No. 3--01--0570

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2002

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the court:

The minor, Jermaine J., was adjudged to be delinquent underthe Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1--1 et seq.(West 1998)) for having committed the offense of unlawfulpossession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4--103(a)(1)(West 1998)). He admitted committing the offense. In adispositional order, he was committed to the Department ofCorrections (DOC) for an indeterminate period not to exceed sevenyears. His motion to reconsider his commitment was denied. Inhis first appeal to this court, we reversed and remanded for hisattorney to file a Rule 604(d) certificate (188 Ill. 2d R.604(d)). In the Interest of J.J., No. 3--99--0021 (2000)(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The facts thatled to his commitment were discussed in his first appeal. Onlythose facts necessary for an understanding of the issues in thisappeal will be discussed here.

On remand, the minor's attorney filed a Rule 604(d)certificate and the minor filed a "Motion To Withdraw Guilty PleaAnd For Reconsideration Of Sentence." His motion was denied. Onappeal, the minor argues that (1) on remand, the trial courtabused its discretion by failing to order and consider an updatedsocial investigation report prior to ruling on his motion towithdraw and reconsider; and (2) he is entitled to credit for thetime he spent in custody prior to the date of the dispositionalorder. We affirm the denial of his motion to withdraw andreconsider. We rule that he is entitled to credit for his timespent in custody prior to the date of the dispositional order. We remand for the trial court to calculate the number of days'credit to which the minor is entitled.

ANALYSIS

I. Social Investigation Report

The minor contends that the trial court abused itsdiscretion by failing to order and consider an updated socialinvestigation report prior to ruling on his motion to withdrawand reconsider. According to this court's research, the issueraised by the minor is one of first impression in Illinois.

We review the denial of a motion to withdraw and reconsiderin a juvenile case for abuse of discretion. In re E.V., 298 Ill.App. 3d 951, 700 N.E.2d 175 (1998). A written socialinvestigation report shall be considered by the trial court priorto the issuance of an order of commitment. The report shall becompleted within 60 days prior to the commitment order beingissued. 705 ILCS 405/5--705(1) (West 2000).

The minor's argument that he was entitled to a new socialinvestigation report is based on the differences between civiljuvenile delinquency proceedings and adult criminal proceedings. He contends that the trial court should have generated a newreport prior to ruling on his motion to withdraw and reconsiderbecause of the underlying philosophy in juvenile proceedings. Among other cases, he cites In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 746N.E.2d 732 (2001), to articulate that philosophy as a spirit ofhumane concern for, and the promotion of the welfare of, theminor.

The minor submits that the Act's philosophy is furtherevidenced by its provisions for (1) a continuance during thecommitment hearing to receive reports or other evidence (705 ILCS405/5--705(3) (West 2000)); and (2) periodic evaluations afterthe minor has been committed (705 ILCS 405/5--745 (West 2000)).

A basic rule of statutory construction, however, states thatcourts are to declare and enforce the law as enacted by thelegislature. Courts are not to annex new provisions orsubstitute different ones, or read into a statute exceptions,limitations, or conditions which depart from its plain meaning. Lauer v. American Family Life Insurance Co., 199 Ill. 2d 384, 769N.E.2d 924 (2002). The purpose of a motion to reconsider thesentence is not to conduct a new sentencing hearing, but ratherto review the appropriateness of the sentence imposed and correctany errors. People v. Vernon, 285 Ill. App. 3d 302, 674 N.E.2d153 (1996).

In this case, we will not annex a new provision into section5--705(1) of the Act regarding the social investigation report. The plain language of the Act only calls for the preparation andconsideration of a written social investigation report before acommitment hearing. A motion to reconsider is not a newcommitment hearing requiring a new social investigation report. See Vernon, 285 Ill. App. 3d 302, 674 N.E.2d 153. Therefore, thetrial judge did not abuse his discretion because he failed toorder and consider a new report prior to denying the minor'smotion to withdraw and reconsider.

II. Credit for Time Served in Predisposition Custody

The minor contends that he is entitled to credit against hisindeterminate term of commitment for the time he was in custodyprior to the trial court issuing its dispositional order.

Jermaine J. committed the instant offense on June 27, 1998. At the time of the offense, he was under the guardianship of theDepartment of Children and Family Services in "The Children'sHome Association of Illinois" (Children's Home) in Peoria. Theminor was served with a copy of the juvenile petition and asummons for this case at the Children's Home on July 22, 1998. He was discharged from the Children's Home on August 12, 1998. The court issued its dispositional order committing the minor tothe DOC on September 25, 1998. The record does not indicate theminor's location between his discharge from the Children's Homeand the issuance of the dispositional order.

In In re B.L.S., 325 Ill. App. 3d 96, 757 N.E.2d 637 (2001),appeal allowed, 198 Ill. 2d 591, 766 N.E.2d 239 (2002), we ruledthat where the court imposes a determinate period of commitmenton a minor, the minor is entitled to credit for time served inpredisposition custody. In B.L.S., we stated that we agreed withthe holding of the Appellate Court, Fourth District, in In reE.C., 297 Ill. App. 3d 177, 696 N.E.2d 846 (1998). In E.C., thecourt held that a minor is entitled to credit for time spent inpredisposition custody against an indeterminate term ofcommitment. Recently, the Fourth District reaffirmed its holdingfrom E.C. in In re Jesus R., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 762 N.E.2d717 (2002).

The State argues that B.L.S. is distinguishable from theinstant case because it concerned a determinate rather than anindeterminate term of commitment. The State urges us to followthe Second District's holding in In re J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d327, 701 N.E.2d 1170 (1998). The J.J.M. court ruled that a minoris not entitled to credit for time in predisposition custodyagainst an indeterminate term of commitment.

We see no reason to distinguish the holding of B.L.S. fromthe present case because of the difference between determinateand indeterminate terms of commitment. In B.L.S., we agreed withthe holding of E.C. in which the minor's term of commitment wasindeterminate. We also rejected the holding of J.J.M. becauseof, inter alia, amendments to the Act subsequent to J.J.M. Therefore, we rule that under B.L.S., E.C., and Jesus R., theminor in this case is entitled to credit for the time he spent inpredisposition custody against his indeterminate term ofcommitment.

It is unclear from the record how many days the minor spentin predisposition custody for the instant offense. We remand thematter to the circuit court for a determination of the number ofdays' credit to which the minor is entitled against his term ofcommitment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of thePeoria County circuit court denying the minor's motion towithdraw and reconsider. The minor is entitled to credit for histime spent in custody for this case prior to the date of thedispositional order. We remand the matter to the circuit courtto calculate the number of days' credit to which the minor isentitled.

Affirmed in part and remanded with directions.

SLATER, J., and MCDADE, P. J., concur.