People ex rel. Department of Labor v. Sackville Construction, Inc.

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Laws-info.com » Cases » Illinois » 3rd District Appellate » 2010 » People ex rel. Department of Labor v. Sackville Construction, Inc.

State: Illinois

Court: 3rd District Appellate

Docket No: 3-09-0006 Rel

Case Date: 06/09/2010

Preview:No. 3-09-0006 _________________________________________________________________ Filed June 9, 2010-CORRECTION IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2010 THE PEOPLE ex rel. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit, ) Rock Island County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) No. 08-L-57 v. ) ) SACKVILLE CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) Honorable ) F. Michael Meersman, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. _________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court: _________________________________________________________________ The Department of Labor, filed a complaint against defendant subcontractor Sackville Construction, Inc. (Sackville), alleging that it violated the Prevailing Wage Act (Act) (820 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 2006)). The trial court granted summary judgment to

defendant, finding that it was unfair to require Sackville to pay the prevailing wage without adequate notice that the project was covered by the statute. We reverse and remand for further

proceedings. In February 2006, private developer Rock Island Industrial Partners (RIIP) entered into a contract with Hy-Brand Contractors (Hy-Brand) to build a 45,000-square-foot industrial complex on a

vacant lot in downtown Rock Island (the project).

Ten days later,

RIIP signed a contract with the City of Rock Island (City) to construct the project. Under the terms of the agreement, RIIP In return, the City

agreed to invest $1.5 million in the project.

conveyed title of the project site to RIIP in consideration of $1. The City also agreed to contribute $150,000 "for use in the project." The funds were to be used for site construction and

dispersed in two equal payments, one when the building permit issued and another when the certificate of occupancy issued. The

City also agreed to pay up to $57,000 for the cost of site clearance and demolition. In March 2006, Hy-Brand entered into an oral subcontract with Sackville to provide laborers for the project. Hy-Brand did not

inform Sackville that the City had contributed funds to the project or that the project was covered by the Prevailing Wage Act. During construction, the Department of Labor received a

complaint that Sackville had failed to pay its laborers the correct wage. The Department conducted an investigation and determined

that the construction project constituted a public works project subject to the Prevailing Wage Act and that Sackville's employees had not been paid the prevailing wage. The Department calculated

an underpayment of $19,189.39 and demanded back wages from the subcontractor. Sackville refused to pay its workers the prevailing wage. 2

In December 2007, the Department filed a complaint against Sackville, alleging a violation of the Act based on Sackville's failure to pay its laborers the prevailing wage for their work. The Department sought back wages, plus penalties. Sackville filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the Act did not apply to the project because RIIP was not a public body; thus, it was not required to pay the prevailing wage.

Sackville argued that the City served only as a "financing conduit" and that the project was not actually funded by the City. The Department filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that RIIP met the requirements of a public body under the Act because it received public funds from the City for the project. The Department further maintained that because the Act applied to both contractors and subcontractors, Sackville owed its workers the prevailing wage and was required to pay a 20% penalty. The trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Sackville on the basis that it had no knowledge of the agreement between the City and RIIP. The court found that public

funds were expended in support of the project and that the Act applied, but concluded that it was "unfair to require payment of prevailing wages when [Sackville] had no reason to believe the project was covered by the Prevailing Wage Act." STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo a trial court's grant of summary judgment. 3

Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213 (2007). judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,

Summary and

depositions

affidavits on file, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Murray, 224 Ill. 2d at 228. ANALYSIS I. Prevailing Wage Act

The purpose of the Prevailing Wage Act is to encourage the efficient and expeditious completion of public works by public bodies by ensuring that workers receive a decent wage. Opportunity Center of Southeastern Illinois, Inc. v. Bernardi, 204 Ill. App. 3d 945, 949-50 (1990). Section 1 of the Act states, in relevant part:

"It is the policy of the State of Illinois that a wage of no less than the general prevailing hourly rate as paid for work of a similar character in the locality in which the work is performed, shall be paid to all laborers, workers and mechanics employed by or on behalf of any and all public bodies engaged in public works." 820 ILCS 130/1 (West 2006). The primary rule of statutory interpretation and construction, to which all other canons and rules are subordinate, is to

ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. Maloney v. Bower, 113 Ill. 2d 473 (1986). 4 In

interpreting a statute, courts must give the legislative language its plain and ordinary meaning. 3d 945. Opportunity Center, 204 Ill. App.

If the language of the statute is plain, clear and

unambiguous, it must prevail and will be given effect by the courts without resorting to other aids for construction. Village of

Buffalo v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 180 Ill. App. 3d 591 (1989). Each word, clause and sentence of a statute should be given reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502 (2007). Brucker v.

Courts must not read into statute

exceptions, limitation or conditions that the legislature did not intend. People v. Roake, 334 Ill. App. 3d 504 (2002). the proper interpretation of a statute and

However,

determination of legislative intent cannot always be based upon language alone. Where a statute is ambiguous and the legislative

intent cannot be ascertained from the plain and ordinary meaning of its language, then the court is guided by the rules of statutory construction and extrinsic aids. Rigney v. Edgar, 135 Ill. App. 3d 893 (1985). Generally, the interpretation of a statute must be

grounded on the nature and object of the statute as well as the consequences which would result from construing it one way or another. Legislative intent may be ascertained from the reason and necessity for the act, the evils sought to be remedied and the objects and purposes sought to be obtained. Antonich, 148 Ill. App. 3d 575 (1986). 5 In re Marriage of

When

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interpretation, the statute will be deemed ambiguous, and the court may consider extrinsic aids to construction, such as legislative history. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206 (2005). An amendment

to a statute is an appropriate source for determining the original legislative intent of a statute. Where the statute is amended soon after questions have arisen regarding its interpretation, it is logical and reasonable to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original statute. People v. Badoud, 122 Ill. 2d 50 (1988). In this case, the Department contends that under the

Prevailing Wage Act, (1) RIIP constitutes a "public body" because the project was supported by public funds, (2) the project

qualifies as a "public work" even though it was not financed through one of the enumerated statutes, and (3) notice was not essential to find Sackville liable. II. Public Body

Section 2 of the Act defines a "public body" as "the State or any officer, board or commission of the State or any political subdivision or department thereof, or any institution supported in whole or in part by public funds." 820 ILCS 130/2 (West 2006). A

The statutory language of section 2 is clear and unambiguous.

public body is any institution supported in whole or in part by public funds. The terms used in the definition are broad and are 6

not limited to institutions wholly supported by public funds. Sackville argues that the definition of a public body should not be extended to engulf a private entity that operates

independently of public funding.

However, we refuse to read into

the statute exceptions or limitations that the legislature did not intend. Under a plain reading of the statute, RIIP's status as a

private developer does not prevent it from being classified as a "public body" under the Act. See People ex rel. Bernardi v. Illini

Community Hospital, 163 Ill. App. 3d 987 (1987) (although not-forprofit nonsectarian hospital is not a public hospital for general purposes, receipt of public tax funds qualified hospital as a public body under Prevailing Wage Act). In this case, and for this purpose, RIIP was a public body because it was supported in part by public funds from the City. Those public funds constituted 10% of RIIP's development and construction costs. Additionally, RIIP received public funds to It was also publicly supported by the

demolish and clear the site.

City's agreement to deed the land to the developer for the nominal consideration of $1. The parties do not dispute that the financial support was significant. For these reasons, RIIP qualified as a

public body under the Prevailing Wage Act. III. Public Works

We must next consider whether RIIP's industrial construction project is a "public works" project within the meaning of the Act. 7

Section 2 of the Act, in effect at the time of the project, states: "'Public works' means all fixed works constructed by any public body, other than work done directly by any public utility company, whether or not done under public supervision or direction, or paid for wholly or in part out of public funds. `Public works' as defined herein

includes all projects financed in whole or in part with bonds issued under the Industrial Project Revenue Bond Act (Article 11, Division 74 of the Illinois Municipal Code), the Industrial Building Revenue Bond Act, the Illinois Finance Authority Act, the Illinois Sports

Facilities Authority Act, or the Build Illinois Bond Act, *** loans or other funds made available pursuant to the Build Illinois Act, `Public Works' also includes all projects financed in whole or in part with funds from the Fund for Illinois' Future under Section 6z-47 of the State Finance Act, funds for school construction under Section 5 of the General Obligation Bond Act, funds authorized under Section 3 of the School Construction Bond Act, funds for school infrastructure under Section 6z-45 of the State Finance Act, and funds for

transportation purposes under Section 4 of the General Obligation Bond Act. `Public works' also includes all 8

projects financed in whole or in part with funds from the Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity under the Illinois Renewable Fuels Development Program Act for which there is no project labor agreement. `Public

works' also includes all projects at leased facility property used for airport purposes under Section 35 of the Local Government Facility Lease Act." 820 ILCS 130/2 (West 2006). The question before us is whether a construction project contracted by a nongovernmental entity that does not receive funds from one of the listed financing statutes qualifies as a public work. Sackville argues that a fixed work construction project

undertaken by a private entity must be funded solely by one of the named financing statutes listed in section 2 to qualify as a "public works" project. The Department argues that the enumerated

statutes are not exhaustive but are examples of projects that would be classified as public works. The Department maintains that its

argument is supported by the legislative history of Public Act 960058 (Pub. Act 96-0058, eff. January 1, 2010 (amending 820 ILCS 130/2 (West 2006))), which clarifies that the Act was not limited to the projects listed in section 2. Generally, the enumeration of specific items implies that the legislature intended to exclude all others. Copley Press, Inc. v.

Administrative Office of the Courts, 271 Ill. App. 3d 548 (1995). 9

However, this rule of statutory construction is subordinate to the primary rule that the intent of the legislature governs statutory interpretation. "Thus, it can be overcome by a strong indication In re Detention of

of contrary legislative intent or policy."

Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 319 (2002) quoting 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction

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