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Plaintiff Gary Matthews brought this action claiming thatMitchell Serafin, deceased, unlawfully transferred his entireestate into a revokable trust to avoid paying a judgment. Theaction was filed against the trustees of Serafin's trust and theexecutors of his estate (collectively trustees). During a benchtrial, the court entered an order at the close of Matthews' casedirecting a verdict in favor of the trustees. We affirm and holdthat a debtor does not violate the Illinois Uniform FraudulentTransfer Act (Transfer Act) (740 ILCS 160/1 et seq. (West 1998))when he transfers his estate into a revocable trust so long as heis not made insolvent and does not act to defraud a creditor.

FACTS

In 1987, Northpoint, Inc. (Northpoint), leased property fromMatthews located at 1500 North East Jefferson Street, Peoria,Illinois. Serafin, president of Northpoint, personally guaranteedNorthpoint's obligation. The lease was to expire in the fall of1990 but was extended to February of 1995 per an option agreementin the lease. The agreement extending the lease was not guaranteedby Serafin.

In January of 1992, Serafin signed a revokable trust agreementnaming himself as trustee. The agreement transferred certain stockand a promissory note made by UFS Savings Center, Inc. (SavingsCenter), into the trust. The agreement provided that Serafin wasto receive income from the trust in "quarterly or other convenientinstallments" but no less than once a year.

In the fall of that same year, Northpoint vacated the Peoriaproperty, discontinued paying rent, and filed a declaratoryjudgment action against Matthews claiming it was constructivelyevicted. Matthews, in turn, filed an action against Serafin andNorthpoint to determine the right to possession of the property andto collect the unpaid rent. The trial court gave Matthewspossession of the property but reserved decision on the issues ofunpaid rent and constructive eviction.

In December of 1992, Serafin transferred additional propertyinto the trust. The property included his investments inNorthpoint and Savings Center as well as his "clothing, jewelry,automobiles, household goods, provisions, furniture, furnishingsand equipment and all interests in real estate." For four monthsthe trust paid Serafin $5,200 a month until he died in May of 1993. Upon his death, the trust's assets were valued at $973,854 themajority of which remained in trust for Serafin's wife anddaughter.

Several years after Serafin's death, the trial court found infavor of Matthews and against Serafin's estate regarding the issuesof unpaid rent and constructive eviction. The court awardedMatthews $33,119.76, representing $6,300 for past rent and$26,819.76 for attorney fees and costs. The record provides noinformation regarding whether Matthews made a demand to thetrustees to pay the judgment or whether the trustees refused topay. Nevertheless, Matthews filed this action three months laterto set aside Serafin's last transfer into his trust, claimingSerafin fraudulently transferred all his assets into the trust toavoid paying the judgment in violation of sections 6(a), 5(a)(1)and 5(a)(2) of the Transfer Act (740 ILCS 160/6(a), 5(a)(1), (a)(2)(West 1998)).

At the close of Matthews' case, the trustees made a motion fora directed verdict, which is governed by section 2-110 of the Codeof Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 1998)). Thetrial court granted the motion, finding that Matthews failed toprove that Serafin was insolvent or that he became insolvent as aresult of the transfer. The trial court's decision was basedsolely on section 6(a) of the Transfer Act. Shortly thereafter,Matthews filed a motion to reconsider his claim under sections5(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Transfer Act. The motion was denied andthis appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Matthews disputes the trial court's determinationthat he failed to prove Serafin fraudulently transferred assets inviolation of the Transfer Act. When a trial court examines theweight of the evidence at the close of a plaintiff's case, thecourt's determination will not be overturned unless it is againstthe manifest weight of the evidence. Evans v. Gurnee Inns, Inc.,268 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 645 N.E.2d 556 (1994).

Matthews first argues the trial court erred when it determinedthat he failed to establish Serafin was insolvent as required bysection 6(a) of the Transfer Act. Section 6(a) states that "[a]transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent ***if the debtor made the transfer *** without receiving a reasonablyequivalent value in exchange for the transfer *** and the debtorwas insolvent at that time or *** became insolvent as a result ofthe transfer or obligation." 740 ILCS 160/6(a) (West 1998).

After careful review of the record, we cannot say that thetrial court's conclusion that Matthews failed to prove Serafin wasinsolvent was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Noevidence was presented establishing that Serafin was not paying hisdebts as they became due, either before or after the transfer ofassets to the trust. Serafin received $5,200-per-month income fromthe trust, and if this judgment had issued during his lifetime hecould have paid it from these funds. Moreover, no evidence waspresented that after Serafin's death and after the judgment wasentered his estate could not pay the judgment. In fact, therecord fails to indicate whether Matthews ever made a demand to thetrustees or whether they refused to pay. Accordingly, we affirmthe trial court's holding that Matthews failed to prove thatSerafin was insolvent as required by section 6(a) of the TransferAct.

Matthews argues that Serafin also violated section 5(a)(1) ofthe Transfer Act. Section 5(a)(1) establishes that a transfer bya debtor is fraudulent to a creditor if the debtor made thetransfer "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud anycreditor of the debtor" either before or after the creditor's claimarose. 740 ILCS 160/5(a)(1) (West 1998).

With respect to "actual intent," section 5(b) sets forth anonexclusive list of factors the court may consider, includingwhether:

"(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;

(2) the debtor retained possession or control of theproperty transferred after the transfer;

(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or

concealed;

(4) before the transfer was made or obligation wasincurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened withsuit;

(5) the transfer was of substantially all of thedebtor's assets;

***

(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets;

(8) the value of the consideration received by thedebtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of theasset transferred or the amount of the obligationincurred;

(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolventshortly after the transfer was made or the obligation wasincurred;

(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly

after a substantial debt was incurred." 740 ILCS160/5(b) (West 1998).

The presence of these factors does not create a presumption ofactual intent but, rather, is an indicator of such intent on whichthe trial court may rely to make its findings based on the evidencepresented by the parties. Lindholm v. Holtz, 221 Ill. App. 3d 330,581 N.E.2d 860 (1991).

According to Matthews, the trust was Serafin's "insider" as itwas created and funded by him with a right to retain income. Hekept possession and control of the property, only switching thecapacity in which he was managing the assets. Matthews claims thatSerafin concealed the trust, placed all his property into it onlywhen he was threatened with suit, and became insolvent as a result.

Matthews' position is untenable. He provides no case law, andwe find none in existence, to support his position that a trust maypersonify an "insider." While Serafin transferred much of hisproperty into the trust shortly after this action was filed, thetrust was created almost a year prior to the time Northpointstopped paying rent. There is no evidence that Serafin concealedthe trust or any of his other assets. As noted, Serafin was notinsolvent and the judgment debt was not incurred until severalyears after the transfer. Even if the judgment was entered duringSerafin's lifetime, these facts do not support Matthews' positionthat Serafin intended to hinder, delay, or defraud him. As aresult, we cannot conclude that the trial court's decision wasagainst the manifest weight of the evidence.

Finally, Matthews argues that Serafin violated section 5(a)(2)of the Transfer Act. Section 5(a)(2) provides that a transfer bya debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made thetransfer "without receiving a reasonable equivalent value inexchange for the transfer," and the debtor was engaged in abusiness for which the remaining assets of the debtor wereunreasonably small in relation to the business, or the debtorbelieved he would incur debts beyond his ability to pay as theybecame due. 740 ILCS 160/5(a)(2) (West 1998).

Matthews asserts Serafin did not receive any value for histransfer. He was "engaged in a business" by acting as guarantorand his remaining assets were unreasonably small in relation to thedebt owned to Matthews. In addition, according to Matthews,Serafin knew he would incur debts beyond his ability to pay.

As noted, Serafin created the trust almost a year before thelawsuit was filed. While he did transfer most of his assets intothe trust after the lawsuit was filed, it was well before anyjudgment was entered. Besides, the almost $1 million worth ofassets in the trust is significant compared to the $6,300 owed forpast rent.

The trustees suggest that there is no more difficulty andexpense in collecting a judgment owed by a debtor who has $1million in various bank accounts than a debtor who has $1 millionin a revocable trust. In either case, Matthews could haveinitiated supplementary proceedings under section 2-1402 of theCode (735 ILCS 5/2-1402 (West 1998)) to discover Serafin's assetsin order to satisfy the unpaid judgment. We agree. Section 2-1402authorizes a "creditor to conduct an examination of a third party[citation], and upon a showing that the third party is holdingassets belonging to the judgment debtor, empowers the court tosummarily compel the application of discovered assets or income tothe satisfaction of the judgment." Mid-American Elevator Co. v.Norcon, Inc., 287 Ill. App. 3d 582, 587, 679 N.E.2d 387 (1996). Whether Serafin had his money in a bank account or in a revocabletrust, as was the case here, the court could have ordered that theassets or income from either be applied to satisfy the judgmentdebt. But apparently no such motion was made.

As the record fails to indicate that Serafin attempted toavoid the judgment or increase the difficulty and expense forMatthews to collect his debt, we find the trial court's decisionwas not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Peoria County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, JJ., concur.