Plaintiffs William and Anita Garcia settled a personal injuryaction with defendant Barbara Gutierrez's insurance company forinjuries William and their daughter Krista sustained in a caraccident. Thereafter, the Garcias' insurance carrier, CountryCompanies, intervened to protect its subrogation rights. The trialcourt determined that Country Companies had no subrogation rightsas to Krista's recovery but that under the common fund doctrine theGarcias' attorney was entitled to one-third of the amount thatCountry Companies had paid for Krista's medical expenses. CountryCompanies appealed. We affirm the holding that Country Companieshad no subrogation rights on Krista's recovery based on its policylanguage. But we hold that the common fund doctrine was notapplicable. Accordingly, we reverse in part, and remand for thecommon fund monies to be returned to Krista's estate.

FACTS

Krista was injured when the car driven by her father wasstruck by a vehicle driven by Gutierrez. Country Companies paid$5,000 to the medical providers who treated Krista's injuries. Thereafter, the Garcias filed a three-count complaint againstGutierrez. Count I was for personal injuries that Williamsustained in the accident and for payments he made for Krista'smedical expenses. Count II sought reimbursement for Krista'smedical bills that were paid by Anita pursuant to the Rights ofMarried Persons Act (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 2000)). Count III wasbrought by Anita on behalf of Krista for Krista's personal injuriesand medical expenses. The parties settled the case, pursuant towhich William received $60,000 and Krista received $55,000. Country Companies was reimbursed from William's proceeds forexpenses paid on his behalf.

The Garcias filed a motion on behalf of their daughter toadjudicate Country Companies' lien on the proceeds of Krista'ssettlement and for application of the common fund doctrine if thelien was determined to be valid. Country Companies intervened andclaimed that a lien attached to the amounts William and Anitarecovered for Krista's medical expenses under counts I and II ofthe complaint. The trial court denied the Garcias' motion toadjudicate the lien, determined that the common fund doctrine wasapplicable to the $5,000 Country Companies had paid to Krista'smedical providers, and reduced the $5,000 claim by one-third forattorney fees and for expenses incurred. The court furtherdetermined that no lien attached to the claim against Krista'sestate. The court subsequently ruled that Country Companies had novalid lien on any portion of Krista's recovery. Country Companiesappealed. After the appeal was filed, Country Companies discoveredthat the case between the Garcias and Gutierrez had never beendismissed after settlement was reached and thus prepared an agreedorder of dismissal which the trial court entered. CountryCompanies then refiled the appeal in a timely fashion.

ANALYSIS 

Country Companies argues on appeal that the trial court erredwhen it determined that Country Companies was not entitled torecover medical payments made on Krista's behalf and when itapplied the common fund doctrine. This court reviews questions oflaw de novo. Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 693 N.E.2d 333 (1998).

As a threshold issue, we must first address the Garcias'assertion that Country Companies failed to preserve any issues forappeal because the agreed order of dismissal referenced thesettlement of all claims, including the subrogation issue.

A court order is to be interpreted in its entirety withreference to other parts of the record, including pleadings,motions, and issues before the court. See Granville BeachCondominium Ass'n v. Granville Beach Condominiums, Inc., 227 Ill.App. 3d 715, 592 N.E.2d 160 (1992). An order is to be construed ina reasonable manner that gives effect to the apparent intention ofthe trial court. See Granville Beach Condominium Ass'n, 227 Ill.App. 3d at 720, 592 N.E.2d at 163.

The agreed order states that the "[p]laintiffs have settledtheir causes of action with the defendants," "that all parties seekand [sic] final order dismissing the [p]laintiffs' causes ofactions with prejudice pursuant to settlement," and "that thismatter is pending in the Appellate Court, but it appears that nofinal dismissal order was entered." When read in its entirety andconstrued with the rest of the record, the order does not indicatethat Country Companies' subrogation claim was included in thesettlement and the dismissal. While inartfully drafted, weinterpret the agreed order to mean that it memorialized thesettlement between the Garcias and Gutierrez and provided a finaland appealable order on the subrogation and common fund doctrineissues. Thus, we hold that jurisdiction is properly before thiscourt. See Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Whitehall Convalescent& Nursing Home, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 879, 748 N.E.2d 674 (2001)(noting that an appellate court is vested with jurisdiction to hearappeals of final orders). Country Companies' first argument isthat William and Anita were contractually bound under the terms ofthe insurance contract to reimburse it for medical payments it madeon Krista's behalf.

Words of an insurance policy are to be given their plainmeaning, but if they are susceptible to more than one meaning, theyare ambiguous and should be narrowly construed against the insurer. See Maremont Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 326 Ill. App. 3d272, 760 N.E.2d 550 (2001). To determine whether an ambiguityexists, the policy should be read in its factual context whereinambiguities may be discovered in the terms used. See Pahn v. StateFarm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 291 Ill. App. 3d 343, 683N.E.2d 972 (1997).

The policy states that "[i]f we make a payment *** and theperson to whom or from whom payment was made *** has a right to recover damages, Country Companies is subrogated to that right"(emphasis added). Based on this language, we determine that thesubrogation provision is ambiguous. The contract language suggestsCountry Companies' subrogation rights only attach to parties towhom Country Companies made payment or from whom payment was made. Such an interpretation would exclude Country Companies fromsubrogating an insured's recovery whenever Country Companies paidmedical providers directly and would contravene the essence ofsubrogation. Accordingly, we hold that Country Companies had nosubrogation right to recover for payments it made for Krista'smedical expenses. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty MutualInsurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992) (holding thatambiguous provisions in an insurance policy are to be construed infavor of the insured).

We turn now to Country Companies' second argument that thetrial court erred when it applied the common fund doctrine andawarded the Garcias' attorney one-third of the amount CountryCompanies paid for Krista's medical expenses.

Under the common fund doctrine, a lawyer who recovers a sum ofmoney for the benefit of others beyond his client is entitled toreasonable attorney fees from the fund as a whole. See CountryMutual Insurance Co. v. Birner, 293 Ill. App. 3d 452, 688 N.E.2d859 (1997). To be entitled to fees under the doctrine, an attorneymust show (1) that the fund was created as a result of legalservices he performed; (2) that the subrogee did not participate increating the fund; and (3) that the subrogee benefitted out of thefund. Birner, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 456, 688 N.E.2d at 862. Whenthese conditions are satisfied, fees and expenses incurred insetting up the fund should be apportioned among those whobenefitted from its creation. Birner, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 456, 688N.E.2d at 862.

Because we determined that Country Companies had nosubrogation rights, it follows that Country Companies did notbenefit from any common fund that was created. Because one of theelements necessary for application of the common fund doctrine islacking, we hold that the trial court erred in implementing thedoctrine, and we reverse its decision. Consequently, the $5,000that was taken from Krista's recovery should be returned to herestate and no attorney fees or expenses should be deducted or paidout of Krista's recovery. We remand for the trial court to act inaccordance with this order.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Will County is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

HOLDRIDGE, and SLATER, JJ., concur.