JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, J.S.A., filed a petition to determine the existence of a parent-child relationship with W.T.H. Defendant, M.H., gavebirth to W.T.H. during her marriage to co-defendant, W.C.H. Defendants filed a motion for a "best interest" hearing and askedthe court to dismiss plaintiff's petition. The court held a bestinterest hearing and subsequently dismissed plaintiff's petition. The court also issued a protective order prohibiting the partiesfrom publicly discussing the case and ordering plaintiff not tocontact the child. We reverse and remand the dismissal ofplaintiff's parentage petition but affirm the issuance of theprotective order.

FACTS

Plaintiff and defendant, M.H., are attorneys who shared officespace with each other. Both were married, but from 1993 to 1998,they were engaged in an extra-marital sexual affair. M.H. becamepregnant in 1995. At that time, she was having sexual intercoursewith her husband and plaintiff. In January 1996, M.H. gave birthto W.T.H.; her husband was listed as the father on the birthcertificate.

In January of 1999, following the termination of the affair,a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test allegedly proved that plaintiffwas the child's biological father. Several months later, plaintifffiled a petition to determine the existence of a parent-childrelationship under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Act). See750 ILCS 45/7(a) (West 2000). At defendants' request, the courtheld a best interest hearing to determine whether it was in thechild's best interest to order DNA testing.

The court concluded that the best interest of the child wouldbe served by denying plaintiff's request for DNA testing anddismissing his parentage petition. The court also issued aprotective order barring the parties from publicly discussing thecase and prohibiting plaintiff from contacting the child.

ANALYSIS

I. Preliminary Procedural Issues

We begin by addressing three procedural issues raised bydefendants. All of the issues are questions of law, and we reviewthem de novo. Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516 (1998).

Defendants contend that plaintiff's appeal was not filed in atimely manner. They argue that the status of the parties wasfinally determined on November 21, 2001, when the trial courtissued its findings of fact. Plaintiff filed his notice of appealon January 4, 2002, more than 30 days after the determination.

Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) requires an appeal to be filedwithin 30 days after the entry of a final judgment. 155 Ill. 2d R.303 (a)(1) (2002). A judgment is final if it fixes absolutely andfinally the rights of all parties. In re Marriage of Carr, 323Ill. App. 3d 481, 483 (2001).

The trial court issued oral findings of fact on November 21,2001, but entered a written order adopting those findings onDecember 7, 2001. Plaintiff filed his appeal within 30 days ofthat written order. Furthermore, the trial court entered a nuncpro tunc order on January 4, 2002, to amend the December 7 order toinclude language making that order appealable. Since the notice ofappeal was filed within 30 days of the final order, the appeal istimely.

Defendants also challenge plaintiff's standing to bring aparentage petition. Defendants argue that, since they were marriedto each other when the child was born, W.C.H. is presumed to be thefather, therefore plaintiff's petition should have been an actionto declare the non-existence of a parent-child relationship.

Regardless of any legal presumptions of paternity, a manalleging that he is the father of a child may bring an action todetermine a parent-child relationship. 750 ILCS 45/7(a) (West2000). Those actions must be brought no later than 2 years afterthe child reaches the age of majority. See 750 ILCS 45/8 (West2000). Since the child in this case has not yet reached majority, plaintiff has standing to bring his parentage petition.

Last, defendants argue that we should sanction plaintiff forreferences in his brief to non-admitted exhibits, specifically, forreferences to the results of a DNA test. Supreme Court Rule 375allows a reviewing court to impose sanctions for failure to complywith appellate procedure or for misrepresenting the record. 155Ill. 2d R. 375 (2002). The purpose of Rule 375 is to provide apunishment for litigants for their abusive conduct. SterlingHomes, Ltd. v. Raspberry, 325 Ill. App. 3d 703, 709 (2001).

Though the DNA test results were never admitted intoevidence, numerous witnesses testified about the test. Plaintiff'sreferences to the test were not abusive conduct, and we decline toimpose sanctions against plaintiff.

II. Best Interest Hearing

Plaintiff argues that the trial court exceeded its authorityunder the Act when it ordered a best interest hearing and dismissedhis petition. Because this issue concerns the construction of astatute, our review is de novo. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 211(2002).

Section 11 of the Act states that "as soon as practicable, thecourt *** may, and upon request of a party shall, order or directthe mother, child, and alleged father to submit to [DNA] tests todetermine inherited characteristics." 750 ILCS 45/11(a) (West2000). In construing statutory provisions, the word "shall" isindicative of mandatory legislative intent. Fumarolo v. ChicagoBoard of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54 (1990). In parentage cases, thetrial court has no inherent powers to deviate from the statute; itis limited to the exercise of the powers given it by the Act. Inre Adams, 324 Ill. App. 3d 177, 180 (2001).

We agree with defendants that the best interests of the childmust generally guide the court, but that standard does not vest the trial court with inherent, special powers. The trial court isbound by the parameters of the Act. The Act provides that thecourt may order testing sua sponte, but it must order testing atthe request of a party. It does not give the court the authority toorder a best interest hearing prior to a blood test. The trialcourt erred in dismissing plaintiff's parentage petition.

Nevertheless, defendants cite to In re Marriage of Slayton,277 Ill. App. 3d 574 (1996), to support their argument. InSlayton, the petitioner argued that the trial court should havedetermined whether it was in the child's best interest to proceedwith a parentage action prior to allowing the action to proceed. The appellate court found that the issue was not necessary to itsdisposition and declined to address it. Slayton, 277 Ill. App. 3dat 577-78. Slayton does not support defendants' argument.

Defendants also argue that the Act gives the trial court thepower to preside over a best interest hearing before ordering theDNA testing, citing 750 ILCS 45/12 (West 2000). The Act does notgive the court that power. Section 12 states that the court mustdetermine whether it is in the child's best interest to make ajudicial declaration of the parent-child relationship, and then, onthe basis of that evaluation, make a recommendation for settlementto the parties.

Further, section 12 does not provide for a hearing. It doesnot give the court the power to order the parties to do anything.Section 12 only gives the court the power to recommend asettlement. The best interest determination is based on a pre-trial conference and is merely a predicate to that recommendation. The parties need not agree to the recommendation, and it does nothave the effect of a court order on the parties. Without asettlement agreement between the parties, the trial court does nothave the authority to dismiss the action under section 12.

Paternity determinations should turn on the best interest ofthe child. In re Custody of D.A., 201 Ill. App. 3d 810, 823(1990). A paternity action to determine a child's biologicalfather may not necessarily be in the child's best interest. In reParentage of Griesmeyer, 302 Ill. App. 3d 905, 914 (1998). Underthe Illinois Parentage Act, a court does not have the power toconsider the best interest of the child before allowing DNA testingto proceed, and we do not have the power to vest the court withthat authority.

The Act itself does not explicitly provide for a best interesthearing at any time during the proceedings. If parentagedeterminations are to be made under the best interest standard, thelegislature must amend the Act to provide for a best interesthearing. The law, as it exists today, fails to protect the child'sbest interests in parentage determinations.

III. Protective Order

Plaintiff argues that the court exceeded its authority byissuing the protective order preventing the parties from publiclydiscussing the case and barring plaintiff from contacting thechild.

A trial court has the power to protect the privacy of partiesappearing before it. Northern Trust Co. v. Brentwood North Nursingand Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 225 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1042(1992). More specifically, courts have a special interest inprotecting the welfare of children. In re Marriage of Lappe, 176Ill. 2d 414, 431 (1997).

The court issued the order to protect the young child fromfuture harm and humiliation. Such an order can be a properjudicial tool to protect the welfare of the child. We find thatthe court did not exceed its authority when it imposed theprotective order on the parties.

CONCLUSION

The order of the circuit court of Will County is reversed inpart, affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

McDADE, P.J., and BARRY, J., specially concurring.

PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurs:

I am in full concurrence with the majority opinion. It seemsquite clear that the legislature intended the ordering of the DNAtest, when requested by the person asserting his paternity, to bemandatory and done without evaluation or judgment. In this narrowsituation, a best interest analysis is irrelevant and the court iswithout discretion.

I write separately only to emphasize that, if petitioner is,indeed, found to be the child's biological father, the legislaturehas charged the court with the responsibility of deciding otherissues which surround paternity, including custody and visitation,with the child's best interest being of paramount concern.

Although the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act)750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 2000), itself, makes little referenceto best interest considerations in its text; it does expresslyincorporate specific sections of the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) 750 ILCS 5/101 et seq.(West 2000) in which the child's best interest is of primaryconcern.

Section 14 of the Parentage Act (Judgment) states in pertinentpart:

"(a)(1) The judgment shall contain orexplicitly reserve provisions concerning anyduty and amount of child support and maycontain provisions concerning the custody andguardianship of the child, visitationprivileges with the child, the furnishing ofbond or other security for the payment of thejudgment, which the court shall determine inaccordance with the relevant factors set forthin the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution ofMarriage Act and any other applicable law ofIllinois, to guide the court in a finding inthe best interests of the child. Indetermining custody, joint custody, orvisitation, the court shall apply the relevantstandards of the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act.***"  (Emphasis added.)

Section 16 of the Parentage Act provides that the relevantstandards of the Marriage Act should also apply to modifications ofthe judgment.

It thus appears that, although the legislature mandated thatthe determination of paternity be made without consideration of thebest interest of the child, his best interest is of the highestconcern in deciding how, or if, that paternity should be exercised.

JUSTICE BARRY, specially concurs:

Because section 11(a) of the Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/11(a)(West 2000)) mandates DNA testing upon the request of a party, Iagree with the majority opinion that the trial court erred indismissing the plaintiff's parentage petition. I further agreewith the special concurrence's emphasis that the child's bestinterests should control once paternity is determined. Ispecially concur to underscore what I interpret as the crucialmessages in the majority opinion and the other special concurrence. First, the existing law controlling parentage determinations doesnot protect the child's best interests. Second, once parentage isdetermined, the child's best interests become the court's primaryconsideration. In my opinion, it is imperative that the child'sbest interests guide the court at all stages of a parentagedetermination, including whether to proceed with the action. Forthat reason, it is necessary that the legislature amend theParentage Act (750 ILCS 45/11 (West 2000)) to require that a trialcourt hold a best interest hearing at any necessary stage in apaternity action, including prior to granting a party's request forDNA testing. It is only with such a requirement in place that thecourts can fulfill their obligation to protect the children of ourstate.