JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Irene Lizzio, appeals from a circuit courtjudgment granting a permanent injunction in favor of plaintiffs, Leland Hasselbring, Jane Hasselbring, and Mike Balding. Theinjunction prevents defendant from interfering with plaintiffs'riparian rights in the use of a non-navigable pond. We allowedIrene's motion for substitution of parties whereby she wassubstituted for Carl Lizzio, her husband who died while theappeal was pending. Defendant claims on appeal that the circuitcourt erred in granting the injunction and denying defendant'scounterclaim to quiet title and enjoin plaintiffs from using thepond. We affirm.

FACTS The pond in question lies near Del Rey in Iroquois Countyand sits on land owned by defendant. Defendant bought theproperty on which the pond sits in 1993. It is bordered on thenorth by property owned by Mike Balding and on the south byproperty owned by Leland and Jane Hasselbring. The followingdiagram, not drawn to scale, indicates the approximate locationof each party's property in relation to the pond:

Mike Balding purchased his parcel of land in 1985. Hesubsequently built a cabin facing the pond, approximately 60 feetfrom the water's edge, in which he now lives. Balding installeda floating dock onto the water extending away from the shorelineclosest to his cabin. He used the dock to fish and at one timehad a boat he used to fish on the pond. Balding believed thathis property bordered the pond.

Leland and Jane Hasselbring bought their property in 1996. It is a wooded tract with a stream on the north part of theproperty which must be crossed to access the pond. A bridgeexists for that purpose and was in place when the Hasselbringscame onto the property in 1996. The Hasselbrings maintained thesouthern bank of the pond and used the bridge to access the pondto fish and canoe.

In approximately 1987 Mike Balding drained the pond in orderto use a bulldozer to deepen and widen the pond. He testifiedthat he did this to maintain and "improve the pond" because ofthe top soil and silt that had accumulated over time in the pond,decreasing its size and depth. Balding testified that nobodyobjected to his actions in bulldozing the pond. Balding alsobuilt a wooden dock extending on the pond that Carl Lizzio laterobjected to being on Lizzio's property. Balding did not use ormaintain this dock and let it deteriorate because of Lizzio'sobjection.

In July 1997 Carl Lizzio began digging a ditch intended todrain the pond for the purpose of creating a wildlife refuge. When Leland Hasselbring and Mike Balding became aware of Lizzio'sintentions, they objected and indicated that they didn't thinkLizzio had the right to take such action to which Lizzio replied,"Well, I own the water. This is my pond. This is my water." When Hasselbring suggested all of them work together to decidewhat should be done with the pond and all share the cost, Lizziodeclined the offer.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint July 2, 1997, to preventdefendant from draining the pond. Plaintiffs claimed that theyowned property riparian to the pond and that defendant intendedto interfere with their ability to use the pond. The circuitcourt issued a temporary restraining order July 2, 1997, andgranted a preliminary injunction on July 10, 1997. Defendantfiled a two-count counterclaim against plaintiffs on June 26,1998, seeking to enjoin them from trespassing on defendant's landand to quiet title to the land against plaintiffs' claimedinterest. A bench trial was held.

Carl Krause, a licensed surveyor, testified for plaintiffsthat he was contacted in 1993 by James Maddin, predecessor intitle to Carl Lizzio's property. Maddin gave him the legaldescription of the land later conveyed to Carl Lizzio, from whichhe was instructed to make a survey. Krause's survey located thesouthern line of what is now the Lizzio property based on thatlegal description. The pond extended significantly beyond thatline, which is also the north line of the Hasselbring property. Upon cross examination, Krause indicated that he had not inquiredinto previous documents in the chain of title because he had notbeen instructed to do so. Rather, the sole source for his surveyhad been the legal description he had been given by Devine. Headmitted that the southern line of the Lizzio property was notthe true southern line but that the line found by surveyors RexBradfield and David Tyson was correct. The correct line wassouth of Krause's line, very close to the edge of the pond. Krause maintained that the rest of his survey was correct.

Testimony varied as to where the edge of the pond waslocated. Bradfield testified that at the times he had measuredits location, it was a foot to a foot and a half from theHasselbring's property line. He also testified that in hisopinion the water level would not rise above that level withoutextreme circumstances, such as heavy rainfall or overflow fromthe nearby stream. Contrarily, surveyor Tyson testified thatalthough he had seen the water level in the same place asBradfield, it was obvious that the bank of the pond was"definitely on Mr. Hasselbring's property." Mike Baldingtestified that during the time he owned his property he had seenthe pond water at higher levels than it was at the time of trial. Carl Lizzio testified that he had never seen it higher than itwas at the time of trial. Several photographs were admitted intoevidence showing the edge of the pond.

In regard to Balding's property, Krause testified thataccording to his survey, the pond extended beyond the northernline of the Lizzio property onto the property owned by MikeBalding. Conversely, defendant's witness Rex Bradfield testifiedthat Balding owned less than the 3.5 acres he claimed to own. Hebased this opinion on an examination of the trail of deeds ofBalding's property extending back to 1895. The original 1895deed, and various later deeds, contain a reference to 1.5 acresin contrast to the more extensive metes and bounds description. Bradfield's opinion was that Balding actually owned only 1.5acres and the southern border of his property was approximately120 feet away from the northern edge of the pond.

The trial court issued an opinion on March 13, 2001, and afinal judgment on May 4, 2001. The judgment was for a permanentinjunction preventing Carl Lizzio from interfering withplaintiffs' use of the pond or altering its water level. Thecourt, according to its written opinion, found that plaintiffs'lands were riparian to the pond. The court indicated that it hadcarefully weighed the credibility of all witnesses and all theevidence presented in reaching its conclusion. The court foundthat there was sufficient evidence showing that the southern edgeof the pond extended onto Hasselbring's property. The court alsoaccepted the Krause survey over the Bradfield survey with respectto Balding's property. The court also found that defendant'sreliance on a deed dating from 1895 was precluded because ofsections 13-114 and 13-118 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735ILCS 5/13-114, 13-118 (West 2000)). The court also indicatedthat the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title had beenusing the pond for such a long period of time without apparentobjection that the doctrine of acquiescence applied to the factshere.

ANALYSIS

It is well-established in Illinois that each owner of thebed of a private non-navigable lake has the right to thereasonable use and enjoyment of the surface water of the entirelake. Beacham v. Lake Zurich Property Owners Ass'n, 123 Ill. 2d227, 526 N.E.2d 154 (1988). We will not overturn the grant of apermanent injunction unless it is contrary to the manifest weightof the evidence. Lucas v. Peters, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1, 741 N.E.2d313, 325 (2000). The opposite result must be clearly evident. Harper v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 282 Ill. App. 3d 19, 667N.E.2d 1382 (1996).

We first examine plaintiffs Leland and Jane Hasselbring'sclaim to riparian rights. It is clear that the southern line ofthe Lizzio property is where surveyors Rex Bradfield and DavidTyson determined it to be. The dispute, however, is where theedge of the pond is in relation to this line and where it hasbeen in the past.

The doctrine of accretion applies when property riparian toa body of water has a shoreline that recedes over time. LinnFarms, Inc. v. Edlen, 111 Ill. App. 2d 294, 250 N.E.2d 681(1969). The riparian owner maintains his access even after thewater recedes. "The whole doctrine of accretions rests upon theright of access to the water, and it must be convenient access. The right to preserve his contact with the water is one of themost valuable of a riparian owner." City of Peoria v. CentralNational Bank, 224 Ill. 43, 56, 79 N.E. 296, 299 (1906). Thesame doctrine was reiterated more recently by the United StatesSupreme Court in Hughes v. State of Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 19L. Ed. 2d 530, 88 S. Ct. 438 (1967) in which the Court stated insubstance that a long and unbroken line of decisions establishedthat the grantee of lands bounded by a body of navigable watersacquires a right to any natural and gradual accretion formedalong the shore. This rule is essential to avoid litigationchallenging the location of the original waterlines. Hughes, 389U.S. 290, 19 L. Ed. 2d 530, 88 S. Ct. 438. This doctrine appliesto lakes and ponds regardless of how large or small they may be. Linn Farms, 111 Ill. App. 2d 294, 250 N.E.2d 681. There is norequirement that a part of the description of these lots mustinclude this lake for the doctrine to apply. Linn Farms, 111Ill. App. 2d 294, 250 N.E.2d 681.

Applying these principles, it is clear that even if thewater had receded past the Hasselbring's property line, the pondis still riparian if it can be shown that the water hadpreviously extended onto the Hasselbring's property. Evidencewas presented that it had. Conflicting evidence was alsopresented. The trial court, as the trier of fact, had theopportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and makethe proper factual determination. The court heard testimony fromDavid Tyson that the bank of the pond extended several feet ontoHasselbring's property and from Leland Hasselbring and MikeBalding that the pond had previously been at higher levels. Thecourt also saw numerous pictures that indicated the edge of thepond had receded. The trial judge's finding was not against themanifest weight of the evidence.

As to the Balding property, defendant disputes that Baldingin fact owns what he claims to own. The deed Balding acquired in1985 when he purchased the property contained a legal descriptionwhich purported to convey approximately 3.5 acres, the southernline of which runs through the northern part of the pond. Ifthat description is accurate it is clear that Balding hasriparian rights in the pond.

Defendant, through extensive testimony by surveyorBradfield, attempted to portray Balding as having only a wilddeed that is out of the chain of title. The trial court foundBradfield's testimony, spanning all three days of the trial, tobe confusing. The thrust of defendant's argument seems to bethat Balding was the owner of only 1.5 acres of property and thatthis property does not border on the pond. It is well settled inIllinois that when a conveyance is made in which the metes andbounds description conflicts with the quantity description, themetes and bounds description controls. Flick v. Kramer, 151 Ill.App. 3d 836, 503 N.E.2d 811 (1987). Defendant claims that thegeneral rule should not apply because the metes and boundsdescription is not clear and therefore the quantity descriptioncontrols. The weight of the evidence, however, indicates thatthe metes and bounds description was adequate in-and-of itself,but that the quantity description created the ambiguity. In thatcase, the metes and bounds controls. So, although some deeds inthe sequence purport to convey only 1.5 acres, each conveys theentirety of land described in the metes and bounds description.

Defendant attempts to discredit surveyor Krause's entiretestimony because he admitted his survey was incorrect withrespect to the true southern line of Lizzio's property. However,Krause only claimed that his survey was correct with respect tothe legal description he was given and not that the legaldescription was ultimately correct. It was not unreasonable forthe court to accept the rest of Krause's testimony as an expertwitness and base its ruling on that testimony.

It is clear from the testimony, and defendant does notdispute, that if Krause's survey was accepted as correct ratherthan Bradfield's with respect to Balding's property, thenBalding's property borders the pond. It was not unreasonable forthe court to so find. The trial judge did not err in findingBalding's property riparian to the pond.

Defendant also claims the trial court committed reversibleerror in allowing David Tyson to give opinions not disclosed ineither party's Supreme Court Rule 213(f) and (g) (134 Ill. 2d Rs.213(f), (g)) answers. As the trial court stated during trial,Tyson was called by defendant, not plaintiff. Tyson's opinionswere given on cross examination and the subject of the opinionwas within the scope of the direct examination. Defendant openedthe door and cannot now object to what he found.

Defendant also claims plaintiffs' attorney made bindingadmissions that should have forced the court to dismiss plaintiffHasselbring's claim. Defendant claims that plaintiff admittedHasselbring would lose his claim if surveyor David Tyson's surveyagreed with defendant's survey. The trial court found thestatements in question to be merely tentative in nature and notbinding. We agree and note that plaintiffs' attorney made noadmission of any fact relevant to the outcome of the case.

Defendant next contends that plaintiffs should be barredfrom seeking an injunction because of unclean hands. When aparty contends that an injunction should not be granted because aparty has not come with clean hands, it must be shown that theplaintiff is, in fact, guilty of fraud or bad faith toward thosemaking the contention. Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. City of Chicago,352 Ill. 11, 185 N.E. 170 (1933). The defendant has failed toshow that any of either plaintiffs' acts amounted to fraud or badfaith.

Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in denyingthe counterclaim seeking to enjoin and eject plaintiffs from hispond and to quiet title to his land. We find that because theissuance of the permanent injunction was proper, dismissal of thecounterclaim was correct.

It is unnecessary for us to examine whether the trial courtused sections 13-114 and 13-118 of the Code of Civil Procedure(735 ILCS 5/13-114, 13-118 (West 2000)) in error, whetherplaintiff Balding's affirmative counter-defenses were improperlyused as a basis for the injunction, and whether plaintiffs'acquiescence argument was properly raised because we find thatthe trial court's ruling was sufficiently supported by theevidence.

We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of IroquoisCounty imposing a permanent injunction.

Affirmed.

LYTTON, P.J., and BRESLIN, J., concur.