MODIFIED ON DENIAL OF REHEARING

This appeal springs from an action for an accounting,dissolution of a partnership, and a claim for breach of fiduciaryduty filed by plaintiff Gregory Neumann against his brother andpartner Kenneth Neumann. After many years of litigation, the trialcourt dissolved the partnership and entered an order on September28, 2000 making final determinations regarding the accounting, thedissolution of the partnership, the splitting of the assets and afinding of breach of fiduciary duty on the part of defendantKenneth. All that remained to be done was the sale of thepartnership real estate and equipment and the setting ofprejudgment interest.

In March of 2001 Kenneth filed a motion to vacate theSeptember 28, 2000 order. The trial court denied the motion,finding that the September 28, 2000 order was final and appealableand that Kenneth was barred from appealing it because he did notappeal within 30 days of its entry. Kenneth appealed both thedenial of the motion to vacate and the award of prejudgmentinterest. We affirm the trial court and hold that an order enteredin a partnership dissolution that disposes of the merits of thecase and finally determines the rights and obligations of theparties is final and appealable and must be appealed within 30 dayspursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(2). 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(2). We also hold that a partner's breach of fiduciary duty does notpreclude the court from awarding him prejudgment interest based onequitable considerations.

FACTS

Gregory and Kenneth were equal partners in Neumann's Nursery. Trouble started between the brothers over a decade ago. After abench trial and by agreed order, the court appointed a receiver tovalue the partnership property, wind down partnership affairs, andliquidate partnership assets. The receiver filed her report inOctober of 1999. Both parties filed written objections to thereceiver's report, and a hearing was held to consider theobjections, question the receiver, and present witnesses to rebuther findings.

Following the hearing, the trial court held that Kenneth hadbreached his fiduciary duty to Gregory and entered an order onSeptember 28, 2000 which granted partial judgment in favor ofGregory in the amount of $775,246.73. The order resolved allpartnership issues but reserved the question of prejudgmentinterest and execution of the sale of certain equipment andpartnership land. In February of 2001, the court entered an orderawarding $689,823 in prejudgment interest to Gregory and entered anunc pro tunc order awarding $7,048 to Gregory for reimbursementfor partnership expenses. Kenneth appealed. A motion to dismissfiled by Gregory was taken with the case.

ANALYSIS

The first issue we must resolve is whether Kenneth's appeal ofthe September 28, 2000, order is barred because it is untimely. Gregory argues that the trial court's September 28, 2000 judgmentwas a final and appealable order and that Kenneth's failure toappeal from it within 30 days precludes him from appealing it now.

A judgment entered in the administration of a receivership,liquidation, or similar proceeding that does not dispose of anentire proceeding but which finally determines a right or status ofa party is appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(2) within 30days after its entry. 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(2); 155 Ill 2d R.303(a) (1). A final judgment is one that disposes of the rights ofthe parties so that if the judgment is affirmed, nothing remainsfor the trial court to do but proceed with execution of thejudgment. Kim v. Alvey, Inc., 322 Ill. App. 3d 657, 749 N.E.2d 368(2001).

In its September 28, 2000 order the trial court made specificfindings regarding all partnership issues. The order determined thejudgment amount that Kenneth owed Gregory. Proceeds from the realestate and equipment sales were to be used to adjust the accountsbetween the brothers. The only details that remained were thosewhich were required to enforce the already decided issues, i.e.,the realty and personalty sales. The court also needed to make adetermination regarding Gregory's request for prejudgment interest. In our view, the order disposed of the rights of the parties andwas final and appealable as nothing remained for the trial court todo except implement its order. Because Kenneth did not appeal fromthat order within 30 days, he is precluded from appealing thoseissues now. See McCaffrey v. Nauman, 204 Ill. App. 3d 761, 562N.E.2d 628 (1990) (holding that an order which finally determinesthe rights of the parties in a partnership dissolution must beappealed within 30 days).

Kenneth cites McCaffrey v. Nauman, 204 Ill. App. 3d 761, 562N.E.2d 628 (1990) as an example of a final and appealable order andmaintains that this case is not like McCaffrey. In McCaffrey, 204Ill. App. 3d at 764, 562 N.E.2d at 630, what remained to be doneafter the order at issue was entered was the real estate closing,the distribution of the sale proceeds, and the filing of thereceiver's report regarding the sale. The court retainedjurisdiction merely to implement its order. McCaffrey, 204 Ill.App. 3d at 764, 562 N.E.2d at 630.

Unlike McCaffrey, at the time the September 28, 2000 order wasentered in this case, no purchasers had been specificallyidentified. Nevertheless, the order in this case left no doubtthat at the November 8 hearing the equipment would be sold and realestate offers would be considered and acted upon. The order statedthat the proceeds from the sales would be used to adjust thebrothers' accounts. As in McCaffrey, all that remained to be doneafter entry of the September 28, 2000 order was for the court toimplement it.

Kenneth also urges us to follow Hildebrand v. Topping, 240Ill. App. 3d 104, 608 N.E.2d 119 (1992), which he maintainssupports his argument. In that case the trial court retainedjurisdiction after it had entered the order at issue to oversee thewind-up of partnership affairs, the final accounting and the saleof real estate. Hildebrand, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 107, 608 N.E.2d at122. To determine whether the order was final and appealable, thecourt looked at the nature of the conflict and the effect that theorder in question had on the conflict. Hildebrand, 240 Ill. App. 3dat 108, 608 N.E.2d at 122. The reviewing court found that theorder was not final and appealable because it was intertwined withthe final accounting that was still pending. Hildebrand, 240 Ill.App. 3d at 108, 608 N.E.2d at 122. Hildebrand is distinguishablefrom the present case in that there was no final accounting stillpending here. In our case, the receiver's report had been acceptedand the September 28 order had determined what the partnershipassets were and how they were to be distributed.

The circumstances that distinguish Hildebrand from this caseillustrate the reasonableness of Supreme Court Rule 304(b) (155Ill. 2d R. 304(b). The rule offers an exception to the general rulethat prohibits the appeal of a judgment that does not dispose ofall the issues before the court. Included in the exception arejudgments involving estate administrations, receiverships,liquidations, and similar proceedings. See 155 Ill. 2d R.304(b)(1) & (2). An appeal under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)promotes efficiency and provides certainty by allowing parties toappeal those issues already decided. See In re Estate of Devey,239 Ill. App. 3d 630, 607 N.E.2d 685 (1993) (discussing thepracticality of Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1) in a lengthy estateadministration).

Partnership dissolution proceedings often continue beyond thedetermination of the parties' rights. It is reasonable to appeala final judgment in dissolution cases before the partnership assetsare sold so that if the trial court is overruled differentdecisions as to the accounting and sales may be made. Direconsequences could result if a court was unable to make alternativedecisions because partners waited to appeal until all the issuesbefore the court were determined. See Yardley v. Yardley, 137 Ill.App. 3d 747, 484 N.E.2d 873 (1985) (noting that an entire estateadministration might have to start anew if appellants waited toappeal).

The second issue is whether the trial court erred when itincreased the judgment by entering a nunc pro tunc order to includereimbursement to Gregory for expenses he paid on behalf of thepartnership. Kenneth claims that the nunc pro tunc order was animproper modification of the judgment and that the expenses awardedby it were not supported by any evidence.

A nunc pro tunc order is an order entered to correct aninconsistency in a written record and must be based on definiteevidence in the record. Gounaris v. City of Chicago, 321 Ill. App.3d 487, 747 N.E.2d 1025 (2001). We review de novo whether an orderwas properly a nunc pro tunc order. Gounaris, 321 Ill. App. 3d at493, 747 N.E.2d at 1030.

The trial court entered the nunc pro tunc order because thejudgment amount did not include reimbursement to Gregory for $7,048he paid on behalf of the partnership. During trial, Kenneth did notchallenge the reimbursement amount. It was entered into evidenceas an exhibit without objection. The amount was included in thereceiver's report. In its September 28, 2000 order the trial courtstated that it would adopt the receiver's report unless contraryevidence was presented. No contrary evidence appears in the record. Under these circumstances, in our view the evidence in the recordis sufficiently precise and definite to indicate that the trialcourt intended to include the reimbursement amount in the judgmentand merely miscalculated the amount that Kenneth owed Gregory. SeeBeck v. Stepp, 144 Ill.2d 232, 579 N.E.2d 824 (1991) (finding thenunc pro tunc order improper because evidence in the record did notdemonstrate that the original order failed to conform to the decreerendered). Because the nunc pro tunc order amended the judgmentamount to conform to the record, we hold that the trial court didnot err.

The third issue is whether the trial court erred when itawarded Gregory prejudgment interest. We review this issue for anabuse of discretion. Kleczek v. Jorgensen, 328 Ill. App. 3d 1012,767 N.E.2d 913 (2002).

Kenneth asserts that the award of prejudgment interest at theprime rate was contrary to law because the judgment against him wasimproper and because he did not unreasonably delay the proceedings.

In cases involving a breach of fiduciary duty, the purpose ofawarding prejudgment interest at the prime rate is to make theplaintiff whole by placing him in the position he would have beenhad he had the opportunity to use the funds wrongly retained by thedefendant. In re Estate of Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d 61, 535 N.E.2d 876(1989).

While the record supports Kenneth's claim that Gregory wasalso found to have breached his fiduciary duty to Kenneth, therecord does not identify what Greg's breaches were. Notwithstanding its conclusion that Gregory had breached hisfiduciary duty to Kenneth, the trial court found that Kenneth owedGregory a substantial sum of money. By awarding Gregoryprejudgment interest, the trial court compensated him for the lossof the use of that money. Contrary to Kenneth's assertion, theredoes not need to be a finding of unreasonable delay to support anaward of prejudgment interest. See Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d at 86, 535N.E.2d at 887 (contrasting a statutory interest award for vexatiousdelay and an award of interest at the prime rate to compensate fora breach of fiduciary duty).

Kenneth's argument that the award of prejudgment interest wasin error because it was based on a complicated calculation is alsomisplaced. He cites Ouwenga v. Nu-Way Ag, Inc., 239 Ill. App. 3d518, 604 N.E.2d 1085 (1992), Lyon Metal Products, L.L.C. v.Protection Mutual Insurance Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 330, 747 N.E.2d495 (2001), and Marvel Engineering Co. v. Commercial UnionInsurance Co., 118 Ill. App. 3d 844, 455 N.E.2d 545 (1983) insupport of his position. In these cases, however, the interestaward was not based on equitable considerations but was statutorilybased. Kenneth also cites McKenzie Dredging Co. v. Deneen RiverCo., 249 Ill. App. 3d 694, 619 N.E.2d 188 (1993) but we concludethat that case supports the trial court's award of prejudgmentinterest to Gregory in that it holds that a court of equity is notprecluded from awarding prejudgment interest merely because thedamages are not subject to exact computation. We find no abuse ofdiscretion in the trial court's decision, and we affirm the awardof prejudgment interest.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Will County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOLDRIDGE and McDADE, JJ., concur.