Richard Girot filed a statement of candidacy and petitionswith Braidwood city clerk Sue Grygiel, seeking his placement on theballot for a mayoral election in the City of Braidwood. The citywas holding a consolidated primary election for the position onFebruary 25, 2003 and a consolidated election on April 1, 2003. The statement of candidacy asserted that Girot was seeking to be acandidate for mayor in the election to be held January 27, 2002.

Two weeks after Girot submitted his petitions, Keith objectedto them, asserting that Girot failed to specify the date of theelection in which he sought candidacy, that Girot failed to specifywhether he sought inclusion in the primary or the general election,and that Girot failed to bind his petitions. Keith asserted thatthese deficiencies in the petitions invalidated them.

As city clerk, Grygiel normally sits on the Board to hear anddecide objections to election petitions. Girot moved to have herremoved from the Board because she had personally received hispetitions and would be testifying regarding whether they had beenbound. He asserted that, as a witness, her position on the Boardwould violate his right to due process. The Board denied hismotion.

At the hearing on the objections, Grygiel testified that shepersonally received Girot's petitions. She stated that they werenot bound in any way when she received them, but that she recalledputting them in a paper clip. Girot testified that the papers werealready paper clipped together when he filed them. He also statedthat Grygiel had stapled them together, but admitted that he couldnot find any staple marks in the petitions.

The Board sustained Keith's objections and held that Girot'sname would not be placed on the ballot. The Board noted that itfound Grygiel's testimony credible, but also stated that it wouldfind that Girot had not complied with the election code even if hehad paper clipped the petitions together. The Board also held thatGirot's failure to indicate the proper date of the election on hisstatement of candidacy and petitions independently supported itsdecision.

On judicial review, the trial court affirmed the Board'sruling. The trial court held that the Board's decision was notagainst the manifest weight of the evidence.

On appeal, Girot asserts that Grygiel's membership on theBoard violated his fourteenth amendment right to due process, andthat he is therefore entitled to a new hearing. He also asserts,in the alternative, that the Board incorrectly held that hispetitions were not properly bound and were improperly completed.

We agree that Girot's due process rights were adverselyaffected by Grygiel's simultaneous status as witness and factfinder. It is a well-settled principle of law that due processrequires that a party appearing before an administrative tribunalbe judged by an unbiased decision maker. Ryan v. Landek, 159 Ill.App. 3d 10, 12 (1987). Girot was not afforded that right in thiscase. Instead, he was placed in the unenviable position ofpresenting testimony contradictory to that of a witness who wouldthen retire with the other two board members to determine thecredibility of the witnesses. Suggesting that Grygiel wasunbiased, when she was required to weigh her own credibilityagainst another witness', stretches our credulity. The Boardshould have removed Grygiel before the hearing.

However, our resolution of the due process violation does notend our analysis. Because Girot claims that Grygiel's dual role atthe hearing violated his fourteenth amendment due process rights,we further assess the error under the harmless error standard. SeePeople v. Jefferson, 227 Ill. App. 3d 491, 496 (1992). If theerror did not affect the outcome of the hearing, then it is notreversible error. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967). If it is clear that Girot didnot comply with section 10-4 of the Illinois Election Code(Code)(10 ILCS 5/10-4 (West Supp. 2003)), then the error washarmless.

Section 10-4 of the Code states:

"No signature shall be valid or be counted inconsidering the validity or sufficiency of [a] petitionunless the requirements of this Section are compliedwith. *** [Petition] sheets, before being presented tothe electoral board or filed with the proper officer ofthe electoral district or division of the state ormunicipality, as the case may be, shall be neatlyfastened together in book form, by placing the sheets ina pile and fastening them together at one edge in asecure and suitable manner, and the sheets shall then benumbered consecutively." (Emphasis Added) 10 ILCS 5/10-4.

The purpose of requiring candidates to securely bind andnumber the petitions is to prevent tampering, thereby preservingnot only the integrity of the petitions submitted, but also theelection process in general. Jones v. Dodendorf, 190 Ill. App. 3d557, 562 (1989). These provisions are mandatory, and failing tocomply with even one of them will result in the petitions'invalidation. See Jones, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 562-63.

Thus, even if Grygiel's testimony is ignored, Girot'stestimony clearly illustrates that the pages of the petition werenot fastened together. Rather, they were merely paper clippedtogether. While the clip may have allowed Girot to present thepages to Grygiel in a neat pile, we cannot find that it is a"secure" fastener for the purposes of section 10-4 of the Code. Byits very nature, a paper clip allows the papers it "fastens" to bepulled apart and rearranged at will, showing no sign of tamperingand doing little to assure the continued integrity of the petitionpackage submitted to the electoral official.

Nevertheless, Girot argues that clipping the pages togetheramounted to substantial compliance under the statute. Courts havefound substantial compliance where a candidate attempted to followthe requirements of the statute, but inadvertently failed to meetthem fully. See, e.g., Williams v. Butler, 35 Ill. App. 3d 532(1976) (Candidate numbered the pages of his petition, butinadvertently omitted page number 191 of 323). There may also besubstantial compliance if the purposes for the requirement aresatisfied by the candidate's actions. Jones, 190 Ill. App. 3d at562. Girot made no effort to securely bind the pages of hispetition in a way that would prevent tampering. "Fastening" thepages with a paper clip could not meet the purposes of thestatute's requirements. Therefore, Girot's actions do notconstitute substantial compliance with the statute.

Finally, Girot argues that there was no need to fasten all ofthe pages together, since one page of signatures would have beensufficient to meet the requirements to be placed on the ballot. This argument must also fail. Section 10-4 of the Code prohibitsany petition that has been filed from being withdrawn, altered, oradded to. Were we to allow Girot to base his candidacy on only oneof the several pages he filed with the city clerk, the petitionwould be impermissibly altered.

The Board correctly stated that Girot would have failed tocomply with the Code even if his testimony were taken as the onlycredible source of facts surrounding this event. Any error causedby Grygiel's bias toward her own testimony would have had no impacton the Board's decision. The error was harmless, and the Board'sdecision should be affirmed.

Because the petitions were properly stricken based on Girot'sfailure to bind them, we need not consider other claimed errors.

The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOLDRIDGE and SLATER, JJ., concur.