This declaratory judgment action was brought by plaintiff JohnIsaacson, special administrator of the estate of Michael Crawford(estate), against defendants Country Mutual Insurance Company andCountry Companies Insurance (collectively Country Mutual), allegingthat they failed to comply with section 143a-2 of the IllinoisInsurance Code (Insurance Code) (215 ILCS 5/143a-2 (West 2000)),which requires that an insurer provide a brief description ofuninsured motorist and underinsured motorist (collectively UM)coverage before issuing an applicant a policy of insurance. Thecourt granted Country Mutual's motion for summary judgment, and theestate appealed. We affirm and hold that the statutoryrequirements of section 143a-2 of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS5/143a-2 (West 2000)) are met when an insurer provides an applicantfor insurance with adequate information to enable him to make aninformed decision regarding UM coverage.

FACTS

In 1995, Ernest Bartoli met with Country Mutual's agent, CraneSchafer, to secure automobile insurance. Bartoli requesteduninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $20,000 per person and$40,000 per occurrence (20/40) and rejected underinsured motoristcoverage. Because Bartoli failed to sign the rejection section onthe application, however, Country Mutual issued Bartoli's policywith UM coverages equal to his bodily injury liability coverage. When he received the policy with the higher UM coverage, Bartolicomplained about the higher cost and again requested that theuninsured coverage be reduced to 20/40 and that there be nounderinsured coverage. He then signed and submitted a formindicating that he had been offered coverage, that he understood hecould purchase such coverage, and that he was rejecting thecoverage. Country Mutual reduced the coverage accordingly byissuing an addendum to the policy.

One month later, Country Mutual notified the agent that therejection had not been received and that it would have to raiseBartoli's UM coverage at the next policy renewal. Thereafter,Bartoli executed a more detailed form of the UM rejection whichstated that he understood what UM coverage was, that the premiumsand the opportunity to purchase such coverage had been explained tohim, that coverage was offered to him, and that he was rejectingthe higher coverage. Subsequently, Bartoli renewed his policy atsix-month intervals. He also signed two additional rejections.

In June of 1998, Bartoli's 16-year-old daughter was added tothe policy. One month later, she was involved in an automobileaccident in which her two passengers, Michael Crawford and anotherperson, were killed. Because the other driver carried minimumliability coverage, Crawford's estate filed a complaint againstCountry Mutual seeking a declaration that Bartoli's rejection didnot comply with statutory requirements and that the policy neededto be reformed to include UM coverage at the same amount as thepolicy's bodily injury liability coverage. Both parties moved forsummary judgment.

At a hearing, the transcript from Bartoli's depositiontestimony was introduced into evidence. The testimony indicatedthat he and the agent had a number of discussions regarding UMcoverage but that Bartoli could not remember if they discussed itat the time of the initial application or at the time of therenewals. After he received a bill itemizing the costs for thehigher UM coverage, however, Bartoli recalled that he had discussedthe coverage with the agent and decided not to carry it. Bartolitestified that he rejected the higher coverage in part based onprinciple. He explained that he objected to being required tocarry insurance to cover those drivers who were not adequatelyinsured. According to Bartoli, the decision to carry the lowerlimits was an informed one and he knew he could have elected tocarry higher coverage.

The agent's deposition testimony was also introduced. Itindicated that it was his custom and practice to initially offer UMcoverage face-to-face, explain the coverage and its cost, and urgeits purchase. On several occasions, the agent attempted topersuade Bartoli to carry higher UM coverage and informed him thatCountry Mutual encouraged the higher coverage. Bartoli adamantlyrejected such coverage based on philosophical grounds. After thehearing, the trial court granted Country Mutual's motion and deniedthe estate's motions. The estate appealed.

ANALYSIS

At issue is whether Country Mutual provided Bartoli adequateinformation to enable him to make an informed decision regardingrejection of UM coverage in amounts equal to the policy's bodilyinjury liability limits.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Nila v.Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 312 Ill. App. 3d 811, 728N.E.2d 81 (2000).

The estate argues that Country Mutual failed to comply withthe requirements of section 143a-2 of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS5/143a-2 (West 2000)) by not providing Bartoli with the information he needed to reject UM coverage and by not properly obtaining therejections. The estate further contends that a new explanation andrejection of UM coverage was required when Bartoli added hisdaughter to the policy. Because the statutory requirements werenot met, Bartoli's UM coverage must equal his bodily injuryliability coverage and the policy must be reformed to reflect thestatutorily required higher coverage.

Section 143a-2 of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a-2(1)(West 2000)) requires that any policy that is issued contain UMcoverage in the amount equal to the insured's bodily injuryliability limit unless the amount is specifically rejected by theinsured. The insurance company providing the coverage is requiredto give a brief description of UM coverage and advise an applicantof the right to reject coverage in excess of the statutory limits.215 ILCS 5/143a-2(1) (West 2000). Under the Insurance Code, eachinsurance application is required to contain a space for theapplicant to reject additional UM coverage. 215 ILCS 5/143a-2(2)(West 2000). The rejection is not effective unless an applicantsigns or initials the indication of rejection. 215 ILCS 5/143a-2(2)(West 2000). The purpose of section 143a-2 is not only to makecertain that drivers are minimally insured but also that theapplicant make an informed decision regarding UM coverage. SeeNila, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 820, 728 N.E.2d at 89.

In Cloninger v. National General Insurance Co., 109 Ill. 2d419, 488 N.E.2d 548 (1985), the court used a four-part test todetermine whether an offer of UM coverage was adequate to fullyinform an applicant about UM coverage. The test included thefollowing: (1) whether there was commercially reasonablenotification if the offer was not made face-to-face; (2) whetherthe limits of additional coverage were specifically set forth; (3)whether the insured was informed of the nature of the option; and(4) whether the insured was informed that the premiums foradditional coverage were relatively modest. See Cloninger, 109Ill. 2d at 425-26, 488 N.E.2d at 550.

The record in this case confirms that the Cloninger test wassatisfied. The testimony of both Bartoli and the agent indicatedboth that they met face-to-face and corresponded through the mail. The agent testified that his usual custom and practice was toinitially offer UM coverage in person, explain the coverage and itscost, and urge its purchase. He attempted on several occasions topersuade Bartoli to carry UM coverage in amounts equal to hisliability coverage, but Bartoli refused. Bartoli testified that heand the agent discussed the UM coverage and that he understood thecoverage and was philosophically opposed to it. While there is noevidence that the price differential between UM coverage at thehigher limits and the cost at the lower levels was minimal, we arecognizant of the fact that Bartoli must have known the costdifferential. We reach this conclusion because he was alerted tothe issue when he received his first bill for coverage andcomplained that it was too high. We therefore hold that the recordin this case indicates that Country Mutual fulfilled the statutoryrequirements of section 143a-2 of the Insurance Code by providingBartoli adequate information to enable him to make an informeddecision regarding UM coverage. Accordingly, we decline to reformthe policy.

In reaching our decision, we note that the estate relies on the recent decision in Wood v. National Liability & Fire InsuranceCo., 324 Ill. App. 3d 583, 755 N.E.2d 1044 (2001), and asks thiscourt to adopt its reasoning to reverse the trial court and entersummary judgment in its favor. In Wood, the insured was issued apolicy with uninsured coverage at the statutory minimum andthereafter submitted a rejection of the higher coverage limits. After the insured was involved in an auto accident, he sought tohave the policy reformed to include UM coverage in an amount equalto the bodily injury limits. On appeal, the court held that the UMrejection was ineffective because it was tendered after the policyissued. The court reasoned that because the statute specificallyreferenced "applicant," the legislature intended that an applicant,not an insured, be provided a description of UM coverage and anopportunity to reject the higher limits and that the applicationprocess ends once a policy has issued.

We decline to apply the Wood reasoning to this case because acritical factual difference exists. In Wood, the policy thatoriginally issued reflected the lower UM coverage limits. In theinstant case, Bartoli's policy was first issued with UM coverageequal to the bodily injury liability limits and, after he rejectedthe higher UM coverage, Country Mutual issued a declarationindicating a coverage change and the lowered limits. Thisrejection procedure falls directly under one of the options offeredby the Wood court whereby a rejection would conform to thestatutory requirements although it was completed after the policyissued. See Wood, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 588, 755 N.E.2d at 1048(determining that the insurance company could issue a new policy oran addendum reflecting the change in UM and be in compliance withthe Insurance Code).

We also note that the estate points to the decision in Nila,312 Ill. App. 3d at 820, 728 N.E.2d at 88, in support of its claimthat the addition of Bartoli's daughter required a new explanationof UM coverage and a new rejection of the higher limits. In Nila,the court found that a wife who survived her husband was not boundby his rejection of higher UM coverage. In reaching its decision,the court noted that the wife had been substituted on the policy asthe sole insured and became solely responsible for the policydecisions, that the insured vehicle had been changed, and that theterm at issue was beyond the husband's last policy renewal. SeeNila, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 820, 728 N.E.2d at 88-89.

Unlike the wife in Nila, Bartoli's daughter was notsubstituted as a named insured and was not responsible for policydecisions. In addition, a new vehicle was not added or substitutedfor coverage, the accident for which the estate seeks UM coverageat the higher limits was within Bartoli's last renewal period, and the declaration indicating the addition of Bartola's daughter didnot reflect a coverage change but a driver information change. TheInsurance Code does not require that a rejection of the higher UMlimits be submitted each time a policy is renewed or that everyinsured covered on a policy individually reject UM coverage. SeeMesserly v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 277 Ill.App. 3d 1065, 662 N.E.2d 148 (1996) (holding that a legallysufficient offer made to one insured satisfied the requirements ofsection 143a-2 of the Insurance Code). Therefore, we decline tofind that the addition of Bartoli's daughter required a newexplanation and rejection of UM coverage.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Bureau County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOLDRIDGE and SLATER, JJ., concur.