No. 3--02--0001

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2002

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the opinion of the court

The respondent, Gloria B., appeals from an order of thecircuit court granting the State's petition to involuntarilyadminister psychotropic medication. The respondent alleges thatthe order should be reversed because it fails to comply with theMental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405ILCS 5/2--107.1 et seq. (West 2000)) in that: (1) it does notspecify the medications to be administered or the dosage amounts,and (2) it does not name the persons authorized to administer themedications. We reverse.

On November 29, 2001, the State filed a petition requestingauthority to administer involuntary medications to the respondent. At the hearing on the petition, Dr. Sreehari Patibandla,the respondent's treating physician, testified that he wanted totreat the respondent with Zyprexa, Haloperidol or Clozapine. These drugs are psychotropic medications. He stated that hewould first administer Zyprexa, which is taken orally. Thedosage of Zyprexa would be between 2.5 and 20 milligrams per day. If the respondent refused to take the Zyprexa, he would administer Haloperidol, because it can be administered by injection. The Haloperidol dosage would be between 5 and 200 milligrams perday. If she did not improve on the Haloperidol, he would administer Clozapine. The dosage for Clozapine would be between 25and 900 milligrams per day. The doctor testified that in thepast eight years the respondent had been admitted to the ZellerMental Health Center 14 or 15 times.

The judge found that the respondent was in need of involuntary medication. The trial judge stated, "The Court makes thefindings as set forth in the form order that I am about to sign***." The order stated that the respondent should receivetreatment:

"to be administered by members of the clinical staff atZeller Mental Health, whose license(s) allows them to administer the treatment pursuant to Illinois law.

The above-named staff is authorized to administerpsychotropic medication/electro-convulsive therapy to theabove-named recipient for a period not to exceed 90 days."

On appeal, the respondent asserts that the court's ordershould be reversed because it does not comply with the Code.

As the order was entered in December 2001 and only lastedfor 90 days, we recognize that this issue is moot. However, amoot issue may be addressed on appeal if the issue is of shortduration, capable of evading review. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d 482, 702 N.E.2d 555 (1998). To qualify for review under thisexception, the challenged action must be of so short a durationthat it cannot be fully litigated and the respondent is likely tobe subjected to the complained of action again. Barbara H., 183Ill. 2d 482, 702 N.E.2d 555. The Code limits the duration of anorder for involuntary medication to 90 days. 405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(5) (West 2000). An appeal on an issue involving thepetition could not reasonably be expected to be completed in lessthan 90 days. Furthermore, the record reflects that the respondent had repeatedly been admitted for psychological treatment. Thus, it is appropriate to review this case under an exception tothe mootness doctrine.

The Code provides that an order for the involuntary administration of medication "shall designate the persons authorized toadminister the authorized involuntary treatment ***. The ordershall also specify the medications and the anticipated range ofdosages that have been authorized." 405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(6)(West 2000).

The involuntary administration of psychotropic medicationsclearly impacts an individual's liberty interests. In re C.E.,161 Ill. 2d 200, 641 N.E.2d 345 (1994). The Code protectspatients from the potential misuse of psychotropic medication bymedical staff. C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 641 N.E.2d 345. Therefore, a court's order that does not comply with the Code shouldbe reversed. In re Cynthia S., 326 Ill. App. 3d 65, 759 N.E.2d1020 (2001).

Citing In the Matter of Miller, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 705N.E.2d 144 (1998), the State argues that the failure of the orderto comply with the Code does not require reversal. In Miller,the trial court's order did not specifically name the individualsauthorized to administer the medication, the medications to beadministered, or the dosage of the medications to be administered. On appeal, the respondent argued that the order should bereversed because of these infirmities. The appellate courtaffirmed, holding that (1) the respondent had waived the issue byfailing to object to the order at trial; (2) the respondent hadnot alleged any prejudice resulting from the order; and (3) thetreating physician was intimately familiar with the respondent'scase. Miller, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 705 N.E.2d 144. Miller isdistinguishable from the case at bar in that the respondent inthis case alleged that she was prejudiced by the omissions in theorder. Furthermore, in Miller, the treating physician whotestified had a long history of treating the defendant, which thecourt indicated was an important factor in determining whetherthe trial court's order should be reversed. Here, the treatingphysician who testified had been the respondent's physician foronly a few days. These critical differences compel us to reach adifferent result than that reached in Miller.

In the instant case, the judge signed a form order thatstated that the "staff at Zeller Mental Health" was authorized to"administer psychotropic medication/electro-convulsive therapy." Not only is the approved dosage of medication not stated in theorder, the types of medication approved are lacking. Furthermore, the individuals who are authorized to administer themedications are not listed. Any one of these failings would besufficient to require the reversal of the court's order. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court's order.

The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County isreversed.

Reversed.

SLATER and MCDADE, JJ., concur.