FACTS

In February of 1999, Derek was seriously injured when he wasstruck by a motor vehicle while walking. The driver of the vehiclewas insured by Allstate Insurance under a policy that containedonly a $25,000-per-person bodily liability limit. Robert allegedthat the value of his claims exceeded $130,000. Fortunately,Robert and Derek were insured by State Farm under two identicalpersonal automobile policies, which were paid for by separatepremiums, and each had $100,000 in underinsured motorist coverage. The policies stated:

"1. If the insured sustains bodily injury as a pedestrianand other underinsured motor vehicle coverage issued byus or any other insurer applies:

a. the total limits of liability under all suchcoverages shall not exceed that of the coverage with thehighest limit of liability;

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5. The most we will pay any one insured is the lesser of:

a. the difference between the 'each person' limit ofthis coverage and the amount paid to the insured by orfor any person or organization who is or may be heldlegally liable for the bodily injury caused by anunderinsured motor vehicle." (Emphasis in original).

With State Farm's consent, Allstate tendered its policy limitof $25,000. Robert made a demand to State Farm that it pay$100,000 pursuant to the terms of its policies to cover theremainder of Derek's damages. State Farm refused, claiming thatits maximum exposure under the UIM policies was $75,000.

ANALYSIS

The issue on appeal is whether the trial court properlydetermined that the maximum UIM benefits State Farm was required topay is $75,000. We review the trial court's interpretation of aninsurance contract de novo. Whiting v. Prestige Casualty Co., 238Ill. App. 3d 376, 606 N.E.2d 397 (1992).

Robert claims that the language of paragraph 1a, which statesthat "the total limits of liability under all such coverages shallnot exceed that of the coverage with the highest limit ofliability," allows him to collect a total of $100,000 in UIMbenefits because that is the highest limit of liability under anyone policy. He argues that he can receive this sum using theaggregate of the two policies ($50,000 per policy). Robert deniesthat he is attempting to "stack" the policies, but claims thatsection 143a-2(5) of the Illinois Insurance Code (Code) (215 ILCS5/143a-2(5) (West 2000)) and applicable case law support hisposition. Finally, Robert contends that State Farm's inconsistentapplication of the policy language in another case demonstratesthat the policy language is ambiguous and, therefore, the policyshould be construed in his favor.

When construing the language of an insurance policy, courtsmust ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties asexpressed in their agreement. Kapinus v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co., 317 Ill. App. 3d 185, 738 N.E.2d 1003(2000). The terms utilized in the policy are accorded their plainand ordinary meaning, and those terms will be applied unless suchapplication contravenes public policy. Kapinus, 317 Ill. App. 3d at187, 738 N.E.2d at 1005. If the policy language is unambiguous,courts will determine the parties' intent directly from thelanguage without resorting to rules of construction. AmericanFamily Mutual Insurance Co. v. Martin, 312 Ill. App. 3d 829, 728N.E.2d 115 (2000). If an ambiguity exists, courts will adopt aliberal construction of the language used in favor of the insured,while the policy will be construed strictly and strongly againstthe insurer. Yates v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass'n, 311 Ill.App. 3d 797, 724 N.E.2d 1042 (2000).

In our view, the policy language is unambiguous. It providesthat the most State Farm is required to pay in UIM benefits is thehighest limit of liability of any one policy minus the amount paidby the party legally responsible for the injury. In this case, thehighest limit of liability of any one policy is $100,000. Theamount recovered by the party legally responsible for the injury is$25,000. Thus, the most State Farm is required to pay in UIMbenefits is $100,000 minus $25,000, or $75,000.

Robert presents a unique argument that we should interpretparagraph 1a of the contract so that UIM benefits are proratedbetween the two policies to reach the highest limit of liability ofany one policy. He claims that he is not attempting to "stack" thepolicies, but we disagree. Paragraph 1a does not provide for theprocedure suggested by Robert. He could only reach the benefits ofthe two policies if the policies are stacked. While he is notclaiming $200,000 under the two policies, he is still "stacking"the policies to obtain the $100,000 he believes he is entitled to. Stacking by any other name is still stacking.

Although we find no cases that address the precise language ofthe contract in this case, similar language has been found by othercourts to prohibit the stacking of policies. See, e.g., Grzeszczakv. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 168 Ill. 2d 216, 659 N.E.2d 952(1995) (determining that the phrase "shall not exceed the highestapplicable limit of liability under any one policy" was unambiguousand allowed a plaintiff to recover up to the highest limitavailable under one of the policies only); American Family MutualInsurance Company v. Martin, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 831, 728 N.E.2d118 (2000) (finding that the phrase "under all policies issued toyou by us shall not exceed the highest limit of liability under anyone policy" was unambiguous and provided that the insured could notstack underinsured motorist coverages of multiple policies).

Robert contends that section 143a-2(5) of the IllinoisInsurance Code (Code) (215 ILCS 5/143a-2(5) (West 2000)) bolstershis claim that he is entitled to receive $100,000 in benefits underparagraph 1a of the contract. Section 143a-2(5) states:

"Nothing herein shall prohibit an insurer from settingforth policy terms and conditions which provide that ifthe insured has coverage available under this Sectionunder more than one policy or provision of coverage, anyrecovery or benefits may be equal to, but may not exceed,the higher of the applicable limits of the respectivecoverage, and the limits of liability under this Sectionshall not be increased because of multiple motor vehiclescovered under the same policy of insurance." 215 ILCS5/143a-2(5) (West 2000).

This appears to be nothing more than a legislative decree thatstacking can be prohibited in insurance policies. Thus, based ona plain reading of section 143a-2(5), we do not find any supportfor Robert's assertion.

Robert cites Hall v. Burger, 277 Ill. App. 3d 757, 660 N.E.2d1328 (1996), in support of his contention that he is allowed torecover UIM benefits under both policies to reach the highest limitof liability of any one policy. To the contrary, we believe Hallrepresents the opposite position. The Hall court determined thatan antistacking clause in an insurance policy, which stated that"'[i]f this policy and any other vehicle insurance policy issued toyou by this Company apply to the same accident, the maximum limitof our liability under all the policies will not exceed the highestapplicable limit of liability under any one policy,'" wasunambiguous and applied in a situation where the insured sued boththe owner and operator of the underinsured vehicle. Hall, 277 Ill.App. 3d at 762, 660 N.E.2d at 1332. The court, citing to section143a-2(5), held that public policy did not prevent the applicationof antistacking clauses. Hall, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 762, 660 N.E.2dat 1332.

Finally, Robert cites to this court's prior decision in Kapinus v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 317 Ill.App. 3d at 186, 738 N.E.2d at 1004, in which State Farm agreed tostack two UIM policies with the same language as in this case toprovide for the recovery of benefits under the aggregate of both. Because State Farm allowed the policies to be stacked in that case,Robert claims that the inconsistent application demonstrates thelanguage of the policy here is ambiguous. Thus, he claims that thepolicy should be construed in his favor. Notwithstanding Robert'sargument, we find Kapinus inapplicable because stacking was agreedto by State Farm. It was not an issue in that case. See Kapinus,317 Ill. App. 3d at 187, 738 N.E.2d at 1005 (considering whether aninsured, who had multiple UIM policies, was allowed a setoff foramounts paid by the legally responsible party against one of thepolicies only).

Accordingly, we determine that the trial court did not errwhen it determined that Robert was entitled to receive a maximum of$75,000 in UIM benefits. Thus, we affirm.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Peoria County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

LYTTON, P.J., and HOLDRIDGE, J., concur.