William Henry willed his 119 acre farm to St. Peter'sEvangelical Church (St. Peter's), subject to a life estate. Henrydied, and the administrator of his estate, Farmer's National Bankof Prophetstown, filed a petition to sell St. Peter's remainderinterest in the property. The trial court found that the sale wasnecessary for the administration of the estate. The court orderedthe sale at public auction, using a valuation method set out insection 15(b) of the Principal and Income Act to determine itsvalue. 760 ILCS 15/15(b) (West 1992) (Act). We affirm.

In his will, William Henry devised a 119 acre farm to St.Peter's, subject to a life estate granted to his wife and daughter. His wife renounced the will, thereby taking an undivided one-thirdinterest in the farm. This left their daughter, Susan Anderson,with a life estate in a two-thirds interest of the farm and St.Peters with a two-thirds remainder interest in the farm. Henry'swife subsequently passed away, leaving her undivided one-thirdinterest to Anderson.

Anderson offered to buy St. Peter's remainder interest in thefarm and the administrator agreed to the sale. In the "Petition toSell Real Estate," the administrator claimed that the sale wasnecessary to pay administration expenses and properly settle andclose the estate. The petition alleged that the estate had only$18,000 in cash, all of which was derived from income. At trial,the bank's trust officer testified that this was substantially lessthan the amount of income owed to the income beneficiary, Anderson. He stated that this deficiency was a result of the previousadministrator's use of income to pay administration expenses thatshould have been charged to the principal of the estate.

The trial court found that sale of the remainder interestwould appropriately restitute the income portion of the estate. The court ordered that the remainder interest should be sold atpublic auction in order to obtain the maximum possible price forthe sale. The court used Anderson's original offer as the minimumopening bid. The court held that the offer was a proper minimumsale price because it was determined using a formula found insection 15(b) of the Act.

St. Peter's argues that the court abused its discretion byallowing the sale of the remainder interest in the property,particularly since the real estate was a specific bequest.

Section 20-4(b) of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act)states that real estate that is specifically bequeathed may not besold "unless necessary for the payment of claims, expenses ofadministration or estate or inheritance taxes or the properdistribution of the estate." 755 ILCS 5/20-4(b) (West 1992). Section 5/24-3(d) of the Probate Act states, "On final distributionof an estate, payments made from principal or income shall beaccounted for as provided in Sections 5 and 6 of the Principal andIncome Act." 755 ILCS 5/24-3(d) (West 1992). Section 6(a) of theAct provides that expenses of administration of the estate must becharged against the principal of the estate. 760 ILCS 15/6(a)(West 1992). Taken together, these sections require that anadministrator account for all probate income at the time ofdistribution and that the income beneficiaries of the estate areentitled to all probate income not reduced by expenses ofadministering the decedent's estate, estate taxes and fees ofattorneys and personal representatives. In re Estate of Enright,106 Ill. App. 3d 914, 917 (1982).

Here, the administrator accounted for all receipts anddisbursements from principal and income. He determined thatexpenses that should have been charged against the principal of theestate were improperly paid from the income, resulting in asubstantial shortfall in income.

The estate can only be properly administered under the Act ifthe administrator uses the principal of the estate to restitute theimproperly expended probate income. Restoring probate income fromthe principal ensures that the income beneficiary will receive allof the probate income, not reduced by expenses of administration. See Enright, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 917. The only principal remainingin the estate is the farmland in which St. Peter's has itsremainder interest. Therefore, the sale of that farmland isnecessary for the proper distribution of the estate and the courtwas within its discretion to order the sale of St. Peter'sspecifically bequeathed interest in the property. See 755 ILCS5/20-4(b).

St. Peter's also contends that, even if the sale of theproperty was proper, the court erred in its valuation of St.Peter's remainder interest. St. Peter's claims that the valuationmethod the court employed, found in section 15(b) of the Act, isimplicitly meant to apply only when the cost of improvements toland are apportioned between a legal tenant and a remainderman,since it is included in a subsection providing a method for doingso.

Section 15(b) consists of two parts. The first concerns theallocation of costs of improvement to real estate between legaltenants and remaindermen. The second establishes a method to valuea legal tenancy or a remainder.

"If the costs of an improvement *** representing anaddition to value of property forming part of theprincipal cannot reasonably be expected to outlast thelegal tenancy, the costs shall be paid by the legaltenant. If the improvement can reasonably be expected tooutlast the legal tenancy, only a portion of the costsshall be paid by the legal tenant and the balance by theremainderman. The portion payable by the legal tenantshall be that fraction of the total found by dividing thepresent value of the legal tenancy by the present valueof an estate of the same form as that of the legaltenancy but limited to a period corresponding to thereasonably expected duration of the improvement. Thecomputation of present value of the legal tenancy shallbe computed on the basis of two-thirds of the valuedetermined by use of the tables set forth under Section7520 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and theregulations thereunder for the calculation of the valuesof annuities, life estates, and terms for years ***. Themethod of computing the present value of a legal tenancyestablished in this subsection shall apply to all legaltenancies and remainders created after January 1, 1992***." 760 ILCS 15/15(b) (West 1992)

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain andgive effect to the legislature's intent. People v. Ellis, 199 Ill.2d 28, 39 (2002). To do so, a court first looks to the plain andcommonly understood meaning of the language of the statute. Ifpossible, the court must give effect to every word, clause andsentence; it must not depart from the statute's plain language byreading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions thelegislature did not express. Ellis, 199 Ill. 2d at 39. It alsomust not read a statute so as to render any part inoperative,superfluous or insignificant. Ellis, 199 Ill. 2d at 39.

Accepting St. Peter's argument would have us violate theserules of statutory construction. First, it requires us to read alimitation that does not exist into plain language of the statute. Section 15(b) of the Act provides a method for apportioning thecost of improvements to land between life tenants and remaindermen,based on the value of the legal life tenancy. But the expansivephrase "all legal tenancies and remainders" in the statuteindicates that the valuation method is meant to be applied beyondthe limited circumstances of the first part of the statute. Limiting this otherwise inclusive language would create exceptionsthat the legislature did not express.

Moreover, limiting the valuation solely to the apportionmentof improvement costs between legal tenants and remaindermen rendersthe word "remainders" superfluous. If 15(b) only allowed valuationof tenancies, the word "remainders" would become irrelevant to anobject of the statute, that is, to value both interests inproperty. In that case, the valuation method would never apply toany remainder, though the statute mandates that it applies to allremainders. We cannot construe the plain language of the Act tolimit the scope of the legislative intent. The trial courtproperly applied the valuation method found in subsection 15(b).

The judgment of the circuit court of Henry County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McDADE, P.J., and HOLDRIDGE, J., concur.