JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner Stacie DeBilio filed a petition to modify avisitation order to allow her to move to Florida with her child,Brianna. The trial court granted the petition, and respondentJeffrey Rodgers, Brianna's father, appeals. We reverse andremand.

Brianna was born December 1, 1998. Respondent was presentat the hospital and he executed an affidavit of paternity. Healso listed Brianna as a dependent on his health insurancepolicy. Following the child's birth, the parties lived togetheruntil the fall of 1999. During that time, both petitioner andrespondent provided care to Brianna. After petitioner moved outof respondent's residence, respondent voluntarily paid childsupport in the amount of $30 to $50 per week. Respondent alsohad regular visitation with Brianna during this period. On May31, 2000, petitioner filed a petition to establish paternity,seeking a determination that respondent was Brianna's father andalso requesting custody and child support. Respondent admittedpaternity and on December 13, 2000, an agreed order for custody,support and visitation was entered. That order granted jointcustody of Brianna to petitioner and respondent, with petitioneras the residential custodian. Respondent was granted liberalvisitation rights, including every other weekend, every Tuesdayevening and various holidays. On February 21, 2001, petitionerfiled a petition to modify, requesting the court to authorize herto move with Brianna to Florida, and to establish a newvisitation schedule between respondent and Brianna.

Both petitioner and respondent testified at the subsequenthearing, along with several other witnesses. Given ourdisposition of this case, we need not give a detailed recitationof that testimony. However, in general, the evidence establishedthat petitioner was unemployed, lived in subsidized housing andreceived public aid. Her most recent job was as a waitress. Petitioner was unable to secure employment or go to schoolbecause respondent had failed to fix her car, despite agreeing todo so in the December 13 order. Petitioner acknowledged,however, that while she lived within walking distance of at least100 businesses, she had only applied to two for employment. Inaddition, a nearby bus route could take her to Blackhawk College,which she had previously attended.

Petitioner had no family in Illinois; her parents and hersister lived in Florida. Petitioner planned to move into herparents' home in Pembroke Pines, Florida. Petitioner had beenoffered a job as a waitress and she planned to go to school at anearby community college. She would have access to her parents'vehicles, and her sister, a stay-at-home mother of three, wouldbabysit with Brianna while petitioner was at school or work.

Respondent testified that he was current in his childsupport payments and regularly exercised his visitationprivileges with Brianna. In addition, the child often spent timewith her 9-year old cousin and with respondent's parents, wholived one block from respondent. Indeed, the trial court foundthat Brianna "has a very close, loving relationship with herfather and the paternal grandparents." Nevertheless, the courtruled that it was in the child's best interests to modifyvisitation as requested by petitioner. It is evident from thecourt's comments in announcing its judgment, as well as from thelanguage of the judgment itself, that the ruling was based on thecourt's belief that a refusal to modify visitation would beequivalent to enjoining petitioner from leaving Illinois.

In In re Parentage of Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d 476, 732N.E.2d 11 (2000), the court held that the Illinois Parentage Actof 1984 (Parentage Act) (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 2000)) doesnot empower a court to enjoin a parent from removing her childfrom the state. Subsequently in In re Adams, 324 Ill. App. 3d177, 754 N.E.2d 425 (2001), this court applied Melton to a caseinvolving joint custody, ruling that the trial court lacked theauthority to enjoin a mother from removing her child fromIllinois. The trial court interpreted Melton and Adams asrequiring a modification of visitation. The court stated:

"Now, if I were to find that amodification of the current visitationschedule is not in Brianna's best interest,then Ms. Debilio could not leave the statebecause she could not comply with the currentschedule, so I would be enjoining Ms. Debiliofrom leaving the state, which Melton andAdams say that I can't do."

Contrary to the court's understanding, neither Melton norAdams held that a court was required to grant a petition tomodify visitation simply because one parent desired to move outof state. In Melton the court noted that vacating the injunctionpreventing removal would have "little practical effect" (Melton,314 Ill. App. 3d at 479, 732 N.E.2d at 14) because petitionerwould not be able to comply with the visitation order if she leftthe state. The court remanded the case so that petitioner "couldseek a modification that would permit her to leave the state." Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 482, 732 N.E.2d at 16. The courtexplained:

"If she files such a petition the courtshould apply the factors, stated in section607(c) of the Marriage Act, relevant topetitions to modify visitation; the referencetherein to the best interests of the childincorporates the factors of section 602. [Citation.] The court may also look forguidance to cases in which courts applyingthe Marriage Act have allowed a party to moveout of state with the child, despite thereduction in the noncustodial parent'svisitation." Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d at482, 732 N.E.2d at 16.

Similarly in Adams, this court stated that "we take issuewith the trial court's suggestion that [petitioner] had 'anabsolute right to relocate' with [the child] because she, likethe mother in Melton had to first seek permission to modify thevisitation schedule if she could not comply with it after themove." (Emphasis added.) Adams, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 180, 754N.E.2d at 428.

In other words, while a court may not enjoin a parent fromleaving the state with her child, if doing so would result in aviolation of the visitation order, the parent must seekmodification or risk contempt proceedings. See In re Parentageof Melton, 321 Ill. App. 3d 823, 748 N.E.2d 291 (2001) (MeltonII) (affirming contempt finding based on violation of visitationorder). Section 16 of the Parentage Act provides that anymodification of a visitation order "shall be in accordance withthe relevant factors specified in the 'Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act' [Marriage Act] [750 ILCS 5/101 etseq. (West 2000)]." Under section 607(c) of the Marriage Act, acourt may modify a visitation order when doing so "would servethe best interest of the child." 750 ILCS 5/607(c) (West 2000). The factors to be considered in making a best interestsdetermination are set forth in section 602. 750 ILCS 5/602 (West2000). In addition, although the Parentage Act does notincorporate section 609 of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/609 (West2000)), which authorizes a court to grant leave to remove a childfrom the state, "cases decided under section 609 provide guidancefor determining when the child's interests may warrant moving himout of state, even though the move will adversely affect thenoncustodial parent's visitation." (Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d at481, 732 N.E.2d at 15-16). See, e.g., Tysl v. Levine, 278 Ill.App. 3d 431, 662 N.E.2d 915 (1996).

We recognize that the trial court in this case made afinding that a modification of visitation was in Brianna'sinterests. However, it did so because petitioner and the childwere moving to Florida. The court acknowledged that it did "notaddress the issue of whether the move to Florida is in Brianna'sbest interest." That is, however, precisely the issue thatshould have been addressed.

The only remaining issue concerns the relief to be grantedin this case. We have before us the record of the hearing in thetrial court, and the parties have fully briefed and argued thequestion of whether allowing petitioner to move would be inBrianna's best interests. We are tempted, in the interest ofjudicial economy and with a view towards minimizing expense tothe parties, to rule on that issue. This court, however,functions as a court of review, not a finder of fact. A bestinterest determination is heavily fact dependent; it "cannot bereduced to a simple bright-line test, but rather must be made ona case-by-case basis, depending, to a great extent, upon thecircumstances of each case" (In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill.2d 316, 326, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (1988)). On review, a trialcourt's determination of what is in a child's best interests willnot be reversed unless it is clearly against the manifest weightof the evidence and it has resulted in manifest injustice. In reMarriage of Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 312, 665 N.E.2d 1209 (1996). There is a strong and compelling presumption in favor of a trialcourt's ruling because it "had significant opportunity to observethe parents and the children, thereby evaluating theirtemperaments, personalities, and capabilities." Smith, 172 Ill.2d at 321, 665 N.E.2d at 1213. This court has had no suchopportunity. Therefore, we find that it is necessary to remandthis cause for further proceedings consistent with this order.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuitcourt is reversed and remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

BRESLIN and McDADE, J.J., concur.