JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:

FACTS

During the morning hours of September 30, 2000, plaintiffswere traveling down Illinois Highway 23 near an intersection withRoute 66 in Pontiac. Harris was quickly approaching thatintersection, attempting to elude LaSalle County deputies andOttawa police officers. Harris had stolen a car in DeKalb and wasleading the officers on a three-county chase. Harris lost controlof the vehicle and struck the plaintiffs, causing them injury.

Plaintiffs sued Harris, LaSalle County and Ottawa. In theircomplaint, plaintiffs alleged that Ottawa was negligent in itspursuit of Harris. Ottawa filed a motion to dismiss claiming thatplaintiffs failed to allege that the city's conduct was willful andwanton as required by the Tort Immunity Act. Plaintiffs arguedthat the appropriate standard of care in police chases is ordinarynegligence. The trial court denied the motion, and, pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 308, certified the following question forappeal:

Whether the proper standard of care in a case involvingpotential tort liability for a municipality arising outof a high-speed chase by a municipal police officer isthe standard of reasonable care as outlined by section11-205(e) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS5/11-205(e)[West 2002]) or the standard of willful andwanton misconduct as outlined by section 2-202 of theLocal Government and Governmental Employees Tort ImmunityAct (745 ILCS 10/2-202) [(West 2002)].

ANALYSIS

Since the issue on appeal concerns a question of law certifiedby the trial court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 and becauseit presents a question of statutory interpretation, we review it denovo. Weatherman v. Gary-Wheaton Bank of Fox Valley, N.A., 186Ill. 2d 482, 480 (1999).

The Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) allows the driver of anauthorized emergency vehicle to disregard some traffic laws wheneither responding to an emergency call or pursuing a known orsuspected violator of the law. 625 ILCS 5/11-205 (West 2002). The Code also states that "[t]his section shall not operate torelieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the dutyto drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using thehighway." 625 ILCS 5/11-907(b) (West 2002).

The Tort Immunity Act, on the other hand, states that "[a]public employee is not liable for his act or omission in theexecution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omissionconstitutes willful and wanton conduct." 745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West2002).

Plaintiffs claim that these statutes overlap and that thevehicle code provides the appropriate standard of care for policechases. Defendants argue that the Tort Immunity Act controls thestandard of care for public employees involved in a police chase.

Four appellate districts have reached this issue. Themajority agree with defendants' construction of the statutes. SeeSanders v. City of Chicago, 306 Ill. App. 3d 356 (1st Dist. 1999);Carter v. DuPage County Sheriff, 304 Ill. App. 3d 443 (2d Dist.1999), and Young v. Forgas, 308 Ill. App. 3d 553 (4th Dist. 1999). Those courts analyzed the Code and the Tort Immunity Act and foundno actual conflict between them. Each statute "stands in its ownsphere" and the immunities afforded by each serve differentpurposes. Carter, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 450. This line of reasoningholds that the Code's provision applies to drivers of allauthorized emergency vehicles, while the Tort Immunity Act onlyprotects public employees.

The Fifth District, in Bradshaw v. City of Metropolis, 293Ill. App. 3d 389 (1997), concluded the statutes provided twodifferent standards for the same conduct, but that ordinarynegligence was the proper standard. The court applied the rule ofstatutory construction which provides that when a general statuteand a specific statute both apply to a case, the more specificstatute governs. It found the language of the Code more specificthan the language of the Tort Immunity Act, and thus the standardin the Code controls.

We agree with the majority view that the statutes each addressdifferent actors under different circumstances. We believe thelegislature made a rational choice to grant broader immunity to apublic employee engaged in the execution or enforcement of the lawthan to a private employee/driver. See Carter, 304 Ill. App. 3d at450. Thus, the statutes are not in conflict, and the Tort ImmunityAct bars a cause of action against Ottawa based on alleged ordinarynegligent conduct.

Plaintiffs argue that our decision in Bouhl v. Smith, 130 Ill.App. 3d 1067 (1985), belies this result. Although the Bouhl courtdetermined that ordinary negligence was the applicable standardunder the vehicle code, it did not consider the provisions of theTort Immunity Act in its analysis and is not precedential.

CONCLUSION

The certified question is answered and the cause is remanded.

Certified question answered; cause remanded.

HOLDRIDGE, J., dissents, SLATER, J., concurs.

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. As the court held in Bradshaw v.Metropolis, 293 Ill. App. 3d 389, 393 (1997), both the Act and theCode apply in the factual situation at issue, yet these twostatutory provisions are not in harmony. As the Bradshaw courtnoted, "[b]oth the Act and the Code can apply to this factualsituation since it involves a public entity and a police officeengaged in the act of executing and enforcing law at the time ofthe occurrence." Bradshaw, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 393. In otherwords, both the Act and the Code address the standard of careapplicable to police officers enforcing the law, by pursuing anactual or suspected violator of the law. I simply cannot agreewith the majority's conclusion that the Act and the Code apply "todifferent actors under different circumstances."

As I would find that the two statutes at issue are inconflict, in that both mandate a different duty of care upon thedefendant, I would resort to general rules of statutoryconstruction, as did the Bradshaw court. Specifically, where thereare two statutory provisions, one of which is general and designedto apply to cases generally, and the other is particular andrelates to only one subject, the particular provision must prevail. Bradshaw, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 393, citing Cleaver v. Marrese, 253Ill. App. 3d 778, 780 (1993). The Act is a general statuteapplying to all civil actions, while the Code is a specific statutecontaining express provisions establishing a particular duty andstandard of care governing the operation of emergency vehicles,including police vehicles in pursuit of a lawbreaker. Bradshaw,293 Ill. App. 3d at 394-95

I would find no error in the judgment of the circuit court indenying defendants' motion t dismiss, and I would answer thecertified question by finding that the Tort Immunity Act does notbar the plaintiffs' action. I would, therefore, affirm the rulingof the trial court and remand the matter for further action.