People v. Hackett

SUPREME COURT CASES

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People v. Hackett

State: Illinois

Court: 3rd District Appellate

Docket No: 3-09-0396 Rel

Case Date: 12/21/2010

Preview:No. 3-09-0396 Opinion filed December 21, 2010. ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2010 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of the ) Twelfth Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 08-CF-2005 ) DENNIS A. HACKETT, ) The Honorable ) Carla Alessio Policandriotes, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice O'Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Schmidt dissented, with opinion.

OPINION The State charged defendant, Dennis A. Hackett, with aggravated driving under the influence and aggravated driving while license revoked. The circuit court of Will County granted defendant's motion to quash arrest and to suppress evidence on the grounds police lacked probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle. For the following reasons, we affirm. BACKGROUND At the hearing on defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, Deputy Michael Blouin of the Will County sheriff's police testified that he was driving his unmarked

police vehicle northbound on Briggs Street near Maple in Will County when he observed defendant's vehicle traveling north on Briggs directly in front of him. Blouin described Briggs as a straight, four-lane roadway with two lanes of northbound traffic and two lanes of southbound traffic. The north and south lanes are marked by a divider and the two northbound lanes of traffic are divided by black and white stripes. Blouin first observed defendant's vehicle in the right-hand northbound lane of traffic. Defendant crossed into the left-hand northbound lane and Blouin maneuvered his vehicle to follow behind defendant. Blouin testified that after entering the left-hand northbound lane, he observed defendant's vehicle move to the right. Blouin testified that defendant's vehicle's right-side tires crossed the black-and-white-striped lane divider between the two northbound lanes of traffic on Briggs. Defendant's vehicle then moved back into the left-hand lane. Blouin testified that five seconds later, defendant's right-side tires again crossed the black-and-white-striped lane divider. Blouin could not recall how far defendant's vehicle crossed into the right-hand lane of northbound traffic on Briggs. Blouin stated that defendant's tires "slightly" crossed the lane divider. Blouin testified that both times, defendant's vehicle "barely" went over the black-and-white-striped lane divider and that both times, defendant's tires crossed the line for a matter of seconds. Based on his observations of defendant's vehicle crossing the lane divider between the two northbound lanes of traffic on Briggs, Deputy Blouin decided to stop defendant's vehicle for a traffic violation. Blouin testified that he did not stop defendant's vehicle after the first time he observed defendant's vehicle cross the lane divider but that he did decide to stop defendant after defendant "swerved a second time" because, in his opinion, if a vehicle "swerves" twice there is usually a problem with the driving. Blouin did not, however, stop defendant immediately after he -2-

"swerved a second time." Rather, he followed him. While Blouin did not specifically recall Hackett's turn indicators flashing or his stopping for lights, he testified that had he seen violations, he would have ticketed defendant for them. Thus the evidence supports finding that after defendant's two momentary swerves Blouin continued to follow him while defendant, without committing any traffic violation, negotiated (1) the move into the left turn lane, (2) two left turns, and (3) compliance with the laws concerning lane usage, speed limit, turn signals, and traffic signals. ANALYSIS Following the hearing on the motion, the trial court granted defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. "On appeal, a trial court's factual findings concerning a motion to suppress will be upheld unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. [Citation.] The ultimate decision, however, concerning whether the evidence should have been suppressed is a question of law, which we review de novo. [Citation.] A peace officer may conduct a lawful traffic stop based on probable cause that the driver of the vehicle has committed a traffic violation. [Citation.]" People v. Matous, 381 Ill. App. 3d 918, 92122 (2008), citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). The State argues that Blouin had probable cause to believe that defendant violated section 11-709(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-709(a) (West 2006)). -3-

"Whenever any roadway has been divided into 2 or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply. (a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety." 625 ILCS 5/11-709(a) (West 2006). Defendant argues, based on his testimony, that in the area he was driving, Briggs is in poor condition and that he may have been taking evasive action to avoid potholes. The State argues that Blouin testified that he did not see any potholes or obstructions that would cause a driver to deviate from a lane of traffic. The State argues that absent obstructions that would cause a driver to deviate from a lane of traffic, an officer's observation of a vehicle crossing the lane divider provides the officer with grounds for a traffic stop based on a violation of section 11709(a). In People v. Halsall, 178 Ill. App. 3d 617, 618 (1989), the officer testified that he observed the defendant's vehicle traveling on the left-hand side of the road. The car slowly drifted into the right lane. The defendant in that case drove his vehicle once across the center line and, after increasing his speed to an estimated 70 miles per hour, crossed the center line two more times. The testimony in that case was that when the defendant crossed the center line, approximately one-half of his car was over the line. Halsall, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 618. This court found that there was no evidence that when the defendant in Halsall moved outside of his lane he endangered himself, pedestrians, or other vehicles. Based on that finding, -4-

this court held that "the State failed to prove that when the defendant moved outside of his lane he did so without first determining that the movement could be made safely" (Halsall, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 619) and reversed the judgment of conviction for improper lane usage (Halsall, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 620). See also People v. Albright, 251 Ill. App. 3d 341, 343 (1993) ("This court has held that improper lane usage does not occur unless the defendant endangers himself, pedestrians, or other vehicles when he moves out of his lane of traffic"). The driving in both Halsall and Albright was potentially more dangerous than defendant's driving in the case before us now. Blouin provided no testimony concerning other vehicles or pedestrians on Briggs at the time he observed defendant's driving. Blouin could not testify how far defendant's tires crossed the dividing line. By contrast, in Albright, the defendant crossed the line on the right side by at least a tire width on three separate occasions. Albright, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 342. Even were we to assume the presence of vehicles or pedestrians, Blouin admitted that defendant's encroachment into another lane of traffic was slight and brief, lasting a total of mere seconds. Thus, under Halsall and Albright, we would affirm the trial court's judgment that Blouin did not have probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a traffic violation and affirm the order granting defendant's motion to quash arrest. The questions we are confronted with are (1) whether our decisions in those cases remain valid following the supreme court's decision in People v. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 289, 297 (1996), and (2) whether Smith requires reversal of the trial court in the instant case. In Smith, the defendant was observed by a police officer leaving a tavern, getting in his car and driving away. The officer, suspecting impairment, followed defendant as he drove on a fourlane, two-way street with a fifth lane in the center northbound and southbound for turning. The -5-

officer observed the driver's side wheels of the defendant's car cross over the lane line dividing the left lane from the center turn lane by at least six inches and remain over the lane line for approximately 100 to 150 yards--the length of 1 to 1 1/2 football fields. A short time later, the defendant crossed over the lane line dividing the left lane from the right lane by approximately six inches for 150 to 200 yards. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at 293. Thus, the defendant in Smith was driving significant distances in all three lanes of traffic

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