People v. Barnett

SUPREME COURT CASES

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People v. Barnett

State: Illinois

Court: 3rd District Appellate

Docket No: 3-08-0672 Rel

Case Date: 08/19/2009

Preview:No. 3-08-0672 _________________________________________________________________ Filed August 19, 2009 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2009 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 06-CF-1220 ) JASON BARNETT, ) Honorable ) Amy Bertani-Tomczak, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. _________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court: _________________________________________________________________ Defendant Jason Barnett was charged with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol while on a suspended license (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2004)), aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol while under the combined influence of alcohol, drugs, or other compounds (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(5) (West 2004)), and obstructing justice for providing a police officer with a false name (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a) (West 2004)). He moved to suppress the

statements he made after he was placed in custody, citing the officer's failure to administer Miranda warnings. granted the motion, and the State appeals. The trial court

We affirm.

At the motion to suppress hearing, Officer Matthew Lehmann was

the only witness.

Lehmann stated that he pulled defendant's

vehicle over on the evening of October 15, 2005, for a speeding violation. Defendant initially told Lehmann that his name was

Darren K. Ellis and gave the officer a date of birth of August 28, 1980. Lehmann asked for identification, and defendant stated that Lehmann asked

did not have any because he was in the Marines.

defendant who owned the vehicle. Defendant stated that it belonged to his cousin, but did not give his cousin's name. Defendant initially stated that he had not consumed any alcohol, but later said that he had had three or four beers. Officer Lehmann administered field sobriety tests and then

handcuffed and arrested defendant for DUI. defendant his Miranda rights at that time.

Lehmann did not read

Lehmann placed defendant in his squad car and headed back to the police station. owned the vehicle. During the drive, Lehmann asked defendant who Defendant started to answer Lehmann but then

paused and said he needed to "be straight" with Lehmann. Defendant then informed the officer that he had provided a false name and that his real name was James Barnett. Lehman testified that he

asked defendant who owned the car because he was going to put the information on the tow report. He admitted that he had already

checked the vehicle's license plates and determined the owner as recorded by the Secretary of State. Lehman stated that, regardless of defendant's answer, he would have written the official owner of

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record on the report. Lehmann also asked if defendant had a valid license, and defendant informed him that his license was suspended. Lehmann

acknowledged that asking a person if he has a valid driver's license could lead to an incriminating response. At the police station, Lehmann discussed the normal DUI arrest procedures with defendant and read him the "Warning to Motorist" provisions. During the booking process, Lehmann asked defendant

several questions "to complete the paperwork necessary for an arrest and booking," such as his name, date of birth, scars, tattoos, etc. Lehmann testified that he had other conversations

with defendant over the course of 20 minutes but could not recall them "in depth." During one of those conversations, defendant

informed Lehmann that he was taking medication for seizures and that he was not supposed to drink alcohol while taking the drug. Lehmann did not read defendant his Miranda rights at any point during the DUI booking process. Defendant argued that the statements he made should be

suppressed because they were made during a custodial interrogation without proper Miranda warnings. The State maintained that the

fifth amendment did not apply because the statements were voluntary and were not made in response to any questions of an interrogative nature. The trial court granted the motion and suppressed

defendant's statements.

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On appeal, the State claims that the trial court erred in suppressing defendant's statements that he provided a false name and was taking seizure medication. The State concedes that the

trial court properly suppressed defendant's statement that his license was suspended. Statements obtained from a person as a result of a custodial interrogation are admissible at trial only if, prior to the

interrogation, the person is warned (1) of his right to remain silent, (2) that any statement he makes may be used against him, (3) that he has the right to have an attorney present, and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 720, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1625 (1966). An "interrogation" occurs through express

police questions or "any words or actions on the part of the police *** that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90 (1980). The

definition of an interrogation focuses primarily on the perception of the defendant, rather than the officer. Ill. App. 3d 728 (2003). People v. Parker, 344

The trial court is in the best position

to assess the witnesses' credibility and draw all reasonable inferences. People v. Vasquez, 388 Ill. App. 3d 532 (2009). The

court's ruling on a motion to suppress a statement will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the

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evidence.

People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414 (1992).

Here, the parties agree that defendant was in custody at the time he made the statements. The issue is whether the statements

were the product of interrogations that required Miranda warnings. We addressed the same issue in People v. Pierce, 285 Ill. App. 3d 5 (1996). In that case, defendant was observed coasting down a The was

hill on a motorcycle in Seatonville without headlights. officer initiated a stop and determined that defendant

intoxicated. station.

He arrested defendant and transported him to the

While in the squad car, the officer questioned defendant

concerning whom the motorcycle belonged to and whether it should be towed. Defendant told the officer that he drove the motorcycle to Defendant filed a motion to suppress the statement, We affirmed, holding that likely to elicit an

Seatonville.

which was granted by the trial court. the officer's questions were

reasonably

incriminating response; thus, the officer was required to issue Miranda warnings before questioning the defendant. Ill. App. 3d at 7. Here, the State argues that the conversation in the car was solely for administrative purposes. However, the questions Pierce, 285

regarding ownership of the vehicle had been previously answered by the officer's computer check of the vehicle registration number. Officer Lehmann knew who owned the vehicle when he posed the question to defendant. He did not need defendant to provide that

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information.

Indeed, Lehmann testified that he would have listed

the owner on the tow report as the person named by the Secretary of State, not defendant. His testimony supports our conclusion that

the questions in the squad car were unnecessary and reasonably likely to produce an incriminating response. The State also claims that any statements made regarding defendant's medication were volunteered and did not result from an interrogation. Lehmann testified that he had a lengthy

conversation with defendant during the 20-minute DUI observation period but that he could not recall most of the questions he asked during that conversation. The trial court heard Lehmann's

testimony and determined that the conversation was a custodial interrogation that required Miranda warnings. court's conclusion. questioned defendant's defendant admitted We agree with the

It is reasonable to infer that the officer regarding his medical of condition. any Given

consumption

alcohol,

questions

regarding his seizures and ingested medication could have induced defendant to incriminate himself. Under these circumstances,

Lehmann was required to advise defendant of his Miranda rights before engaging in further discussions. In Pierce, we supported our conclusion that the officer's questions resulted in a Miranda interrogation by speculating that the conversation could have produced any number of incriminating responses which could have led to the filing of charges against the

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defendant. need not

See Pierce, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 7. speculate. Defendant incriminated

In this case, we himself when he

responded to Lehmann's conversations in the squad car and at the police station, and his answers resulted in a three-count felony indictment against him. Miranda warnings the prior trial Defendant should have been accorded the to both conversations. suppressed He was of not. his

Accordingly, statements.

court

properly

all

The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed. Affirmed. MCDADE, J., concurs. JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting: I believe that Pierce, relied upon by the majority, was wrongfully decided. N.E.2d 750 (1996). People v. Pierce, 285 Ill. App. 3d 5, 673 As in Pierce, the issue before us is whether,

as a matter of law, the officer's questions regarding the ownership of the vehicle constituted an interrogation reasonably likely to elicit incriminating evidence. In this case, the officer's

question was made for an administrative purpose and, therefore, was not reasonably likely to evoke the statement made by defendant. See People v. Abdelmassih, 217 Ill. App. 3d 544, 577 N.E.2d 861 (1991); People v. Pierce, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 7, 673 N.E.2d at 75152 (Holdridge, J., dissenting). Defendant's statement regarding the fact that he had given the

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police a false name was nonresponsive to the question regarding ownership. This was a volunteered admission and, thus, not secured in violation of Miranda. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299,

64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 307, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1688-89 (1980). Likewise, defendant's statement regarding his medication, and the fact that he was not supposed to be consuming alcohol, was not secured in violation of Miranda. booking are exempt from the Routine questions posed during of Miranda. People v.

rigors

Abdelmassih, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 549, 577 N.E.2d at 864; see also People v. Fognini, 47 Ill. 2d 150, 152, 265 N.E.2d 133, 134 (1970). During the standard booking process, defendant volunteered the names of his medication, the reason he was taking them, and the fact that he was not to consume alcohol while on the medication. Although defendant had not been "Mirandized" at this point, and the officer testified that the information given by defendant was likely to be incriminating, an officer need not interrupt a suspect in the process of making a spontaneous statement in order to warn him of his constitutional right to remain silent. People v. Baer,

19 Ill. App. 3d 346, 348, 311 N.E.2d 418, 420 (1974); In re Orr, 38 Ill. 2d 417, 423, 231 N.E.2d 424, 427 (1967). warnings before police interrogation. Miranda requires was not

Defendant

interrogated. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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