No. 3--01--0033

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2002

This appeal arises from a post-dissolution proceedinginvolving Nancy Macaluso, n/k/a Nancy Ventrello (Nancy) and LouisMacaluso (Lou). Nancy appeals from a judgment of the circuitcourt of Will County dismissing as untimely her petition forcontribution from Lou toward her attorney's fees and costs. Onappeal, she maintains that the trial court erred in holding thather petition was untimely. We reverse and remand with directionthat the trial court grant her petition.

A judgment of dissolution of marriage dissolving Nancy's andLou's marriage was entered on January 10, 1997. On February 18,1998, Lou filed a three-count petition for modification. CountIII of the petition sought a change in custody of the party's twochildren. On October 27, 1998, the court entered an orderappointing attorney Michelle Hansen as guardian ad litem (GAL)for the children. In the order appointing the GAL, the courtreserved the issue of apportionment of the GAL's fees between theparties. On March 12, 1999, a hearing was held on the GAL'spetition for attorney fees to date, and an agreed order forjudgment was entered against both parties for $1,625.

On June 22, 1999, following 15 non-consecutive days ofhearing, the trial court entered an order dismissing count I ofLouis' petition as moot, and denying counts II and III. On July13, 1999, Nancy filed her petition for adjudication of costs andfees seeking contribution from Louis toward her attorney fees andcosts. On August 16, 1999, Louis filed a response to Nancy'spetition for costs and fees, denying each allegation of thepetition, but raising no affirmative defense. In September 1999,the GAL filed a supplemental petition for fees and on March 22,2000, the GAL filed a final petition for fees. Hearing on boththe GAL fee petition and Nancy's petition for fees and costs werecontinued from time to time over a 15-month period, until bothwere heard on October 24, 2000.

On October 24, 2000, the trial court entered an orderfinding that the GAL petition was timely and granting her feestotaling $10,034.25. The parties were ordered to split the GALfees equally, with Louis to be given credit for a previouspayment. Judgment was entered against Louis for $5,017.12 andagainst Nancy for $3,392.13. In that same order, the trial courtfound that the fees sought by Nancy's counsel were reasonable andnecessary; and that it would be appropriate to order Louis tocontribute 60% towards Nancy's attorney's fees. However, thetrial court, on October 24, 200, dismissed Nancy's petition asuntimely, finding that it was bound by In re Marriage fo Konchar,312 Ill. App. 3d 441 (2000).

Application for attorney fees in a post-decree dissolutionproceeding are governed by section 508 of the Illinois Marriageand Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA) 750 ILCS 5/508 (West2000). Section 508(a) states in relevant part as follows:

"The court from time to time, after duenotice and hearing, and after considering thefinancial resources of the parties, may orderany party to pay a reasonable amount for hisown or the other party's costs and attorney'sfees. *** At the conclusion of the case,contribution to attorney's fees and costs maybe awarded from the opposing party, inaccordance with subsection (j) of Section503. Fees and costs may be awarded to counselfrom a former client in accordance withsubsection (c) of this Section." 750 ILCS5/508 (West 2000).

Reference is made in section 508 to section 503(j), whichstates:

"(j) After proofs have closed in the finalhearing on all other issues between theparties (or in conjunction with the finalhearing, if all parties so stipulate) andbefore judgment is entered, a party'spetition for contribution to fees and costsincurred in the proceeding shall be heard anddecided, in accordance with the followingprovisions:

(1) A petition for contribution, if notfiled before the final hearing on otherissues between the parties, shall be filed nolater than 30 days after the closing ofproofs in the final hearing or within suchother period as the court orders.

(2) Any award of contribution to one partyfrom the other party shall be based on thecriteria for division of marital propertyunder this Section 503 and, if maintenancehas been awarded, on the criteria for anaward of maintenance under Section 504.

(3) The filing of a petition forcontribution shall not be deemed toconstitute a waiver of the attorney-clientprivilege between the petitioning party andcurrent or former counsel; and such a waivershall not constitute a prerequisite to ahearing for contribution. If either party'spresentation on contribution, however,includes evidence within the scope of theattorney-client privilege, the disclosure ordisclosures shall be narrowly construed andshall not be deemed by the court toconstitute a general waiver of the privilegeas to matters beyond the scope of thepresentation.

(4) No finding on which a contributionaward is based or denied shall be assertedagainst counsel or former counsel forpurposes of any hearing under subsection (c)or (e) of Section 508." 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(West 2000).

In Konchar, the court found that the jurisdictional languageof section 503(j) of the IMDMA, which requires that petitions forcontribution shall be filed before final hearings on other issuesbetween the parties, or no later than 30 days after the closingof proofs, was applicable to post-decree proceedings. Konchar,312 Ill. App. 3d at 443. We do not agree.

It is axiomatic that when interpreting statutes courts mustascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Inre Marriage of Takata, 304 Ill. App. 3d 85, 94 (1999). The bestindicator of legislative intent is typically the plain andordinary meaning of the language of the statute. Takata, 304Ill. App. 3d at 94. To that end, every part of the statute mustbe considered together and every word or phrase should be givensome reasonable meaning within the context of the statute. Takata, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 94.

Section 508(a) of the IMDMA provides that the court "at theconclusion of the case" may award contribution toward attorneyfees "in accordance with subsection (j) of Section 503." 750 ILCS5/508 (West 2000). Section 503, which deals generally with thedistribution of property in an original dissolution of marriagedecree, contains a single subsection (subsection j) which dealswith the contribution toward attorney fees in a pre-decreeproceeding. Specifically, section 503(j) references "the finalhearing on all other issues between the parties. (Emphasisadded)" 750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 2000). This reference isspecific to the bifurcated hearing required in pre-decreeproceedings. 750 ILCS 5/403(e)(West 2000).

We hold that so long as the trial court otherwise hasjurisdiction over the case, either party may petition forcontribution toward attorney fees "at the conclusion of thecase." 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2000). We find that the proceduralrequirements of section 503(j) have no effect in post-dissolutionproceedings. See, In re Marriage of Carr, Ill. App. 3d ,(1--00--0977, decided June 20, 2001).

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the circuit courterred in dismissing plaintiff's petition for contribution towardher attorney fees as untimely. As the trial court still hadjurisdiction to apportion the GAL fees between the parties, thecourt had jurisdiction to rule on plaintiff's petition. We notethat the trial court found that Nancy's fees amounted to$34,388.90 and that 60% of those fees ($20,633.34) should be paidby Louis. Pursuant to our appellate powers we reverse thejudgment of the circuit court, grant plaintiff's petition forcontribution toward her attorney fees and enter judgment in favorof Nancy and against Louis in the amount of $20,633.34. (134Ill.2d R 366(a)(5)).

The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversedand judgment entered for plaintiff.

Reversed; judgment entered.

BRESLIN and HOMER, JJ., concur.