JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the Court:

Plaintiff, Theresa Maldonado, appeals from a judgmentof the circuit court of Will County, granting defendant's,Creative Woodworking Concepts, Inc. motion for summaryjudgment on plaintiff's claim for breach of express andimplied warranties. In a prior appeal, this court reversedthe trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's cause of actionbased upon statute of limitations grounds. See, Maldonadov. Creative Woodwork Concepts, 296 Ill. App. 3d 935 (1998). Following remand, the trial court entered summary judgmentfor defendant on the ground that the defendant, themanufacturer of a gate/door for a bar top, was not liablefor plaintiff's injuries under breach of express and impliedwarranty counts as it had followed plans and specificationsfurnished by the owner of the bar. In so finding, thetrial court relied upon the holding of our supreme court inHunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203 (1978), wherein the courtfound that a manufacturer of an allegedly defective productwas not liable in negligence for injuries to third partieswhere the manufacturer followed the design specifications itwas given unless those specifications were so obviouslydangerous that no competent contractor would follow them. Hunt, 74 Il. 2d at 209. We find that the trial court erredin granting summary judgment to the defendant.

FACTS

Plaintiff was employed as a housekeeper on the EmpressOne Riverboat Casino. On October 10, 1992, she was workingin a bar area, cleaning the bar, when the bar gate or doorfell on her right arm, resulting in serious injury. The bardoor at issue was a section of the bar that was hinged onone side so that it could be lifted upward, creating apassage for employees to go into or out of the area behindthe bar. When raised to allow passage, the door restedagainst a brass rail, but was not secured. The record doesnot reflect the exact cause of the door's fall that resultedin plaintiff's injuries; however, there was some conjecturein the record that the rocking of the boat may have causedthe door to fall.

The entire bar, including the door, was manufacturedand installed by defendant, Creative Woodworking Concepts,Inc. Most of the construction of the bar was done atdefendant's facility in Tarpon Springs, Florida. Defendantthen disassembled the bar, transported it to Joliet andinstalled it on the riverboat.

Defendant performed pursuant to a contract with theriverboat owner, Des Plaines River EntertainmentCorporation. That contract set forth the work agreed uponas follows: "The Contractor [defendant] shall perform allthe work required by the contract documents for provision,fabrication, and installation of the architectural millworkas specified by the owners and technical consultant." Theagreement further set forth that the "owner may by writteninstructions and/or drawings issued to the contractor makechanges in the plans and specifications, issue additionalinstructions, require additional work, or omit any workpreviously required until a written change order is agreedupon by both the owner and the contractor." The contractalso contained a warranty provision stating: "Contractorwarrants to owner that all materials and equipment furnishedshall be new unless otherwise specified, and that all workunder this contract shall be of good quality, free fromfault and defects in accordance with the contractdocuments." The contract noted that the plans andspecifications under which defendant was to perform wereissued by Directions in Design, Inc. (technical consultant)and Clyma & Associates (architects).

Hal Roenick gave a discovery deposition, relevantportions of which were filed with defendant's motion forsummary judgment. Roenick was an officer and employee ofdefendant. Roenick testified that the bar was manufacturedat defendant's Florida facility following architecturaldrawings and specifications provided to defendant. Thedrawings and specifications called for the presence of alift-top swing gate in the bar. However, there was norequirement that the swing gate have any type of locking ordampening mechanism. Roenick further testified thatdefendant simply followed the design and plans given to it. All plans were signed off on and approved by the owner'stechnical consultant and architect. According to Roenick,defendant does not do any design work in-house. Their soleresponsibility was to meet the design specificationsprovided to it by the owner. In this matter, the owneraccepted defendant's work as in conformity with the drawingsand specifications.

Following remand, plaintiff filed a third amendedcomplaint, alleging in count I a breach of express warrantyand in count II a breach of implied warranty. Defendantmoved for summary judgment, maintaining inter alia that itwas not liable to any third parties where it merely followedthe design specifications provided to it by the owner. Defendant relied upon Hunt v. Blasius, which stands for theproposition that, in a negligence action, an independentcontractor owes no duty to third parties with respect toproducts it manufactures if it is merely following plans andspecifications furnished by the contracting party, unlessthe plans were so obviously dangerous that a reasonablyprudent contractor would be put on notice that the productwas dangerous and likely to cause injury. Hunt, 74 Ill. 2dat 209. Plaintiff maintained that Hunt is limited only toactions sounding in negligence and had no applicability to abreach of warranty action. The trial court found thereasoning of the Hunt court should extend to claims soundingin breach of warranty and granted summary judgment to thedefendant. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration wasdenied, and this appeal ensued.

ANALYSIS

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial courterred in entering summary judgment for the defendant basedupon Hunt v. Blasius. An appellate court review of an ordergranting summary judgment is de novo. General CasualtyInsurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill. 2d 281 (2002). If aplaintiff fails to establish any element of a cause ofaction, summary judgment in favor of the defendant isproper. Flint v. Court Appointed Special Advocates ofDuPage County, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d 152 (1996). Anappellate court may affirm summary judgment on any groundswhich appear in the record, regardless of whether the trialcourt relied upon those same grounds. Leavitt v. FarwellTower Partnership, 252 Ill. App. 3d 260 (1993).

As a preliminary matter, plaintiff maintains that thiscourt must follow Florida law in its determination as towhether defendant owes a duty to this plaintiff. Plaintiffnotes that the contract between defendant and DesPlainesRiver Entertainment Corporation required that the contractwould be "governed by the laws of the State of Florida [as]to both their interpretation and the performance of the Workthereunder." Plaintiff maintains that, as the warrantyflows from the contract, the choice of law clause containedin the contract should govern this action. We disagree. Wenote that the previous appeal in this action was decidedunder Illinois law; and therefore, under the law of the casedoctrine, Illinois law should continue to govern in thissubsequent appeal. See, Hagopian v. Board of Education, 83Ill. App. 3d 1097 (1980). Moreover, a choice of law orforum clause in a contract is not applicable to a non-party. See American Specialty Systems, Inc. v. Chicago MetallicCorp., F.3d (2002 WL 406965) (N.D. Ill. 2002). We therefore will resolve this matter by reference toIllinois law.

Moving to the merits, plaintiff maintains that thetrial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summaryjudgment based upon Hunt v. Blasius. Hunt involved a claimfor negligence against the manufacturer of a highway exitsign. Plaintiffs therein were injured when the vehicle inwhich they were passengers struck the sign. Plaintiffsalleged that their injuries would have been less severe hadthe sign been of a "breakaway" design so that it would havegiven way to the impact of the vehicle. The court, aftertracing the history of third- party liability and privity ofcontract, declared that the manufacturer of the sign owed noduty to third parties where it had followed the designspecifications provided to it. The court held: "Anindependent contractor owes no duty to third persons tojudge the plans, specifications, or instructions which hehas merely contracted to follow. If the contractorcarefully carries out the specifications provided him, he isjustified in relying upon the adequacy of the specificationsunless they are so obviously dangerous that no competentcontractor would follow them." Hunt, 74 Ill. 2d at 209. The Hunt court then concluded that the defendantmanufacturer could not be held liable in negligence formerely complying with the State's contract specifications.

On appeal, the plaintiff herein maintains that the trialcourt erred in extending the holding in Hunt beyond causes ofaction sounding in negligence to those sounding in breach ofwarranty. In support of this argument, plaintiff points outthat the Hunt court, after finding the manufacturer owed noduty to a third party where it had reasonably relied upon thespecifications provided to it, then analyzed the plaintiffs'product liability claim against the manufacturer withoutregard to the defendant's reliance upon the designspecifications. Hunt, 74 Ill. 2d at 210. Plaintiff positsthat, had the Hunt court believed that the reasonable relianceupon supplied specifications defense, which it had justcreated, extended beyond a negligence action, it would haveaddressed this defense in its discussion of the productliability claim. Instead, the Hunt court disposes of theproduct liability claim without any reference to reasonablereliance upon specifications. The court merely notes that"[t]he elements of a cause of action in strict productliability, of course, differ markedly from their counterpartsin negligence." Hunt, 74 Ill. 2d at 210.

We agree with the plaintiff that the doctrine in Hunt wasintended to be limited to actions sounding in negligence. Liability in negligence arises only if the defendant breachesa duty owed to persons whose injuries proximately resultedfrom the breach. Hunt, 74 Ill. 2d at 210. The Hunt courtheld that no such duty arose where a manufacturer merelyfollows the specifications given to him. However, we notethat duty to a third party is not an element of breach ofwarranty actions. As a basis for recovery under a breach ofimplied warranty of merchantability, a plaintiff mustestablish (1) a sale of goods, (2) that the seller of thegoods is a merchant with respect to those goods, and (3) thatthe goods were not of merchantable quality (i.e., unfit forthe ordinary purposes for which the goods are used). CrestContainer Corp. v. R. H. Bishop Co., 111 Ill. App. 3d 1068,1973 (1985). To prove a breach of an implied warranty offitness for particular purpose, a plaintiff must show (1) asale of goods, (2) that the seller had reason to know of anyparticular purpose for which the goods are required, (3) thatplaintiff, as buyer of the goods, was relying upon seller'sskills or judgment to select suitable goods, and (4) that thegoods were not fit for the particular purpose for which theywere used. Crest Container Corp., 111 Ill. App. 3d at 1073-74. Indeed, our courts have found that a cause of action forbreach of an implied warranty requires only a showing that thegoods are unmerchantable or unfit for their intended purpose,regardless of whether they contain a "defect." Malawy v.Richards Manufacturing Co., 150 Ill. App. 3d 549 (1986). Since the only issue governing liability in an impliedwarranty action is whether the product meets the requiredstandard of merchantability or fitness, it is not relevantthat the seller did or did not follow particular plans orspecifications. The issue in a breach of warranty claim, asin a strict product liability action, is the condition of theproduct, not the conduct of the seller-manufacturer. We holdthat the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to thedefendant based upon the contract specification defense, adefense that is not relevant to a breach of warranty cause ofaction. Defendant maintains that, regardless of theapplicability of Hunt, this court should nonetheless affirmthe trial court's grant of summary judgment based upon anargument that the contract between Creative Woodworking andDesPlaines was not a contract for goods covered by the UCCwarranties of fitness, but was instead a services contract. Defendant argues that the contract was for the construction,fabrication, delivery and installation of a bar and that thecontract was thus primarily for services and only incidentallyfor goods and that such contracts are not covered by the UCC. See, Executive Centers of America, Inc. v. Bannon, 62 Ill.App. 3d 738 (1978); J&R Electric Division v. Skogg, 38 Ill.App. 3d 747 (1982). Although the record seems to indicatethat defendant herein was primarily providing services, i.e.,following the design specifications to construct, fabricate,deliver and install a bar, the question is primarily one offact more than law. Thus, we cannot say that a grant ofsummary judgment on that basis would be appropriate.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the judgment ofthe circuit court of Will County granting summary judgment tothe defendant was in error. We reverse and remand this matterto the circuit court for further proceedings consistent withthis disposition.

Reversed and remanded.

LYTTON and SLATER, JJ., concur