No. 3--01--0227

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2002

The minor was charged with unlawful possession of a motorvehicle and residential burglary. At arraignment, the trialcourt appointed counsel for the minor. The minor signed a formacknowledging that she had been advised of her rights and thepossibility of trial in her absence.

The minor later admitted the allegation of unlawfulpossession of a motor vehicle, but denied the residentialburglary charge. The matter was set for trial on the residentialburglary charge.

The minor failed to appear for trial. The trial courtdenied her attorney's motion for a continuance and proceeded withthe trial in her absence. After hearing the State's evidence,the court adjudicated the minor delinquent for the offense ofresidential burglary and set the matter for a posttrial motionhearing.

The trial court subsequently denied the minor's posttrialmotion and the matter was set for a sentencing hearing. Theminor failed to appear for sentencing. The trial court deniedher attorney's motion for a continuance and committed her to theDOCJD for an indeterminate term not to exceed her 21st birthday.
 

On appeal, the minor contends her sentence should be vacatedbecause she was not admonished that she could be sentenced in herabsence, but was only informed that a trial could be held in herabsence. The minor concedes that the Juvenile Court Act of 1987(Act) (705 ILCS 405/1--1 et seq. (West 2000)) does notspecifically require that juveniles be admonished regarding thepossibility of trial or sentencing in their absence. However,the minor contends the statute governing adult defendants shouldapply because the Act provides that juveniles "shall have all theprocedural rights of adults in criminal proceedings, unlessspecifically precluded by laws that enhance the protection ofsuch minors." 705 ILCS 405/5--101(3) (West 2000).

We agree the Act requires that minors receive, at a minimum,the same procedural rights as adults. In this regard, we notethat a trial court must advise an adult defendant that trial mayproceed in his absence if he fails to appear. 725 ILCS 5/113--4(e) (West 2000). A sentencing hearing has been construed to bepart of the trial. People v. Marks, 239 Ill. App. 3d 178, 607N.E.2d 286 (1992). Therefore, when an adult defendant has beeninformed that trial may proceed in his absence, he need not alsobe specifically told that sentencing may occur in his absence. Marks, 239 Ill. App. 3d 178, 607 N.E.2d 286; People v. Clark, 96Ill. App. 3d 491, 421 N.E.2d 590 (1981). We conclude that thisprocedural right afforded to adult defendants also applies tojuveniles. Accordingly, a juvenile must be advised that trialmay proceed in her absence before she is tried or sentenced inher absence. The minor was so advised in this case; therefore,she was afforded the same protections that adults receive underthe adult criminal provisions.

However, the minor further contends juveniles should beafforded greater protections. The minor asserts this courtshould require that a juvenile be specifically admonished thatshe could be sentenced in absentia prior to any such sentencing. The minor also argues juveniles should always be present forsentencing because the purpose of the Act, to rehabilitate thejuvenile, cannot be accomplished without his or her presence.

A primary rule of statutory construction is to give effectto the legislative intent. People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91,720 N.E.2d 225 (1999). The best indicator of such intent is theplain and ordinary meaning of the language used. People v.Jones, 306 Ill. App. 3d 793, 715 N.E.2d 256 (1999). Courtsshould not add requirements that are inconsistent with the plainmeaning of the statute. People v. Holmes, 268 Ill. App. 3d 802,644 N.E.2d 1 (1994).

The Juvenile Court Act allows sentencing of minors inabsentia. 705 ILCS 405/5--625 (West 2000).⁽¹⁾ However, the Actdoes not require the trial court to admonish a juvenile that shemay be sentenced in her absence. See 705 ILCS 405/5--625 (West2000). The Act does provide other safeguards for a juvenile whois sentenced in absentia, including a provision that a minor mustbe granted a new sentencing hearing if she can establish that herfailure to appear was not her fault and due to circumstancesbeyond her control. 705 ILCS 405/5--625(5) (West 2000). Therefore, the legislature considered in absentia sentencing ofminors and provided safeguards, but did not include a requirementthat a minor must be admonished that she could be sentenced inher absence.

As stated, courts should not add requirements that areinconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute. Thelegislature could have chosen to give juveniles more protectionin this regard, but it did not do so. Accordingly, we concludethe Act does not require that a minor be admonished that she maybe sentenced in absentia if she fails to appear. The trial courtsatisfied any requirement that the minor be admonished of thepossibility she could be sentenced in her absence when itinformed her that she could be tried in her absence.

The minor also contends her sentence should be vacatedbecause she did not fail to appear on two successive court daysprior to being sentenced in absentia.

The Act provides that "[i]f trial had previously commencedin the presence of the minor and the minor willfully absentshimself for 2 successive court days, the court shall proceed totrial." 705 ILCS 405/5--625(1) (West 2000).

This statute section deals with a trial court's authority toproceed with a trial when a minor is present to start the trial,but later willfully fails to appear. In this case, the trial didnot commence in the presence of the minor. The minor was notpresent for the one-day trial. Therefore, this statute does notapply to this case.

Moreover, our supreme court has construed similar statutorylanguage as being permissive rather than mandatory because tohold otherwise would result in an unconstitutional infringementupon the inherent powers of the judiciary. See People v. Flores,104 Ill. 2d 40, 470 N.E.2d 307 (1984) (construing similarlanguage in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 115--4.1). Therefore, the decision to proceed in such circumstances is inthe discretion of the trial court. Flores, 104 Ill. 2d 40, 470N.E.2d 307.

Here, the trial court considered and denied the request fora continuance by the minor's attorney. The court did not abuseits discretion in denying the request for a continuance andproceeding with sentencing. Accordingly, the statute did notprevent the court from proceeding in the minor's absence.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Peoria Countycircuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

LYTTON, P.J., and MCDADE, J., concur.

1. The minor's argument that a juvenile's presence is alwaysrequired for sentencing is addressed by this statute section,whereby the legislature clearly contemplated in absentiasentencing of juveniles.