JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the opinion of the court:

Before July 1, 1999, section 3 of the Act provided that "[a]sex offender shall *** register in person" with a prescribed lawenforcement official. 730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 1998). The term"sex offender" was defined in section 2 as, inter alia, "anyperson" who is charged with, and convicted of, a sex offense. 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(1)(a) (West 1998). Effective July 1, 1999, thelegislature amended section 2 by adding the following definition:

" Juvenile sex offender means any person who isadjudicated a juvenile delinquent as the result of thecommission of or attempt to commit a violation setforth in item (B), (C), or (C--5) of this Section or aviolation of any substantially similar federal, sisterstate, or foreign country law. For purposes of thisSection, convicted shall have the same meaning asadjudicated." 730 ILCS 150/2(A--5) (West 2000).

The amendment did not change the definition of a "sex offender"or the requirement in section 3 that such offenders registerunder the Act.

In his original motion challenging the constitutionality ofthe Act, Ben S. acknowledged that the amendment "includ[ed] thedefinition of juvenile sex offender as a sex offender forapplication of the *** Act." He nevertheless averred that duringhis pre-admission negotiations with the State, both partiesbelieved he was not subject to registration because his offensespreceded the amendment's effective date. He said he did not wantto withdraw his admissions or have his sentence vacated; hesimply wanted "to be free from the dictates of the new provisionsof the *** Act as he bargained for during his plea negotiations."

The fundamental cannon of statutory construction is toascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent. Nottage v.Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386 (1996). The best indicator of such intentis the language the legislature used in the statute. Nottage,172 Ill. 2d 386. Courts cannot use construction as a guise forsupplying omissions, remedying defects, adding limitations, orotherwise departing from the plain meaning of a statute'slanguage. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Adelman, 215 Ill. App. 3d 561(1991). Questions of statutory construction invoke de novoreview. In re Application for Tax Deed, 285 Ill. App. 3d 930(1997).

The Appellate Court, Second District, addressed the instantissue in In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d 497 (2001), and heldthat juveniles are not required to register under the Act. Thecourt's reasoning was as follows:

"By creating a separate category of juvenile sexoffenders, the legislature must have intended those inthis category to be treated differently. Section 3 ofthe Act plainly provides that only sex offenders arerequired to register. It says nothing about juvenilesex offenders. If the legislature wanted to providethat juveniles who were adjudicated delinquent forhaving committed sex crimes had to register as sexoffenders on the same basis as adults convicted of sexcrimes, it could simply have amended the definition ofsex offender to include juveniles who were adjudicateddelinquent." Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 500.

We disagree with the Second District's holding. Indeedsection 3 of the Act only requires "sex offenders" to register. But the applicable definition of a "sex offender" is "any person"who is charged with, and convicted of, a sex offense. (Emphasisadded.) 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(1)(a) (West 2000). The plain meaningof that language encompasses juveniles without any need for themissing amendment noted by the Second District. In light of suchplainness, we refuse to add an adult limitation under the guiseof statutory construction.

Ben S. argues that when the legislature uses certain wordsin one context and different words in another context, it intendsthe words to have different meanings. See In re Marriage ofWalters, 238 Ill. App. 3d 1086 (1992). This argument misses thepoint that "juvenile sex offenders" are encompassed by thedefinition of "sex offenders" and thus do not occupy a differentcontext for purposes of registration under the Act. In additionto the plain language discussed above, the relevant legislativehistory on this point is telling.

The amendment that added "juvenile sex offender" to theAct's list of defined terms appeared before the legislature inHouse Bill 2721 (91st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 2721, 1999Sess.). In the House of Representatives, Representative Klinglerexplained that the bill "requires juveniles who are adjudicateddelinquent to register." 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., HouseProceedings, March 10, 1999, at 143. The bill then passed by avote of 116 yeas to 0 noes. 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., HouseProceedings, March 10, 1999, at 143. In the Senate, SenatorKlemm explained that the bill added definitions of certainpersons (including a "juvenile sex offender") to the Act "andimpose[d] registration requirements of those persons." 91st Ill.Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 26, 1999, at 52. The billthen passed by a vote of 57 yeas to 0 noes. 91st Ill. Gen.Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 26, 1999, at 53.

Ben S. himself acknowledged the juvenile registrationrequirement in his original post-admission motion, where hestated that the amendment "includ[ed] the definition of juvenilesex offender as a sex offender for application of the *** Act." His position has since changed, but the legislature's intent hasnot. He must register as a sex offender.

The judgment of the Will County circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOMER, J., concurs.

SLATER, J., dissents.

JUSTICE SLATER, dissenting:

I agree with the reasoning of the second district's decisionin In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d 497 (2001). In amendingthe Act and creating a separate category of "juvenile sexoffender", the legislature indicated its intent to treat suchoffenders differently. Accordingly, I would hold that therespondent is not required to register as a sex offender.