September 21, 2001

No. 3--00--0677

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2001

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOMER delivered the opinion of the court:

In this appeal, B.L.S. claims: (1) he should not have beencommitted to the Department of Corrections (DOC) without thejudge considering a social investigation report, and (2) heshould receive credit against his commitment for the time hespent in predisposition detention. We order the credit andotherwise affirm.

BACKGROUND

B.L.S., a minor, committed an aggravated battery and washeld in predisposition detention before being adjudicated anhabitual juvenile offender under section 5--815(f) of theJuvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/5--815(f)(West 2000)). After the adjudication, he was committed to theDepartment of Corrections, Juvenile Division (DOC), until histwenty-first birthday, as section 5--815(f) requires. Section 5--705(1) of the Act calls for preparation of a socialinvestigation report before a minor is committed to the DOC. 705ILCS 405/5--705(1) (West 2000). However, the judge did not ordersuch a report before sentencing B.L.S. to the commitment requiredin section 5--815(f).

ANALYSIS

Respondent contends that the trial court's failure to ordera social investigation report prior to committing him to the DOCrequires that the commitment order be vacated and entitles him toa new dispositional hearing. We disagree.

Section 5--705(1) of the Act, which pertains to juvenileoffenders in general, provides:

"No order of commitment to the Department ofCorrections, Juvenile Division, shall be enteredagainst a minor before a written report of socialinvestigation, which has been completed within theprevious 60 days, is presented to and considered by thecourt." 705 ILCS 405/5--705(1) (West 2000). Section 5--815(f) of the Act, a special provision pertainingsolely to habitual offenders, provides:

"If the court finds that the prerequisites establishedin subsection (a) of this Section have been proven, itshall adjudicate the minor an Habitual JuvenileOffender and commit him to the Department ofCorrections, Juvenile Division, until his twenty-firstbirthday, without possibility of parole, furlough, ornon-emergency authorized absence." 705 ILCS 405/5--815(f) (West 2000).

Respondent bases his claim on the mandatory language ofsection 5--705(1) requiring the court to consider a socialinvestigation report before committing a minor to the DOC. However, our review of the relevant provisions of the Act leadsus to conclude that section 5--705(1) does not apply in thiscase. Section 5--705(1) is part of a comprehensive statutoryscheme specifying, inter alia, the circumstances under which atrial judge shall determine whether to make the minor a ward ofthe court. If the minor is made a ward of the court, section 5--705(1) directs the judge to determine the disposition best suitedto the interests of the minor and the public. The statutefurther provides that the judge may rely on "[a]ll evidencehelpful in determining these questions, including oral andwritten reports." 705 ILCS 405/5--705(1) (West 2000). Thesocial investigation report is one such written report.

Accordingly, the report is generally necessary to guide acourt in determining (1) whether to make the minor a ward of thecourt, and (2) an appropriate disposition for the minor if he isadjudged a ward of the court. In the instant case, however, thecourt never faced these determinations because B.L.S.'s habitualjuvenile offender status invoked section 5--815(f), whichautomatically required a disposition of commitment to the DOC. The mandatory nature of the disposition naturally also requiredthat B.L.S. be made a ward of the court. See In re S.P., 297Ill. App. 3d 234, 696 N.E.2d 739 (1998) (noting that adisposition cannot be made without an underlying adjudication ofwardship). Because B.L.S. had been adjudicated an habitualjuvenile offender, the court was required to commit him to theDOC until his twenty-first birthday. Thus, any construction ofthe statute that would require the court to consider a socialinvestigation report prior to disposition would render suchconsideration meaningless.

Respondent contests this conclusion in his brief byasserting:

"Even where a minor has been initially found in anadjudicatory hearing to be an habitual offender, thetrial judge who conducts the dispositional hearing isrequired to determine whether the best interests of theminor and the public require that he be made a ward ofthe court."

This assertion flatly contravenes the language in section 5--815(f) requiring commitment of habitual juvenile offenders tothe DOC. B.L.S. cites In re S.P. to support his position. However, a close reading of that case shows that the language hequotes⁽¹⁾ does not pertain to proceedings conducted under thehabitual offender provisions of the Act. Rather, the quotedlanguage pertains to proceedings conducted in the cases thatpreceded the offense invoking section 5--815(f). Accordingly,B.L.S.'s above-quoted assertion is unfounded.

In sum, we hold that the requirement of a socialinvestigation report in section 5--705(1) applies only injuvenile proceedings where the judge has dispositionaldiscretion. When a minor is adjudicated an habitual offenderunder section 5--815(f), a social investigation report is notrequired.

Following the trial court's adjudication of respondent as anhabitual juvenile offender, he was made a ward of the court and committed to the DOC until his twenty-first birthday. Theparties agree that respondent is entitled to day-for-day goodtime credit pursuant to section 5--815(f) of the Act. 705 ILCS405/5--815(f) (West 2000). The parties disagree, however, as towhether respondent is entitled to credit for his predispositionalconfinement.

The record shows that B.L.S. was held in a detention homebefore being committed as an habitual juvenile offender. Thetrial court did not award any credit for the period ofpredispositional confinement. Respondent argues that thecommitment order should be modified to allow credit for the timehe spent in custody prior to his dispositional hearing. TheState disagrees, arguing that any right to presentence credit isstatutory and that unlike provisions in the Unified Code ofCorrections (730 ILCS 5/1--1--1 et seq., (West 2000)), no suchright has been provided by the Act. We agree with respondent onthis issue. It is true, as the State maintains, that the Actdoes not expressly provide for a credit against commitment forthe time a minor spends in predisposition detention. However,the Act does provide that "minors shall have all the proceduralrights of adults in criminal proceedings, unless specificallyprecluded by laws that enhance the protection of such minors." 705 ILCS 405/5--101(3) (West 2000). Adults receive presentencecustody credit against determinate sentences (730 ILCS 5/5--8--7(b) (West 2000)), and nothing in the Act specifically precludesminors from receiving similar credit against the determinatecommitment mandated in section 5--815(f).

The Act also provides that "[i]n no event shall a guiltyminor be committed to the Department of Corrections, JuvenileDivision for a period of time in excess of that period for whichan adult could be committed for the same act." 705 ILCS 405/5--710(7) (West 2000)). In our view, denying minors credit forpredisposition detention contravenes the spirit, if not theletter, of this provision. We also note that minors are clearlyentitled to such credit when their dispositions involve a"sentencing order of detention." 705 ILCS 405/5--710(1)(a)(v)(West 2000).

These considerations led the Appellate Court, FourthDistrict, to conclude that a minor is entitled to credit forpredisposition custody against an indeterminate commitment to theDOC. In re E.C., 297 Ill. App. 3d 177, 696 N.E.2d 846 (1998). The Appellate Court, Second District, reached the oppositeconclusion in In re J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d 327, 701 N.E.2d 1170(1998). The holding in J.J.M. was based on the differencesbetween juvenile proceedings for minors and criminal proceedingsfor adults. However, subsequent amendments to the Act havebrought juvenile proceedings more in line with criminalproceedings.

For instance, the court in J.J.M. stated: "While thepurposes of the Juvenile Court Act are protective andrehabilitative, by contrast, the purpose and policy of theUnified Code [of Corrections] are designed to be punitive as wellas rehabilitative." J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 331-32, 701N.E.2d at 1173. Yet our supreme court recently stated thatsubsequent amendments to the Act "represent[] a fundamental shiftfrom the singular goal of rehabilitation to include theoverriding concerns of protecting the public and holding juvenileoffenders accountable for violations of the law." In re A.G.,195 Ill. 2d 313, 317, 746 N.E.2d 732, 735 (2001).

Additionally, the court in J.J.M. noted that juvenilesreceive only indeterminate commitments to the DOC with"continuous opportunity to seek early release." J.J.M., 299 Ill.App. 3d at 331, 701 N.E.2d at 1173. That observation does notapply to minors like B.L.S. who are adjudicated habitual juvenileoffenders. This factor provides additional reason to grantminors who are committed under section 5--815(f) the presentencecustody credit that adults receive.

We decline to follow J.J.M. for these reasons. We agreewith the holding in E.C. and conclude that its reasoning appliesequally to determinate dispositions under section 5--815(f).

The record does not reflect how much time B.L.S. spent inpredisposition detention. We thus remand with directions for thecircuit court to determine the appropriate credit.

The judgment of the Henry County circuit court adjudicatingB.L.S. an habitual juvenile offender and committing him to theDOC is affirmed. The cause is remanded for calculation of hispredisposition detention credit.

Affirmed and remanded with directions.

HOLDRIDGE and SLATER, JJ., concur.

1. "[I]f the trial court decides that an adjudication ofwardship is not in the best interests of the minor and thepublic, it may dismiss the petition and discharge the minor--evenafter a finding of delinquency." In re S.P., 297 Ill. App. 3d at237, 696 N.E.2d at 741.