August 3, 2001

FACTS

Steffanie gave birth to Brandon on January 13, 1995. Approximately four years later, Ricardo was identified as theputative father, and the parties entered into a joint custodyagreement that was made formal in an agreed order. The agreementgave Steffanie physical custody of Brandon and gave Ricardovisitation every other weekend, one evening each week, and certainholidays.

In May of 2000, Steffanie filed a petition to relocate, whichstated that she had recently married and intended to reside withher new husband in California. The petition also stated thatSteffanie received a job offer in California and that moving wouldgreatly enhance Brandon's life. In response, Ricardo filed amotion to dismiss and a subsequent petition that requested leave tofile a petition to modify custody pursuant to section 610(a) of theIllinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act)(750 ILCS 5/610(a) (West 1998)).

In his petition, Ricardo claimed that Steffanie met hercurrent husband over the Internet and married him shortlyafterwards, even though they met in person only two times and spentno more than four total days together prior to marriage. Ricardoalso claimed that although Steffanie continued to abide by thevisitation schedule set forth in the agreed order, she refused tomake any adjustments to facilitate "a proper joint parentingrelationship." Based on these factors, Ricardo argued thatBrandon's living environment was a danger to his mental, moral, andemotional health. Ricardo's petition was later dismissed by thetrial court, and no appeal was taken regarding that dismissal.

On July 11, 2000, the First District Appellate Court publishedIn re Parentage of Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d 476, 732 N.E.2d 11(2000). Several weeks later, Steffanie filed a second petition torelocate based on Melton, requesting a modification of visitation. Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial courtdetermined that Steffanie had "an absolute right to relocate" basedon the decision in Melton and that Steffanie's motion to relocatewas moot. The court issued an order stating that the parties wererequired to mediate the visitation issue and that "until all issuesremaining in this case are heard, there are no final and appealableorders in this case." The order also stated that, if mediation wasunsuccessful, the court would conduct a hearing regarding thevisitation issues.

In lieu of mediation, the parties entered into an agreementfor a new visitation schedule, and they presented their agreementto the court on that same day. The court issued a supplementalorder, approving the agreement and negating the parties' obligationto mediate. The order stated that Ricardo was reserving his rightto appeal the court's decision with respect to Melton, that hisconcession to the visitation schedule was based solely on thecourt's ruling that day, and that the agreement was not aconcession or agreement regarding the issues of removal,relocation, or custody. The order also stated that it was a fulland final decision of the court, subject to the right of animmediate appeal regarding the applicability of Melton. Ricardofiled a notice of appeal three weeks later.

ANALYSIS

The first issue in this case is whether the court erred whenit dismissed Steffanie's petition to relocate as moot pursuant toMelton. This court reviews issues of law de novo. Department ofPublic Aid ex rel. Davis v. Brewer, 183 Ill. 2d 540, 702 N.E.2d 563(1998).

Relying on Melton, the trial court dismissed Steffanie'spetition to remove because it believed that she had "an absoluteright to relocate" Brandon to California. Ricardo contends thatthe trial court erred and suggests that Melton is inapplicable tothis case because the parties in Melton did not have joint custody. Because the parties here have joint custody of Brandon, Ricardoasserts that section 16 of the Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/16 (West2000)) requires that the court apply the "relevant standards" setforth in section 610 of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/610 (West2000)), which relates to modifications of joint custodyarrangements.

In Melton, the appellate court determined that the trial courtlacked the power under the Parentage Act to enjoin a mother fromremoving her child from the state. Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 479,732 N.E.2d at 14. The court also determined, however, that if theproposed move would result in the mother's noncompliance with thevisitation schedule, she had to first seek permission from thecourt to modify the visitation order. Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d at479, 732 N.E.2d at 14.

We find the reasoning in Melton persuasive. Although theParentage Act has adopted some of the provisions of the MarriageAct, it does not incorporate the entire Marriage Act and does notconfer the same broad powers on the court. See Melton, 314 Ill.App. 3d at 478, 732 N.E.2d at 13. The court has no inherent powersin parentage cases, and the court's authority to hear parentagecases is limited to the exercise of those powers that are expresslygiven to it by the statute. See In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d190, 443 N.E.2d 541 (1982). Because the Parentage Act does notexpressly give the courts the power to enjoin a parent, even withjoint custody, from removing the child from the state, we affirm. Steffanie's petition to relocate is moot because the trial courtlacks the power under the Parentage Act to enjoin Steffanie fromremoving Brandon from Illinois.

But we take issue with the trial court's suggestion thatSteffanie had "an absolute right to relocate" with Brandon becauseshe, like the mother in Melton, had to first seek permission tomodify the visitation schedule if she could not comply with itafter the move. Steffanie, in fact, filed a petition to modifyvisitation. Therefore, we now consider whether the trial courtshould have conducted a best interests hearing on Steffanie'spetition.

Section 16 of the Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/16 (West 2000))provides that the court has continuing jurisdiction to modify anorder for visitation included in a judgment entered under theParentage Act.

According to the record, Steffanie properly filed a motionrequesting a modification of the visitation schedule based on thedecision in Melton. After a hearing, the court ordered the partiesto mediate the visitation issue. In its order, the court statedthat it would conduct a best interests hearing if the parties couldnot reach an agreement. Rather than mediate, the parties consentedto a new visitation schedule and presented their agreement to thecourt. The court issued a supplemental order approving theagreement.

Although Ricardo requests this court to remand this case tothe trial court with orders to conduct a best interests hearing,the parties agreed to a revised visitation schedule and thatagreement was set forth in an order of the court. Because theorder was a recital of the parties' agreement and was not ajudicial determination of the rights of the parties, the order isnot appealable. See English v. English, 72 Ill. App. 3d 736, 393N.E.2d 18 (1979) (determining that a consent order signed by theparties in a divorce action was not subject to appeal); Jackson v.Ferolo, 4 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 283 N.E.2d 247 (1972) (determiningthat a party cannot complain of a judgment, decree, or order towhich he has consented). Accordingly, Ricardo's attempt topreserve his right to appeal subject to the applicability of Meltonfails.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Rock Island County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOMER, P.J., and McDADE, J., concur.