No. 3--03--0826

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2005

In a stipulated bench trial, the defendant, Coty E. Watkins, was found guilty of recklessdischarge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24--1.5 (West 2002)) and possession of a firearm without afirearm owner's identification (FOID) card (430 ILCS 65/2 (West 2002)). He was sentenced to18 months of conditional discharge. On appeal, the defendant argues that the State failed toprove the elements of reckless discharge of a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

At trial, the parties stipulated to the statements in several documents. The defendant'sneighbor, Roger Shults, said in his statement that on the night of April 21, 2002, he and his familyheard approximately five gunshots. Shortly after hearing the gunshots, Shults went outside andsaw police cars "circling the area." A police officer from one of the squad cars approached Shultsand asked him if he had heard gunfire. Shults replied that he had heard gunshots. Shults informedthe officer that immediately after hearing the shots in the present incident, he saw the defendantleave in a white Pontiac.

One of the officers' statements indicated that officers responded to the area of the incidentat approximately 9:24 p.m. Officers stopped the defendant in his white Pontiac Grand Prix not farfrom his apartment. Meanwhile, another officer discovered several .40-caliber shell casings in therear driveway of the defendant's residence.

An officer confronted the defendant about the presence of shell casings in his driveway. After further questioning by the officer, the defendant gave his consent for the officers to searchhis apartment for weapons.

While officers conducted the search at the apartment, the defendant informed one of themthat there was a gun in the top drawer of his dresser. The officer retrieved a .40-caliber Glockhandgun from the dresser. Another officer also recovered a .32-caliber gun and a 9-millimeterweapon in the residence. The defendant advised the officers that he did not have a FOID card forthe weapons. The officers then arrested the defendant and transported him to the police station.

At the police station, the defendant gave a written statement to the police. In hisstatement, the defendant submitted that his brother owned the guns. On the day of the incident,his brother was out of town. The defendant contended that he took the Glock into the backyardand fired it into the air approximately four times. He stated to police, "I can't believe I was thatstupid. I found the gun in the closet and just wanted to see how it worked. I was not shooting atanyone, and I was not trying to hurt anyone[.] I just fired the gun into the air."

The court later found the defendant guilty of reckless discharge of a firearm andpossession of a firearm without a FOID card. The defendant appealed.

ANALYSIS

The defendant contends that the State failed to prove the elements of reckless discharge ofa firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

"A person commits reckless discharge of a firearm by discharging a firearm in a recklessmanner which endangers the bodily safety of an individual." 720 ILCS 5/24--1.5(a) (West 2002). "A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a substantial andunjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statutedefining the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of carewhich a reasonable person would exercise in the situation." 720 ILCS 5/4--6 (West 2002).

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are to determinewhether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rationaltrier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 824 N.E.2d 262 (2005).

Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the elements of reckless discharge of afirearm in Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 824 N.E.2d 262. The court stated that the offense has twoprongs, which are (1) recklessly discharging a firearm; and (2) endangering the bodily safety of anindividual. In Collins, the defendant argued that the State failed to prove the second prong. TheCollins court held that the defendant's acts of repeatedly shooting a firearm into the air in aresidential area satisfied the second prong of the offense. Because the Collins court did notconsider the first prong, it did not analyze the reckless state of mind element of the offense.

In the present case, the stipulated evidence showed that the defendant repeatedly fired agun into the air in a residential neighborhood. Thus, under Collins, the State proved the secondprong of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Next, we consider whether the State proved the first prong of the offense, as articulatedby the Collins court, beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, our analysis focuses on whether thedefendant recklessly discharged a firearm. The defendant admitted that he discharged a firearmseveral times into the air and further admitted he believed it was stupid to do so. These statementswere stipulated to by the parties and are part of the record before us on review. Therefore, ouranalysis even more narrowly concerns whether the defendant fired the gun recklessly beyond areasonable doubt.

The reckless state of mind may be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances in therecord. People v. Barham, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 788 N.E.2d 297 (2003). When recklessnesshas been found by the trier of fact, this determination should not be overturned unless inference ofthe mental state is inherently impossible or unreasonable. In re Thur, 80 Ill. App. 3d 592, 400N.E.2d 564 (1980). The State need not prove that the defendant shot a gun knowing that he mayinjure a particular person to show the defendant's reckless state of mind. People v. Thomas, 8 Ill.App. 3d 690, 290 N.E.2d 418 (1972).

According to this court's research, analysis of the reckless state of mind, as applied to theoffense of reckless discharge of a firearm, is a matter of first impression. Consequently, we lookto cases analyzing the reckless state of mind, as applied to other offenses, for analogous examplesof reckless conduct.

Pointing a gun at someone is a reckless act regarding the offense of involuntarymanslaughter. People v. Lemke, 349 Ill. App. 3d 391, 811 N.E.2d 708 (2004). Driving whilespeeding and weaving between lanes is a reckless act regarding reckless homicide. People v.Testin, 260 Ill. App. 3d 224, 632 N.E.2d 645 (1994). Merely drawing a loaded gun in a crowdedtavern is a reckless act concerning the offense of involuntary manslaughter. Thomas, 8 Ill. App.3d 690, 290 N.E.2d 418.

In this case, the stipulated evidence showed that the defendant consciously disregarded thesubstantial and unjustifiable risk that the bullets he fired into the air would endanger the bodilysafety of others in a residential area. Additionally, his disregard for the safety of othersconstituted a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercisein a residential neighborhood. Furthermore, the defendant's conduct was analogous to the level ofdisregard for the safety of others and failure to exercise care exhibited by a person merely pointinga gun at another, driving while speeding and weaving, or drawing a loaded gun in a crowdedtavern. Therefore, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold thata rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved the elements of reckless discharge ofa firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Kankakee County circuit court's judgmentconvicting the defendant of reckless discharge of a firearm.

Affirmed.

SLATER, P.J., concurs.

McDADE, J., dissents.

The only issue presented to the court in this appeal isdefendant's contention that the State failed to prove theelements of reckless discharge of a firearm beyond a reasonabledoubt. In order for the State to meet its burden of proof inthis case, it had to show that defendant "consciouslydisregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [he willendanger the bodily safety of an individual (720 ILCS 5/24--1.5(a) (West 2002))]; and such disregard constitutes a grossdeviation from the standard of care which a reasonable personwould exercise in the situation". 720 ILCS 5/4--6 (West 2002).

The majority notes that our supreme court has recentlydetermined that the offense of reckless discharge of a firearmhas two prongs: (1) recklessly discharging a firearm; and (2)endangering the bodily safety of an individual. People v.Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 824 N.E.2d 262 (2005). Because Collinsheld that repeatedly shooting a firearm into the air in aresidential area satisfied the second prong of the offense andbecause it appears that defendant lived in a residential area ofKankakee and admitted to firing four shots into the air, Collins,as the majority points out, controls our decision as to thesecond prong.

Therefore, the only issue we examine is whether the Stateproved that defendant had the requisite mental state to justify afinding that he was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, ofreckless discharge of a firearm. It appears from the opinionthat the majority believes that his stipulation that he told thepolice "I can't believe I was that stupid." somehow equates to aconfession of recklessness. I think his admission shows that, infact, there was nothing "conscious" in his apparent disregard ofa possible risk. Nor do I find any showing by the State thatdefendant knew or should have known of circumstances that madeany risk to others "substantial and unjustifiable" at the time hedischarged the weapon. Absent such evidence, there is no way todetermine that defendant "consciously disregarded a substantialand unjustifiable risk" of endangering the bodily safety of anindividual.

The legislature could have crafted a statute making anydischarge of a firearm into the air in a residential area acrime, but it chose not do so. Perhaps the legislators wereconcerned about the wholesale arrests that would be occasioned bythe overly exuberant celebrators of holidays such as the NewYear, the Fourth of July, and Memorial Day. Arguably, firing agun into the air in a residential area at any time is inherentlystupid. The legislators, however, whatever their rationale,chose to include a more rigorous mental state -- onenecessitating proof of "conscious disregard of a substantial andunjustifiable risk". I do not think an admission of stupiditysatisfies that requirement and therefore respectfully dissentfrom the contrary finding of the majority.