The respondent, Gloria Bates, appeals from an order of thecircuit court denying her petition for discharge from involuntarycommitment. 405 ILCS 5/4--706 (West 1998). On appeal, shecontends that the trial court erred in denying her petition. Weagree with the respondent, and we therefore reverse.

The record reflects that on September 10, 1999, the trialcourt ordered the respondent to be involuntarily committed toeither the Robert Young Mental Health Center or Zeller MentalHealth Center (Zeller) for treatment of a mental illness for aperiod of time not to exceed 180 days. 405 ILCS 5/3--813 (West1998). On October 26, 1999, the respondent filed a petition fordischarge. 405 ILCS 5/3--900 (West 1998). On October 27, 1999,the trial court held a hearing on the petition.

At the hearing, the respondent initially argued that theoriginal commitment order was void on its face for committing herto two facilities and for failing to hospitalize her in the leastrestrictive facility. The trial court ruled that the commitmentorder was not void, and it therefore did not have jurisdiction toreview those issues.

Next, the respondent testified that she was 48 years old andhad a Bachelor of Arts degree in foods and nutrition. She wascurrently involuntarily committed to Zeller. According to therespondent, she did not belong at any mental facility. She saidshe was eating pizza with her mother and sister at home one daywhen the sheriff and two deputies pulled up to her home and tookher away to Trinity, a medical center in Rock Island. She saidneither she nor her mother called the police. In addition tobeing committed for no reason, she said she wanted to bedischarged because the people at Zeller were giving hermedications that were making her sick and giving her terribleside effects. During her time at Zeller, she had been on goodbehavior and had not threatened or caused any harm to anyone.

The respondent testified that her only problem was that shewas unhappy, not mentally ill. She said everyone could beclassified as mentally ill because everyone is unhappy to acertain degree. She wanted to return home to care for hermother, who is dying. She receives a small social security checkand she manages to support herself on that check. She is able totake care of her personal needs and to fix her own meals. Finally, she noted that she wanted her freedom like any othernormal person.

On cross-examination, the respondent noted that she did notbelieve that she was mentally ill when she was involuntarilycommitted on September 10. She said she has gotten moredepressed since she has been at Zeller because she wants to bereleased.

The State then moved for a directed verdict, which the trialcourt denied.

Dr. Pratapkumar Attaluri, a psychiatrist at Zeller,testified that he had treated the respondent since September 13,1999. He said that this was not the respondent's first admissionand that he had treated her once before. He said the respondentis loud, disruptive, and has paranoid delusions. For example,she believes that her mother is dying when she is healthy. Shecalls government agencies and harasses them. She is currently ontelephone restriction because of complaints from the community. Her main problem is that she does not have any insight, i.e., shedoes not believe that she has any illness.

Dr. Attaluri diagnosed the respondent as a paranoidschizophrenic. She had been receiving court-ordered medicationsince September 29. However, he had not seen any improvement inher condition yet. He said it generally took four to six weekson the medication to see a change in her condition. He said therespondent was not depressed, but she was angry and agitated. Hesaid that she does not know what she wants, and he did not thinkthat the respondent had any place to live if she were discharged.In Dr. Attaluri's opinion, the respondent was unable to providefor her basic physical needs so as to guard herself from seriousharm because of her illness. However, he did not know if shewould inflict serious physical harm on herself or others in thenear future because she would not speak to him.

On cross-examination, Dr. Attaluri said that when therespondent was brought to Zeller she would not eat because shebelieved the food was poisoned. However, he admitted that shewas presently eating her meals and taking care of her basicpersonal needs.

At the end of the hearing, the trial court noted that he didnot blame the respondent for questioning the reason she was beingkept at Zeller. However, the court said that it knew of noreason that Dr. Attaluri would misstate to the court hisprofessional findings. Therefore, the court denied therespondent's discharge petition.

On appeal, the respondent first contends that the commitmentorder entered on September 10, 1999, was void because the trialcourt committed her to two facilities and failed to hospitalizeher in the least restrictive facility. In response, the Stateargues that the original commitment order was not void and thiscourt therefore lacks jurisdiction to review the propriety ofthat order. We agree.

A judgment entered contrary to statute by a trial courthaving jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter isvoidable, not void, and is not subject to collateral attack. People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 619 N.E.2d 750 (1993). A trialcourt is not deprived of jurisdiction by an alleged failure ofthe trial court's order to reflect that treatment be the leastrestrictive alternative. In re Devine, 214 Ill. App. 3d 1, 572N.E.2d 1238 (1991).

Here, the trial court had jurisdiction over the parties andthe subject matter on September 10, 1999. The order entered bythe court reflects that the cause came on for hearing pursuant toArticle VIII of the Mental Health and Developmental DisabilitiesCode. 405 ILCS 5/3-800 et seq. (West 1998). The order alsoreflects that the respondent was personally present. Since thetrial court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subjectmatter, the order entered by the court was voidable, not void. Therefore, that order is not subject to collateral attack and weshall not address it.

Next, the respondent contends that the trial court erred indenying her petition because: (1) she had proven a prima faciecase for discharge; and (2) the State failed to clearly andconvincingly prove that the petition should be denied.

A person is subject to involuntary commitment when thatperson has a mental illness and who, because of that illness: (1) is reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm uponherself or another in the near future; or (2) is unable toprovide for her basic physical needs so as to guard herself fromserious harm. 405 ILCS 5/1--119 (West 1998).

A person seeking discharge from involuntary commitment mustfirst establish a prima facie case for discharge. In re Katz,267 Ill. App. 3d 692, 642 N.E.2d 893 (1994). The State must thenprove by clear and convincing evidence that the petition shouldbe denied. Katz, 267 Ill. App. 3d 692, 642 N.E.2d 893. If thetrial court finds that the party seeking discharge does not meetthe standard for judicial admission, the court shall enter anorder discharging that party. 405 ILCS 5/4--706 (West 1998). We initially note that the parties disagree over thestandard of review that applies in this case. The respondentargues that it is de novo. American National Bank & Trust Co. v.Department of Revenue, 242 Ill. App. 3d 716, 611 N.E.2d 32(1993). The State, however, argues that the correct standard iswhether the trial court's ruling was against the manifest weightof the evidence. See In re Moore, 301 Ill. App. 3d 759, 704N.E.2d 442 (1998). We find the State's citation to authority tobe most relevant. Moore involved the correctness of aninvoluntary commitment order where the State's burden of proofwas also clear and convincing. Moore, 301 Ill. App. 3d 759, 704N.E.2d 442. Therefore, we shall apply the manifest weight of theevidence standard to this appeal.

Here, the trial court's order denying the respondent'spetition was against the manifest weight of the evidence. First,the respondent made a prima facie case for discharge when shetestified that she was not harmful to herself or others and thatshe could take care of her basic personal needs. The State didnot refute the respondent's case by clear and convincingevidence. Although Dr. Attaluri testified that the respondentwas mentally ill, that alone was not sufficient evidence to denyher petition for discharge. See People v. Shelton, 281 Ill. App.3d 1027, 667 N.E.2d 562 (1996) (as a matter of due process, it isunconstitutional for a State to confine a harmless mentally illperson). The doctor also testified that the respondent wasunable to provide for her basic physical needs so as to guardherself from serious harm. However, on cross-examination, heconceded that the respondent was eating the food at Zeller andthat she was taking care of her basic needs. Dr. Attaluri alsoadmitted that he did not know if the respondent posed a seriousphysical harm to herself or others because she would not talk tohim. He merely said that the respondent was loud and disruptiveduring her time at Zeller, but he did not report any instances ofphysical misconduct to the court.

We agree with the trial court that Dr. Attaluri would haveno reason to misstate his findings. However, we find that thosefindings were not based on sufficient evidence to prove that therespondent was not entitled to discharge. For that reason, wereverse the trial court's order denying the respondent's petitionfor discharge.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of PeoriaCounty is reversed.

Reversed.

SLATER, P.J., and KOEHLER, J., concurring.