JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the Court:

Defendant, Kevin Braman, was charged by indictment with theClass 4 felony of aggravated driving under the influence ofalcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1)(West 1998)(Vehicle Code). In the indictment, it was alleged that the defendant had twoprior DUI violations. Thereafter, a jury found him guilty of theoffense tried; however, the fact of the defendant's two prior DUIconvictions was not submitted to the jury. At the sentencinghearing, the State offered the defendant's two prior DUIviolations into evidence, which under section 501(d)(1)(A) of theVehicle Code, enhanced the offense from a Class A misdemeanor toa Class 4 felony (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(A)). The court thensentenced the defendant to two years of probation and six monthsof work release.

The defendant appeals, arguing that (1) his conviction forfelony DUI must be reduced to misdemeanor DUI because the Statepresented no evidence to the jury that he had two prior DUIviolations, and (2) section 501(d)(1)(A) of the Code isunconstitutional pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.466, 490 (2000). We affirm.

The indictment against the defendant alleged that on January14, 1998, the defendant drove a vehicle while he had a bloodalcohol concentration of .08 or greater, and he had at least twoprior DUI violations. By alleging the defendant had at least twoprior DUI violations, the State placed the defendant on noticethat, if convicted, he was eligible to be sentenced as a Class 4felon for the charged offense. 625 ILCS 5/11-501 (d)(1)(A)(West1998).

At trial, the State presented evidence to the jury that atapproximately 7:40 p.m. on January 14, 1998, an East Peoriapolice officer was dispatched to the scene of a car accidentinvolving a Honda and a Ford Bronco. The officer testified thathe observed the defendant sitting in the driver's seat of theBronco. When the officer approached the defendant, he noticedthat the defendant's eyes were red, his speech slurred, and hesmelled of alcohol.

Further testimony at trial established that the defendantwas transported by ambulance to a nearby hospital. There, anurse conducted two blood draws on the defendant, one authorizedby the officer and the other for the defendant's medicalevaluation. The draws yielded blood-alcohol concentrations of.169 and .18 respectively.

The driver of the Honda testified that he was driving onMeadows Avenue in East Peoria at approximately 7:30 p.m. onJanuary 14, 1998, when a car traveling the opposite directioncrossed over the center line and collided with his car. Thedriver further testified that he was driving in the correct laneand had his headlights on at the time.

A passenger in the defendant's car testified that she andthe defendant had been drinking alcohol in a bar on January 14,1998. At approximately 7:30 p.m., they left the bar in thedefendant's Bronco. The defendant was driving. She nextrecalled awakening inside a police car at the accident scene. She testified that she spoke to the defendant a few daysfollowing the accident, and he explained that a car driving inthe opposite direction with its headlights off had crossed overthe center line and collided with his car.

After the close of evidence and arguments, the trial courtinstructed the jury that it needed to find the followingpropositions beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain the charge ofdriving under the influence of alcohol: (1) that the defendantdrove a vehicle; and (2) that at the time the defendant drove thevehicle, the alcohol concentration in his blood was .08 per centor greater. The jury returned a guilty verdict.

At the sentencing hearing, the State offered defendant's twoprior DUI violations into evidence for the purpose of enhancingthe offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. Thetrial court then sentenced defendant to two years probation andsix months of work release. The defendant appealed hisconviction and sentence to this court.

The defendant contends on appeal that his conviction foraggravated DUI should be reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor.The defendant argues that the State had to present evidence tothe jury that he had two prior DUI violations, and that the Statefailed to do so. He argues that the fact that he had two priorDUI violations is an element of the charged offense. Thus, heasks this court to reduce his conviction for aggravated DUI tomisdemeanor DUI and remand the cause for resentencing within therange for a Class A misdemeanor.

Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides, inpertinent part:

"(a) A person shall not drive *** any vehicle withinthis State while:

(1) the alcohol concentration in the person's blood orbreath is 0.08 or more ***;

(2) under the influence of alcohol;

* * *

(d)(1) Every person convicted of committing a violationof this Section shall be guilty of aggravated driving underthe influence of alcohol *** if:

* * *

(A) the person committed a violation of thisSection, or a similar provision of a law of another state ora local ordinance when the cause of action is the same as orsubstantially similar to this Section, for the third orsubsequent time[.]" 625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 1998).

The present issue involves interpretation of the DUIstatute. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is toascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997);Nottage v. Jeka,172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). Since the language used by thelegislature is the best indication of legislative intent, courtslook first to the words of the statute. Nottage, 172 Ill. 2d at392. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous,courts will not read in exceptions, limitations, or otherconditions. People v. Daniels, 172 Ill. 2d 154, 163 (1996).Moreover, criminal or penal statutes are to be strictly construedin favor of an accused, and nothing should be taken by intendmentor implication beyond the obvious or literal meaning of thestatute. People v. Shinkle, 128 Ill. 2d 480, 486 (1989).

We find this court's previous holding in People v. Lambert,249 Ill. App. 3d 726 (1993), to be dispositive. In Lambert, thedefendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcoholand he appealed. He argued that the indictment had failed togive him sufficient notice of the People's intent to use hisprior DUI convictions to establish that he had committed a Class4 felony. Lambert argued that the indictment was defectivebecause it did not set out the date or location for the prior DUIoffenses. This court held that the indictment was sufficient andaffirmed Lambert's conviction as a Class 4 felony. In rejectingLambert's argument, this court stated:

"* * * We note that the indictment's failureto list the location and dates of the priorDUI offenses did not impair the defendant'spreparation of his defense since the elementsof a Class 4 felony DUI are the same as aClass A misdemeanor DUI. [Citationsomitted.] Here, the prior offenses are notelements of a DUI charge and are used solelyfor sentencing purposes after the defendantis found guilty of DUI. As such, since theprior DUI offenses were irrelevant to histrial preparation, the defendant cannot claimhe was prejudiced by the State's failure toinclude detailed information in theindictment regarding the prior convictions." Lambert, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 728.

As the language of section 11-501(d)(1)(A) makes clear, anenhanced penalty is available when a person commits somemisdemeanor DUI, in violation of paragraph (a), and theaggravating circumstance of two prior DUI convictions arepresent. People v. Lavallier, 187 Ill. 2d 464, 469 (1999).

After careful review of the statute, we find that theaggravated DUI terminology used in the DUI statute simply refersto an aggravated or enhanced sentence for a third or subsequentDUI. Section 501(d)(1)(A) of the Vehicle Code is clearly arecidivist sentencing statute for repeat DUI offenders.

Having found that section 501(d)(1)(A) is a sentenceenhancing provision, we must determine whether the fact ofdefendant's prior DUI violations must be presented to the jury. In other words, is the enhancement provision of section501(d)(1)(A) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/501(d)(1)(A)(West1998)), under which the defendant was sentenced as a Class 4felon, unconstitutional under Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490? We findno constitutional violation.

The issue presented in Apprendi was whether the due processclause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that a factualdetermination authorizing an increase in the maximum prisonsentence for an offense must be made by a jury on the basis ofproof beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2351. The Apprendi court also stated that, "[o]ther than the fact of aprior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crimebeyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to ajury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. 2362-63. Apprendi is not violated when a defendant issentenced to an extended-term sentence based upon priorconvictions. People v. Dillard, 319 Ill. App. 3d 102 (2001).

Here, we find no constitutional violation.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Tazewell County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOMER and SLATER, JJ., concur.