Loftis v. Vesta Cos.
State: Illinois
Court: 3rd District Appellate
Docket No: 3-97-0016
Case Date: 10/16/1997
No. 3--97--0016
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1997
_________________________________________________________________
JOHN W. LOFTIS, JR., ) Appeal from the Circuit
) Court for the 13th
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Judicial Circuit
) La Salle County, Illinois
)
v. )
) No. 94--CH--7
)
VESTA COMPANIES, )
) Hon. Robert L. Carter
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding
_______________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOMER delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
The plaintiff, John W. Loftis, Jr., filed an action against
the defendant insurance company which denied coverage for damages
caused when his tractor-trailer drove over a pothole. We must
determine whether driving over a pothole constitutes a "collision
with another object" within the contemplation of the policy of
insurance. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendant. We reverse and enter summary judgment for the
plaintiff.
FACTS
The plaintiff purchased an insurance policy from the
defendant. The policy covered damages to the plaintiff's vehicle
caused by a "collision with another object." The plaintiff was
driving on Interstate 80 when his tractor-trailer traveled over a
pothole in the road.
The main beam of the trailer was sheared off and the chain
securing a roll of steel broke, spilling the contents onto the
roadway and adjacent shoulder. The plaintiff sustained damages
in the amount of $5,534.00.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant and the
plaintiff appeals.
ANALYSIS
The standard of review of a trial court's decision on a
motion for summary judgment is de novo. Andrews v. Cramer, 256
Ill. App. 3d 766, 769, 629 N.E.2d 133, 135 (1993). In addition,
the construction of a policy of insurance is a question of law
and this court can interpret a policy independently of the trial
court's judgment. Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Linak, 208 Ill.
App. 3d 892, 567 N.E.2d 638 (1991). In reviewing a motion for
summary judgment, this court is limited to the record in
determining whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Bryant v. Glen Oaks Medical Center, 272 Ill. App. 3d 640,
649, 650 N.E.2d 622, 629 (1995).
The plaintiff asserts that the phrase "collision with
another object" is ambiguous and must be construed in his favor.
He argues that striking the far side of a pothole is a collision
with another object, and that damage caused by such collision
should be covered by his insurance policy. The defendant
contends that the phrase is unambiguous and must therefore be
enforced as its plain meaning dictates. Even if the phrase is
ambiguous, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's trailer
passing over a pothole cannot be reasonably construed as a
"collision with another object." The defendant suggests that the
trailer did not collide with an "object," but was "jostled" by an
uneven portion of the road. Therefore, the defendant maintains
that its policy does not provide coverage.
Where the language of an insurance policy is clear and
unambiguous, it must be enforced as the plain meaning dictates.
United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Schnackenberg, 88 Ill. 2d 1,
4-5, 429 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (1981). As with the construction of a
contract generally, whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a
question of law for the court. Cowens v. Illinois Insurance
Guaranty Fund, 249 Ill. App. 3d 214, 618 N.E.2d 873 (1993). An
insurance policy contains an ambiguity if the challenged language
is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Bruder v.
Country Mutual Insurance Co., 156 Ill. 2d 179, 193, 620 N.E.2d
355, 362 (1993). An insurance policy that is ambiguous or
susceptible of at least two reasonable interpretations should be
construed in favor of the insured. Gibbs v. Madison Mutual
Insurance Co., 242 Ill. App. 3d 147, 610 N.E.2d 143 (1993). A
court should liberally construe an insurance policy in favor of
coverage. Bellmer v. Charter Security Life Insurance Co., 140
Ill. App. 3d 752, 755, 488 N.E.2d 1338, 1340 (1986).
We find the phrase "collision with another object" contained
in the insurance policy at issue in the instant case ambiguous as
reflected by the two reasonable interpretations advocated by the
parties. We believe this ambiguity should be resolved in favor
of the insured.
The defendant points out that the only reported Illinois
case that considered this issue arrived at a contrary conclusion.
In Garford Motor Truck Co. v. Miller's National Insurance Co.,
230 Ill. App. 622 (1923), the Illinois Appellate Court, First
District, considered an insurance policy that covered the
plaintiff for "an accidental collision *** with [another]
object." The plaintiff's truck hit a water-filled hole caused by
wear in a road known as Indianapolis Boulevard. The truck slid
off the road into a lake. The court determined that the words
"accidental collision with *** an object" were not intended or
expected to cover the occurrence. The court stated that "it may
not reasonably be said that the hole in the pavement or the far
side of the hole was an 'object' within the meaning of that word
as we find it in the insurance policy involved in this case."
Garford, 230 Ill. App. at 630.
The plaintiff responds by challenging the relied upon
language in Garford as dicta. We find it unnecessary to address
that point. It is well settled that one district of the Illinois
Appellate Court is not required to follow decisions of other
districts, although there may be compelling reasons to do so when
dealing with similar facts and circumstances. In re May 1991
Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 381, 604 N.E.2d 929 (1992).
We decline to follow Garford because we find its reasoning faulty
and the dissent rendered in that case more persuasive. The
dissent pointed out that after the Garford majority found doubt
as to the meaning of the words "collision" and "object" in the
policy at issue in that case, it resolved that doubt in favor of
the insurance company. The dissent noted this construction
violates the rule of interpretation which requires the insured to
be given the benefit of the doubt.
In addition, we agree with the plaintiff that Garford is no
longer good law because transportation has changed significantly
in the past seventy years. The increased traffic count, rate of
speed, and size of vehicles that are now common to interstate
highway travel have made it more difficult and dangerous to take
evasive action to avoid potholes. Therefore, the circumstances
surrounding the instant case are unlike those that existed when
Garford was decided, and we do not feel compelled to follow the
majority's holding in that case.
We find more persuasive the position adopted in Nutchey v.
Three R's Trucking Company Inc., 674 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. App.
1984), by the Court of Appeals of Texas. That court reviewed
three previous Texas cases with similar facts and concluded that
an "impact occurring when a trailer strikes a road bed as a
result of a jolt produced by a 'chug hole,' or depression ***
would be a collision with an object or obstruction within the
purview of the insurance clause in question." Nutchey, 674
S.W.2d at 931.
We agree with the conclusions reached in Nutchey. The
plaintiff in the instant case hit a pothole apparently with
considerable force causing significant damage to his tractor-
trailer. A contemporary over-the-road truck driver purchasing
insurance would expect to have coverage for this type of
occurrence. After having paid premiums for such coverage, the
insured should not now be denied benefits. We hold that the
impact of a vehicle with a pothole located in the roadbed of an
interstate highway constitutes a "collision with another object,"
and that the resulting damage is covered by the language
contained in the plaintiff's insurance policy.
The parties agree that the only issue in this appeal is
whether the damage caused when the plaintiff's tractor-trailer
impacted the pothole is insured under the plaintiff's policy.
Having concluded that it is, we reverse the trial court's order
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5)(155 Ill. 2d R.
366(a)(5)) enter summary judgment for the plaintiff in the amount
of $5,534.00 plus costs.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of La Salle County is reversed and summary judgment is entered
for the plaintiff.
Reversed and judgment entered.
BRESLIN and SLATER, JJ., concur.
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