No. 3--03--0802
(Consolidated with Nos. 3--03--0803 and 3--03--0804)

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2004

BACKGROUND

The State cited Joseph B. with violating the Curfew Act onJuly 3, 2003. At the time of the offense, Joseph B. was 16 yearsof age. Bradley M. and Jacki L. were charged with violating theCurfew Act on August 5, 2003. At the time of their offenses,Bradley M. was 16 and Jacki L. was 14 years old. All threeviolations took place in Bureau County.

On September 5, 2003, Bradley M. and Jacki L. pled guilty,and each was sentenced to six months of conditional discharge and10 hours of public service. That same day, Joseph B. waived hisright to a jury trial.

On its own motion, the trial court issued an order stayingthe proceedings in all three cases on September 6, 2003. Theorder set the matter for a joint hearing on the three cases forSeptember 12, 2003, to consider whether the court should dismissthe actions for lack of jurisdiction under the Juvenile Act.

At the September 12 hearing, the trial judge stated that thejurisdictional provisions of the Juvenile Act had been changed bythe enactment of Public Act 90--590 (Pub. Act 90--590, eff.January 1, 1999). The previous version of the Juvenile Actprovided that a trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider acharge against a juvenile under the Code unless the offense was atraffic, boating, or fish and game offense, or an offensepunishable by fine only. The newer version of the Juvenile Act,however, had removed the provision for an offense punishable onlyby fine. The judge stated that under the older version of theJuvenile Act, juveniles were prosecuted for curfew violationsbecause the offenses were punishable by fine only. The judgesaid that under the newer version of the Juvenile Act, however,the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the charges against thedefendants because curfew violations were not traffic, boating,or fish and game offenses.

The prosecutor argued that the judge's interpretation led toan absurd result, which the legislature could not have intended. According to the prosecutor, the legislature could not haveintended to make the Curfew Act, which is applicable only tominors, part of the Code, but not allow the State to chargeminors with violations of the Curfew Act under that same Code.

The prosecutor also contended that when two statutes are inconflict, the more specific statute prevails over the moregeneral statute. In the prosecutor's view, the Curfew Act wasmore specific than the jurisdictional provisions of the JuvenileAct, and therefore, should prevail.

The judge responded that his interpretation did not lead toan absurd result because a curfew violation brought in a juvenilepetition could be transferred to criminal court under theJuvenile Act. Additionally, under the judge's interpretation,the Juvenile Act's jurisdictional provisions were more specificthan the Curfew Act because a juvenile could not be charged underthe Code unless the offense was specifically a traffic, boating,or fish and game offense.

On its own motion, the trial court vacated its previoussentences and findings of guilt against Bradley M. and Jacki L.,and dismissed the charges in all three cases. The Stateappealed.

ANALYSIS

The State submits that the trial court misinterpreted theJuvenile Act and erred in dismissing the charges against thedefendants. The construction or interpretation of a statute is aquestion of law subject to de novo review. Carver v. Sheriff ofLa Salle County, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 787 N.E.2d 127 (2003); In reA.J., 323 Ill. App. 3d 607, 753 N.E.2d 551 (2001).

The portion of the Curfew Act which the defendants in thiscase were charged with violating is only applicable to "a personless than 17 years of age." 720 ILCS 555/1(a) (West 2002). Thepenalty for violation of section 1(a) is a fine of $10 to $500. 720 ILCS 555/1(c) (West 2002).

Before the enactment of Public Act 90--590, thejurisdictional provisions of the Juvenile Act stated that"[e]xcept as provided in this Section, no minor who was under 17years of age at the time of the alleged offense may be prosecutedunder the criminal laws of this State." 705 ILCS 405/5--4(1)(West 1996). At that time, section 5--4(2) of the Juvenile Actprovided that "any minor alleged to have committed a traffic,boating or fish and game law violation, *** or an offensepunishable by fine only, may be prosecuted for the violation." 705 ILCS 405/5--4(2) (West 1996).

Public Act 90--590 repealed section 5--4 and replacedsubsections 5--4(1) and 5--4(2) with two new sections. Under thenewer version of the Juvenile Act, "[e]xcept as provided inSection[] 5-125 [and other sections not applicable here], nominor who was under 17 years of age at the time of the allegedoffense may be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State." 705 ILCS 405/5--120 (West 2002). Section 5--125 states that"[a]ny minor alleged to have violated a traffic, boating, or fishand game law *** may be prosecuted for the violation." 705 ILCS405/5--125 (West 2002).

In this case, we are called upon to construe thejurisdictional provisions⁽¹⁾ of the new version of the JuvenileAct. According to this court's research, our interpretation ofthese sections is a case of first impression.

The primary rule of statutory construction is to determineand give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Mary AnnP., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 781 N.E.2d 237 (2002). The most reliableindication of the legislature's intent is the language of astatute (People v. Jurisec, 199 Ill. 2d 108, 766 N.E.2d 648(2002)), which should be given its plain or ordinary andpopularly understood meaning. Carver, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 787N.E.2d 127. When legislative intent can be determined from thelanguage of the statute, it will be given effect without resortto other aids of construction. Jurisec, 199 Ill. 2d 108, 766N.E.2d 648. A court should not depart from the plain language ofa statute by reading in exceptions, limitations or conditionsthat conflict with the express legislative intent. Carver, 203Ill. 2d 497, 787 N.E.2d 127.

In the present case, we initially note that even if thetrial court had not vacated the sentences it imposed upon BradleyM. and Jacki L., their sentences were void because they were notauthorized under the Curfew Act. See People v. Williams, 179Ill. 2d 331, 688 N.E.2d 1153 (1997) (sentence not authorized bystatute is void). The court sentenced Bradley M. and Jacki L. toterms of conditional discharge and community service forviolations of section 1(a). See 720 ILCS 525/1(c) (providing forfine of $10 to $500, and also authorizing community service asadditional or alternative sentence, but only for violation ofsubsection (b)). The Curfew Act, however, only authorizes a fineas a sentence for committing a violation of section 1(a). Thus,Bradley M.'s and Jacki L.'s sentences were void even before thetrial court vacated their sentences.

Regarding the statutory construction of the jurisdictionalprovisions of the Juvenile Act, this court has reviewed thelegislative history of Public Act 90--590. Although there wasextensive discussion of this act by the legislature, none of thelegislators mentioned why the act deleted the jurisdictionallanguage concerning criminal offenses punishable by fine onlythat was in the previous version of the Juvenile Act.

The State argues that we should apply the rule of statutoryconstruction which states that when two statutory provisionsrelate to the same subject, the more specific provision prevails. See Knolls Condominium Ass'n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 781N.E.2d 261 (2002). We disagree for several reasons. First, aswe noted above, when the language of the statute makes the intentof the legislature clear, there is no need to resort to otheraids of statutory construction. Jurisec, 199 Ill. 2d 108, 766N.E.2d 648. The legislature's intent in removing offensespunishable by only a fine from section 5--125 of the Juvenile Actwas unambiguous. Second, the "specific versus general" rule ofstatutory construction is of little help in this case. One couldfind, as the trial court did, that the Juvenile Act is morespecific. Sections 5--120 and 5--125 specifically determinewhether an offense falls within the jurisdiction of the JuvenileAct, while the Curfew Act is simply one among a large number ofthose offenses. Third, "[w]here by amendment or revision, wordsare stricken from a statute, it must be concluded that theLegislature deliberately intended to change the law." Goedde v.Community Unit School District No. 7, 21 Ill. App. 2d 79, 84, 157N.E.2d 266, 269 (1959); see also Board of Trustees of SouthernIllinois University v. Department of Human Rights, 159 Ill. 2d206, 636 N.E.2d 528 (1994) (where legislature has changed statuteby adding specific limited jurisdiction language, presumption isthat amendment was intended to change the law). It is presumedthat an amendment is made for some purpose, and effect must begiven to the amendment in a manner consistent with that purpose. Cook County Sheriff's Enforcement Ass'n v. County of Cook, 323Ill. App. 3d 853, 753 N.E.2d 309 (2001). Adopting the State'sposition would circumvent the statutory change. Finally, no ruleof statutory construction authorizes a court to declare that thelegislature did not mean what the plain language states. In reEstate of Hoehn, 234 Ill. App. 3d 627, 600 N.E.2d 899 (1992). Weare bound to declare and enforce the law as enacted (In reJermaine J., 336 Ill. App. 3d 900, 784 N.E.2d 428 (2003)), andhere the legislature pointedly brought offenses punishable by afine only, such as curfew violations, within the jurisdiction ofthe Juvenile Act. We are not free to ignore that legislativedirective.

The State also maintains that Public Act 90--590's omissionof the language concerning crimes punishable by fine only hasrendered a portion of the Curfew Act meaningless because theState would be prohibited from charging a minor under the Codewith a violation of a statute that is applicable only to minors. We disagree. While the State could not bring criminal chargesagainst a minor for violating curfew, it could bring a petitionagainst such a minor under the Juvenile Act alleging a violationof the Curfew Act (see 705 ILCS 405/5--120, 5--520 (West 2002)). The primary difference would be that the sentencing provisionsapplicable to section 1(a) of the Curfew Act (imposition of finesfor juveniles) would not apply. The Juvenile Act provides forrehabilitative civil remedies, such as juvenile probation ordetention (see 705 ILCS 405/5--101, 5--710 (West 2002)), ratherthan criminal punishments under the Code, such as imprisonment ora fine (see 730 ILCS 5/5--1--1 et seq. (West 2002)). Nevertheless, fines could be imposed under the Curfew Act if thecase was transferred from juvenile court to criminal court at theminor's request (see 705 ILCS 405/5--130(9) (West 2002)) or onthe State's motion (see 705 ILCS 405/5--805(3) (West 2002)). Therefore, Public Act 90--590 has not rendered the Curfew Actmeaningless. We find, therefore, that the trial court properlydismissed the charges brought against the minor defendants.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuitcourt is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOLDRIDGE, P.J., and McDADE, J., concur.

1. Although both sections 5--120 and 5--125 employ the term"jurisdiction," our supreme court has held that since juvenilecourt is merely a division of a single unified circuit court, itis the circuit court as a whole which is vested withjurisdiction. The issue of whether a person is tried in juvenileor criminal court is a matter of procedure rather thanjurisdiction. See People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 582 N.E.2d700 (1991); People v. DeJesus, 127 Ill. 2d 486, 537 N.E.2d 800(1989). While perhaps relevant in some other context, thedistinction between jurisdiction and procedure does not affectour analysis.