No. 3-05-0189

This court granted defendants' application for leave toappeal under Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308) toconsider whether plaintiff's claim for punitive damages foralleged fraud in inducing an attorney-client relationship isbarred by section 2-1115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code)(735 ILCS 5/2-1115 (West 2004)). We find that it is.

Facts

The third amended complaint filed by plaintiff JudithKennedy, administrator of the estate of Edith Nesmon, consists offour counts. Count I alleges that defendant Leanna KarnoppGrimsley (hereinafter "defendant") committed legal malpractice byfailing to file a medical malpractice lawsuit prior to theexpiration of the statute of limitations. Count II alleges thatdefendant was an employee of the law firm of Grimsley & Grimsley,P.C., (hereinafter "law firm") and it asserts liability based onrespondeat superior. Neither of those counts is at issue in thisappeal.

Count III of plaintiff's complaint alleges that at theinitial meeting with defendant on January 18, 2000, plaintifftold defendant that she was seeking an attorney who was skilledin handling medical negligence cases and defendant told plaintiffthat she was "well familiar" with such cases. Defendant also toldplaintiff that she was familiar with the legal principlesgoverning such cases in the State of California. According toplaintiff, defendant made these statements with the intent todeceive plaintiff and induce her to enter into an attorney-clientrelationship. Plaintiff asserts that defendant in fact had noprior experience in medical negligence cases, had no knowledge ofCalifornia law and was not competent to try a medical negligencecase. Plaintiff hired defendant in reliance on her falsestatements and defendant subsequently failed to file suit priorto the running of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff soughtboth compensatory and punitive damages. Count IV re-alleges thesame claim against the law firm on the basis of respondeatsuperior.

Defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss counts IIIand IV on various grounds, which the trial court denied. However, the court identified the issue of the application ofsection 2-1115 of the Code as a question of law suitable forimmediate appeal under Rule 308, and this appeal followed.

Analysis

Standard of Review

The scope of review in an interlocutory appeal under Rule308 is ordinarily limited to the question certified by the trialcourt, which is reviewed de novo. See Thompson v. Gordon, 356Ill. App. 3d 447, 827 N.E.2d 983 (2005). In addition, questionsof statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review. Schweickert v. AG Services of America, Inc., 355 Ill. App. 3d439, 823 N.E.2d 213 (2005).

Section 2-115 of the Code provides:

"