No. 3--00--0601
December 12, 2001

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2001

_______________________________________________________________________________________________

The minor, M.R.H., was adjudicated delinquent on a charge ofretail theft (720 ILCS 5/16A--3 (West 1998)). He was placed onprobation for 12 months. On appeal, the minor contends that: (1)the trial court erred in denying his motion for nonadjudication;and (2) the court's determination that it lacked authority toimpose supervision was incorrect. We reverse and remand forfurther proceedings.

In September of 1999, 13-year-old M.R.H. entered Casey'sGeneral Store and purchased a bottle of pop. The clerk noticedsomething in the minor's pants. The minor did not remove it beforeleaving the store. The clerk followed the minor out of the storeand confronted him. M.R.H. admitted that he had taken a package ofRollo candies worth 59 cents. He apologized and the clerk calledthe Aledo police department. After taking the clerk's statement,the officer transported the minor to the station and telephoned hismother. The minor was eventually released. The officer did notissue a station house adjustment.

The State filed a juvenile petition charging the minor withretail theft and requesting that he be adjudged a ward of thecourt. In response, the minor filed a motion for remand for astation adjustment, or in the alternative, probation adjustment. The court noted that the case was an ideal situation for a stationhouse adjustment. However, the court denied the minor's motionbecause the State insisted on prosecution.

The minor then filed a motion to request nonadjudication. Theminor asked the court, upon a finding of guilt, to determine not toadjudicate because it would not be in the best interests of theminor or the public to make him a ward of the court. The Statesubsequently filed an objection to an order of continuance undersupervision. Prior to a resolution of the motion fornonadjudication, the minor agreed to the factual basis for thecharge as presented by the State and was found guilty of retailtheft.

At the sentencing hearing, the minor again argued that heshould not be adjudicated a ward of the court. The court held thatsince the minor had already been found guilty, it did not have thepower to allow the motion for nonadjudication. The motion wasdenied and the minor was granted leave to present authority thatwould allow the imposition of court supervision. After hearingarguments, the court concluded that, absent consent of the State,supervision was not an appropriate sentence of disposition. Itsentenced the minor to 12 months' probation.

On appeal, the minor claims that the trial court erred inruling that it lacked the authority to allow the minor's motion fornonadjudication under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705ILCS 405/1--1 et seq. (West 1998)).

Article V of the Act sets forth the procedure for conductinga delinquency proceeding. First, the court must hear evidence anddetermine whether the minor is guilty of the offense. 705 ILCS405/5--620 (West 1998). If the court determines that the minor isnot guilty, the petition is then dismissed and the minor isdischarged. 705 ILCS 405/5--620 (West 1998). If the court findsthat the minor committed the offense, the matter proceeds to asentencing hearing. 705 ILCS 405/5--620 (West 1998). Section 5--705 of the Act provides:

"(1) At the sentencing hearing, the court shalldetermine whether it is in the best interests of theminor or the public that he or she be made a ward of thecourt, and, if he or she is to be made a ward of thecourt, the court shall determine the proper dispositionbest serving the interests of the minor and the public." 705 ILCS 405/5--705 (West 1998).

In construing statutes we are guided by well-establishedprinciples. A primary rule of statutory construction is to giveeffect to the legislative intent. People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d91, 720 N.E.2d 225 (1999). The best indicator of such intent isthe plain and ordinary meaning of the language used. People v.Jones, 306 Ill. App. 3d 793, 715 N.E.2d 256 (1999). Courts shouldnot add requirements or impose limitations that are inconsistentwith the plain meaning of the statute. People v. Holmes, 268 Ill.App. 3d 802, 644 N.E.2d 1 (1994).

The plain language of section 5--705 allows the court todetermine whether it is in the best interests of the minor to beadjudicated a ward of the court. According to the ordinary meaningof the language used, such a determination must be made prior tothe entry of a dispositional order. Nothing in the statute limitsthe court's authority to assess the best interests of the minor andthe public and to determine whether adjudication is appropriate. The trial court had the statutory authority to make that decision. Accordingly, the denial of the minor's request for nonadjudicationis reversed. The cause is remanded for a hearing to determinewhether it is in the best interests of the minor or the public thathe be made a ward of the court.

Based on our resolution of this issue, we need not addresswhether the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked theauthority to impose supervision as a disposition afteradjudication.

The judgment of the circuit court of Mercer County is reversedand remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

HOLDRIDGE and SLATER, JJ., concur.