No. 3--01--0073

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2002

JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, William Brooks, pled guilty to first degreemurder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9--1(a)) and wassentenced to natural life in prison. He appeals from thedismissal of his second postconviction petition, arguing that hissentence violates the constitutional rule set forth in Apprendiv. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348(2000). We find that the defendant's term of life in prison wasconstitutionally imposed and affirm his sentence.

On July 17, 1991, the defendant pled guilty to one count offirst degree murder. At the plea hearing, the trial court fullyexplained the nature of the charge. It advised the defendantthat at trial the State would be required to prove beyond areasonable doubt that "on or about February 16, 1991, you withoutlawful justification, while committing the forcible felonyoffense of Robbery, stabbed Rosine Saylor with a knife," causingher death. The court further informed the defendant that itcould impose a term of natural life imprisonment without paroleif the proper factors were found to exist. The defendantresponded that he understood the charge and the possiblesentence.

The State presented the factual basis for the defendant'splea. The victim's neighbor and his wife would testify that theyfound the victim early in the morning on Sunday, February 17. She was lying naked on her kitchen floor in a pool of blood. Alarge kitchen knife stained with blood was sitting on a nearbycounter. The victim's purse was open and its contents had beendumped onto the kitchen table. An officer would testify thatduring his interview of the defendant, the defendant admittedthat he knew the victim. He stopped at her house late in theevening of February 16 and asked if he could use her telephone. The defendant had done yard work for the victim in the past. Thevictim recognized him and quickly let him enter the home. Onceinside, the defendant struck the victim, took $140 from her purseand stabbed her several times with a knife he found in thevictim's kitchen. The defendant admitted that once he took themoney, he decided to kill the victim.

The State concluded that the evidence would prove beyond areasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offenses ofrobbery and murder. The defendant agreed that the evidencepresented by the State would be substantially as stated. Thecourt determined that there was a factual basis for thedefendant's plea and scheduled the cause for sentencing.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that thedefendant qualified for a term of natural life because the crimewas exceptionally brutal and heinous and it was committed in thecourse of another felony. The court noted that no mitigatingfactors applied and sentenced the defendant to natural life undersection 5--8--1(a)(1)(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections(Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005--8--1(a)(1)(b)).

The defendant's direct appeal was dismissed for failure toprosecute. He subsequently filed a postconviction petition onSeptember 23, 1991. Counsel was appointed, but the petition waseventually dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.

On January 2, 2001, the defendant filed a secondpostconviction petition, claiming that his sentence wasunconstitutional in light of the recent United States SupremeCourt decision in Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120S. Ct. 2348. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimelyand without merit.

On appeal, the defendant claims that his natural lifesentence is unconstitutional and should be vacated because itviolates the rule set forth in Apprendi. The State responds thatthe trial court properly dismissed the defendant's secondpetition because it was untimely and successive. In thealternative, the State claims that Apprendi should not be appliedretroactively to the defendant's collateral proceeding. Becausewe find that the defendant's rights were not violated under Apprendi, we need not address the concerns raised by the State.

In Apprendi, the defendant, Charles Apprendi, fired severalbullets into the home of a new neighbor who allegedly did not fitApprendi's racial criteria. The State of New Jersey charged himwith numerous offenses, but none of them included allegations ofracial motivation. Apprendi pled guilty to possession of afirearm for an unlawful purpose, an offense which provided a 10-year maximum term of imprisonment. Under an entirely separateNew Jersey law, a defendant could be sentenced to an enhancedterm if the crime for which he was convicted was raciallymotivated. At sentencing, the trial court found that Apprendi'sactions were motivated by racial bias and sentenced him to a termgreater than 10 years. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d435, 120 S. Ct. 2348.

The Supreme Court held that the defendant's constitutionalguarantee of due process had been denied and struck down thehate-crime enhancement statute. In so doing, the Court handeddown a constitutional rule that any fact, other than a priorconviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond theprescribed statutory maximum must be proven to a jury beyond areasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120S. Ct. 2348. The Court rejected the notion that the length ofApprendi's sentence itself was unconstitutional, but adopted theposition that a defendant has a right to a have a jury decidewhether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the factorthat resulted in the longer sentence. The defendant's primaryargument on appeal is that the brutal and heinous nature of thecrime was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore Apprendi should control. However, unlikeApprendi, the trialcourt did not sentence the defendant based solely on a factorthat was not alleged in the indictment or proven to a jury beyonda reasonable doubt. First degree murder while committing theforcible felony of robbery was plainly charged in the indictment. Before accepting the defendant's plea, the trial court informedthe defendant of the possibility of a sentence of natural lifefor the crime to which he pled. Further, the State presentedevidence of the crime in open court, and the trial court foundthat there was an adequate factual basis for the plea. Thatevidence included potential testimony that the defendantcommitted a robbery during the course of the murder and that heintended to kill the victim. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38,pars. 9--1(b)(6); 1005--8--1(a)(1)(b). Thus, the defendant wasclearly aware of one of the factors that led to his life sentencewhen he entered his plea of guilty.

Based on our review of the indictment and the pleaproceeding, we find that the defendant's guilty plea was aknowing admission of guilt of the criminal acts charged and allthe material facts alleged. See People v. Rhoades, 323 Ill. App.3d 644, 753 N.E.2d 537 (2001). He was admonished as to thepossibility of a life sentence and chose to enter a plea ofguilty. Having waived his right to a trial on this issue, hecannot now claim that he was unfairly deprived of his right tohave the State prove the aggravating factor beyond a reasonabledoubt. See People v. Chandler, 321 Ill. App. 3d 292, 748 N.E.2d685 (2001).⁽¹⁾

In sum, we find that the defendant was sentenced accordingto the statute for the offense to which he knowingly pled guilty. Accordingly, his constitutional rights were not violated under Apprendi. The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

HOLDRIDGE and HOMER, J.J., concur.

1. The appeal in Apprendi also followed a guilty plea. However, Apprendi expressly reserved the right to challenge theconstitutionality of the sentence-enhancement scheme. Further,the indictment did not allege that the crime was raciallymotivated. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct.2348. Thus, Apprendi's plea of guilty did not waive his right toa jury trial on the sentencing issue.