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. _________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices O'Brien and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION _________________________________________________________________ Plaintiff, Marilee Curto, filed a complaint against defendant, Illini Manors, Inc., and Pekin Manors (Pekin Manors),1 under the Illinois Nursing Home Care Act (Nursing Home Care Act) (210 ILCS 45/1-101 et seq. (West 2008)) for personal injuries her husband suffered while a resident at Pekin Manors and his wrongful death. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration.

1

The correct name of defendant is "UDI #10, LLC."

The trial court denied the motion, and we affirm. On August 9, 2007, Marilee entered into a contract with Pekin Manors, a residential nursing home, to admit and care for her husband, Charles. The contract named Charles as the resident and Marilee signed the

Marilee as the "Guardian/Responsible Party."

form on the preprinted signature line which designated her as the "Legal Representative." The parties also Charles did not sign the contract. entered into a separate arbitration

agreement, which provided that "any and all disputes arising hereunder shall be submitted to binding arbitration and not to a court for determination." In the arbitration agreement, each party waived its right to a trial by jury. Marilee signed the

arbitration agreement above the line that stated "Signature of Resident Representative." agreement. On August 13, 2009, Marilee filed a complaint against Pekin Manors pursuant to the Nursing Home Care Act for personal injuries Charles sustained while he was a resident. The complaint also Charles did not sign the arbitration

sought damages suffered by Charles' next of kin under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 et seq. (West 2008)). It further alleged

that Charles suffered pain and anguish, which subjected defendant to liability under the Survival Act (755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 2008)), and that his heirs incurred expenses, which they were entitled to recover under the Rights of Married Persons Act (Family Expense 2

Act) (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 2008)). Pekin Manors filed a motion to dismiss and to compel

arbitration, asserting that the estate was contractually bound by the arbitration agreement Marilee signed when Charles was admitted. After a thorough examination of authority supporting both

positions, the trial judge denied the motion. The judge found that "the spouse is not an agent for the other spouse for purposes of an agreement to arbitrate." He concluded that the arbitration

agreement was not valid and enforceable because there was no indication that Marilee had the authority to bind Charles to the mandatory arbitration terms of the contract. STANDARD OF REVIEW Initially, the parties dispute the standard of review.

Generally, the issue we are asked to consider on an interlocutory appeal is whether there was a sufficient showing to sustain the order of the trial court granting or denying the relief sought. Onni v. Apartment Investment & Management Co., 344 Ill. App. 3d 1099 (2003). However, where the trial court does not make any

factual findings, or the underlying facts are not in dispute and the court's decision is based on a purely legal analysis, we review the trial court's denial of a motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration de novo. La Hood v. Central Illinois

Construction, Inc., 335 Ill. App. 3d 363 (2002).

Here, the trial

court based its decision on the undisputed facts in the record. 3

Thus, our review of the issue is de novo. App. 3d at 364. ANALYSIS

See La Hood, 335 Ill.

Pekin Manors claims that Marilee was Charles' agent and thus the agreement to arbitration is enforceable against him. It

contends that the evidence permitted a finding of agency based on (1) actual authority and (2) apparent authority. I. Agency

Whether a nonsignatory party is bound to an arbitration agreement is dictated by the ordinary principles of contract and agency. Johnson v. Noble, 240 Ill. App. 3d 731 (1992). The

spouse's signature on an arbitration agreement may bind a nursing home resident if the spouse has the authority to sign the document as the resident's agent. The status of the parties as husband and Capital

wife, by itself, does not create an agency relationship.

Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Snyder, 2 Ill. App. 3d 660 (1971). The agency of the spouse is a question of fact to be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence; there is no presumption that the wife has authority to act for the husband. Inc. v. Simon, 46 Ill. App. 2d 232 (1964). Fettes, Love & Sieben, The scope and extent of

an agency relationship depend on the terms of the agreement between the principal and the agent and the intention of the parties. Brown v. Kerber Packing Co., 342 Ill. App. 474 (1951). The party

claiming an agency relationship must prove it by a preponderance of 4

the evidence.

Granite Properties Ltd. Partnership v. Granite

Investment Co., 220 Ill. App. 3d 711 (1991). A. Actual Authority

Pekin Manors first argues that Marilee had actual authority to bind Charles to the arbitration agreement because she signed the admission contract and the arbitration agreement as her husband's "representative." In any agency relationship, the principal can be legally bound by action taken by the agent where the principal confers actual authority on the agent. 714. Granite Properties, 220 Ill. App. 3d at Buckholtz v.

Actual authority may be express or implied.

MacNeal Hospital, 337 Ill. App. 3d 163 (2003).

Express authority

is directly granted to the agent in express terms by the principal and extends only to the powers the principal confers upon the agent. 1991). United States v. Schaltenbrand, 930 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. Such authority may be granted through a written contract,

a power of attorney or a court-ordered guardianship. Amcore Bank, N.A. v. Hahnaman-Albrecht, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 126 (2001) (power of attorney explicitly listed powers given to the attorney-infact); 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(a) (West 2006) (guardian has authority as provided in court order under provisions of Probate Act). Implied

authority, on the other hand, is actual authority circumstantially proved. Buckholtz, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 172. It arises when the

conduct of the principal, reasonably interpreted, causes the agent 5

to believe that the principal desires him to act on the principal's behalf. example, See Restatement (Second) of Agency

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