IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2004
| In re SEAN A., a Minor (THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Appellant.) | ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) | Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 9th Judicial Circuit Fulton County, Illinois, No. 03--JA--18 Honorable |
JUSTICE O'BRIEN delivered the opinion of the court:
The appellant, the Department of Children and FamilyServices (DCFS), brings this interlocutory appeal from an orderof the trial court granting temporary custody of the minor, SeanA. (Sean), to the DCFS and ordering the DCFS to place Sean in anappropriate residential placement. On appeal, the DCFS arguesthat the trial court erred when it ordered the DCFS to place Seanin residential treatment after it determined that the DCFS shouldtake temporary custody of Sean. The Guardian ad Litem (GAL), onbehalf of Sean, argues that this court does not have jurisdictionto hear this appeal. After a careful review of the record, wefind: (1) appellate jurisdiction has been properly invokedpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) (166 Ill. 2d R.306(a)(5)); and (2) the trial court had the authority to orderthe DCFS to place Sean in residential treatment after it ruledthe that DCFS should take temporary custody of him. Therefore,we affirm.
On September 18, 2003, the State filed a delinquencypetition with regard to 14-year-old Sean. A detention hearingwas held that same day. At the hearing, Sean stipulated thatthere was probable cause to believe that he was delinquent andthat it was a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for hisprotection that he be detained.
The trial court noted that the State had also filed apetition alleging that Sean was a neglected minor and that therehad been a pending case against Sean in McDonough County. In theone count neglect petition, the State alleged that Sean wasneglected because he was not receiving the proper care andsupport as necessary for his well-being, or, in the alternative,that he was abandoned by his mother. The State alleged thatSean's mother blamed Sean for the family's problems, that she hadrepeatedly contacted professionals involved in the case andstated that she wished to surrender her parental rights, and thatshe failed to fully cooperate with service providers.
At the conclusion of the detention hearing, the trial courtentered an order finding probable cause to believe that Sean wasdelinquent and ordered that he be held in the Mary Davis home forseven days. It also ordered the DCFS to procure a residentialplacement for Sean during that seven day period and set a sheltercare hearing at the end of that period.
On September 25, 2003, the trial court held a status hearingon the delinquency petition and a shelter care hearing on theneglect petition. At the combined hearing, the State asked thetrial court to place Sean in the temporary custody andguardianship of the DCFS. The DCFS did not oppose that request. However, the DCFS opposed any request that it be ordered to makea specific placement of Sean.
The trial court found probable cause that Sean was neglectedand that there was an immediate and urgent necessity that he beplaced in the temporary custody of the DCFS. It then orderedthat the DCFS place Sean in residential treatment after reviewingSean's mental health records and taking judicial notice of aprior case involving Sean in McDonough County.
The DCFS objected to the trial court's order which hadplaced Sean in the custody of the DCFS and additionally requireda specific placement for Sean. It argued that the court only hadtwo alternatives after finding that Sean should be placed intemporary custody: (1) it could choose a specific placement; or(2) it could place Sean in the custody of DCFS and let the DCFSchoose where Sean was placed.
The trial court rejected the DCFS' argument. It ruled thatit had the statutory authority to appoint the DCFS custodian ofSean and order that Sean be placed in a residential treatmentcenter. The trial court noted that such an order was necessaryin this case based on Sean's unmet mental health needs.
On December 4, 2003, this court granted the DCFS' petitionfor leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5). 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5).
Supreme Court Rule 306 provides, in relevant part:
"(a) Orders Appealable by Petition. A partymay petition for leave to appeal to theAppellate Court from the following orders ofthe trial court: * * * (5) from interlocutory orders affecting thecare and custody of unemancipated minors, ifthe appeal of such orders is not otherwisespecifically provided for elsewhere in theserules[.]" 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5).
Section 2--10 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1--1et seq. (West 2002)) provides, in relevant part:
"Sec. 2--10. Temporary Custody Hearing. Atthe appearance of the minor before the courtat the temporary custody hearing, allwitnesses present shall be examined beforethe court in relation to any matter connectedwith the allegations made in the petition. * * * (2) If it is consistent with the health,safety and best interests of the minor, thecourt may also prescribe shelter care andorder that the minor be kept in a suitableplace designated by the court or in a sheltercare facility designated by the Department ofChildren and Family Services or a licensedchild welfare agency; . . . If the minor isordered placed in a shelter care facility ofthe Department of Children and FamilyServices or a licensed child welfare agency,the court shall, upon request of theappropriate Department or other agency,appoint the Department of Children and FamilyServices Guardianship Administrator or otherappropriate agency executive temporarycustodian of the minor and the court mayenter such other orders related to thetemporary custody as it deems fit and proper,including the provision of services to theminor or his family to ameliorate the causescontributing to the finding of probable causeor to the finding of the existence ofimmediate and urgent necessity." 705 ILCS 405/2--10(2) (West 2002).
We will first address the issue of appellate jurisdiction. The GAL argues that this court improperly allowed DCFS' petitionfor leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5). 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5). Specifically, the GAL argues thatappeals arising under the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1--1et seq. (West 2002))(Act) are specifically provided for bySupreme Court Rules 660 and 662. 134 Ill. 2d R. 660, 662. Sinceneither of those specific rules governing juvenile cases pertainto the facts of this case, the GAL claims that DCFS cannotattempt to obtain appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutoryappeal by means of Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5), a general rulerelating to appeals. 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5).
Except where a supreme court rule provides for aninterlocutory appeal, the appellate court has jurisdiction toreview only final judgments. In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 435N.E.2d 473 (1982).
We have jurisdiction to review this case pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 306(a)(5). 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5). The GALcorrectly notes that jurisdiction in this case cannot be invokedunder Supreme Court Rules 660 or 662. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 660(appeals from final judgments); 134 Ill. 2d R. 662 (appeals fromcases brought under the Act that are predispositional). However,we fail to see how the lack of jurisdiction under those rulesbars jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5). 166Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5).
The language of Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) specificallypertains to appeals from interlocutory orders affecting the careand custody of unemancipated minors, "if the appeal of suchorders is not otherwise specifically provided for elsewhere inthese rules." 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5)(emphasis added). This isthe appeal of an unemancipated minor whose interlocutory order isnot provided for elsewhere in the rules.
The GAL argues that a fair reading of the supreme courtrules together would be that not every interlocutory order underthe Act may be appealed from by leave or by right. That may be afair reading of the rules. However, the language of SupremeCourt Rule 306(a)(5) makes it clear that a reviewing court hasjurisdiction to hear the appeal of an interlocutory order whichaffects an unemancipated minor. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5). To hold otherwise would be to distort the plain meaning of therule. Accordingly, the DCFS' petition for leave to appeal thetrial court's temporary custody order was proper pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 306(a)(5). 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5).
The DCFS argues that the trial court erred in ordering it toplace Sean in residential treatment after the court had grantedit temporary custody over Sean. Specifically, the DCFS arguesthat once a minor has been temporarily committed to the custodyof the department, that agency has the sole discretion todetermine the proper type of placement for that child pursuant tosection 2--10 of the Act. 705 ILCS 405/2--10 (West 2002).
Section 2--10 of the Act provides that after hearingtestimony in a temporary custody hearing, the trial court may,consistent with the health, safety and best interests of theminor, prescribe shelter care and order that the minor be kept ina suitable place designated by the court or in a shelter carefacility designated by the DCFS. 705 ILCS 405/2--10(2) (West2002).
"If the minor is ordered placed in a shelter care facilityof the Department of Children and Family Services or a licensedchild welfare agency, the court shall, upon request of theappropriate Department or other agency, appoint the Department ofChildren and Family Services Guardianship Administrator or otherappropriate agency executive temporary custodian of the minor andthe court may enter such other orders related to the temporarycustody as it deems fit and proper, including the provision ofservices to the minor or his family to ameliorate the causescontributing to the finding of probable cause or to the findingof the existence of immediate and urgent necessity." 705 ILCS405/2--10 (West 2002)(emphasis added).
Here, the DCFS' argument centers around the first portion ofsection 10. 705 ILCS 405/2--10(2) (West 2002). That sectionstates that if the trial court prescribes shelter care it mustorder that the minor be kept in a suitable place designated bythe court or in a shelter care facility designated by the DCFS. 705 ILCS 405/2--10(2) (West 2002). However, the latter part ofsection 10 specifically provides that if the court appoints theDCFS temporary custody of the minor, the court still retains thepower to "enter such other orders related to the temporarycustody as it deems fit and proper, including the provision ofservices to the minor or his family to ameliorate the causescontributing to the finding of probable cause or to the findingof the existence of immediate and urgent necessity." 705 ILCS405/2--10(2) (West 2002).
While the DCFS acknowledges that section 2--10 of the Actcontains this latter provision, it argues: (1) when thelegislature authorized the courts to enter "such other orders"relating to temporary custody as it deemed proper, it clearly wasreferring to orders other than the temporary custody orderitself; and (2) the general grant of authority given in thisprovision is limited to the provision of ancillary socialservices and it should not be interpreted as a modification ofthe earlier provision dealing with temporary custody orders.
We are not persuaded. Statutes should be given their plainand ordinary meaning. Michigan Avenue Bank v. County of Cook,191 Ill. 2d 493, 732 N.E.2d 528 (2000). A plain reading of thestatute indicates that the legislature vested the trial courtwith authority to make additional orders related to the temporarycustody of the minor, even after the trial court awarded the DCFStemporary custodian of the minor. Nowhere in the statute is itevident that the legislature intended that these other orders beunrelated to the temporary custody order itself or that theyshould be limited to ancillary social services. Courts shouldnot, under the guise of statutory construction, add requirementsor impose limitations that are inconsistent with the plainmeaning of the statute. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 667N.E.2d 91 (1996).
Our Supreme Court has reviewed the power of a trial court intemporary custody proceedings on several occasions. See In reA.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408, 748 N.E.2d 183 (2001); In re Lawrence M.,172 Ill. 2d 523, 670 N.E.2d 710 (1996). In In re A.H., the trialcourt granted temporary custody of the minor to the DCFS with theright to place him. The DCFS placed him in foster care. Afterthe GAL became aware that the minor was being beaten in fostercare, the trial court held a hearing and ordered that the minorbe removed from the home. In re A.H., 172 Ill. 2d at 414, 748N.E.2d at 188. On appeal, the DCFS argued that the trial judgehad no authority to circumvent the agency's administrativeprocesses and order the that minor be removed from anindividual's foster care.
The Supreme Court found that section 10 of the Act allowedthe trial court to enter such orders related to the temporarycustody as the court deemed fit and proper if the minor isordered placed in a DCFS shelter care facility. In re A.H., 172Ill. 2d at 419, 748 N.E.2d at 190; 705 ILCS 405/2--10 (West2002). Therefore, the Supreme Court held that these "otherorders relating to the temporary custody" of the minor were notlimited to providing ameliorative services and that the trialcourt had the authority to enter an order removing the minor fromtemporary foster care without having to hold another temporarycustody hearing. In re A.H., 172 Ill. 2d at 420, 748 N.E.2d at191.
The Supreme Court also considered the powers of a trialcourt in temporary custody hearings in In re Lawrence M., 172Ill. 2d 523, 670 N.E.2d 710 (1996). In that case, our SupremeCourt held that the portion of section 2--10(2) of the Act whichauthorized a trial court to enter such other orders relating tothe temporary custody as it deems proper, including the provisionof services to the minor or his family, authorized the trialcourt to enter orders requiring the DCFS to provide and pay forin-patient drug treatment services for mothers whose addictionhad caused or contributed to the minor's placement in sheltercare. In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d at 530, 670 N.E.2d at 714;705 ILCS 405/2--10(2) (West 2002).
It is clear that our Supreme Court has held that a trialcourt has broad authority at a temporary custody hearing tocontrol the custody of a minor and the services given to him orhis parents, even if the DCFS has been granted temporary custodyof the minor. See In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408, 748 N.E.2d 183(2001); In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 670 N.E.2d 710 (1996)Further, a literal reading of section 10 of the Act indicatesthat the trial court has been given this authority by thelegislature. 705 ILCS 405/2--10(2) (West 2002).
Here, the trial court found that placement of Sean in aresidential facility was proper based on its concerns about hismental health and on information about a juvenile case involvingSean in McDonough County. The trial court therefore had theauthority, under section 10 of the Act, to direct the DCFS toplace Sean in residential treatment, even after it had awardedtemporary custody of Sean to the DCFS. See 705 ILCS 405/2--10(2)(West 2002).
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of FultonCounty is affirmed.
Affirmed.
BARRY and SCHMIDT, J.J., concurs.