JUSTICE SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Michael L. Keegan was arrested for driving underthe influence of alcohol (DUI). One hundred and three dayslater, he filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension ofhis driving privileges. Following a hearing, the trial courtgranted the petition on its merits. The State then moved toreconsider on the ground that the trial court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction because the petition was untimely. The courtgranted the State's motion and vacated the rescission order. Defendant appeals, arguing that the 90-day period for filing apetition to rescind under section 2--118.1 of the IllinoisVehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/2--118.1 (West 2000)) is notjurisdictional and was waived by the State's failure to raise theissue prior to the hearing on defendant's petition. We reverse.

The record shows that defendant was arrested and chargedwith DUI on August 17, 2001. His petition to rescind thestatutory summary suspension of his driving privileges was filedin the circuit court on November 28. Following a hearing, thetrial court granted the petition on the ground that the evidencedid not show that there was probable cause to arrest defendantfor driving under the influence of alcohol.

The State moved to reconsider based on defendant's failureto file his petition to rescind within 90 days of receivingnotice of the summary suspension (625 ILCS 5/2--118.1 (West2000)). The circuit court, reasoning that section 2--118.1 was"analogous" to an administrative review proceeding, ruled thatthe lack of a timely petition deprived the court of subjectmatter jurisdiction. See Fredman Brothers Furniture Co., Inc. v.Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 486 N.E.2d 893 (1985). Accordingly, the court granted the State's motion and vacated itsorder rescinding the summary suspension of defendant's drivingprivileges.

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court's analogyto administrative review proceedings was in error. He contendsthat the filing period in section 2--118.1 is an ordinary statuteof limitations that should be considered as an affirmativedefense, which the State waived by failing to assert it prior tothe hearing on the merits of his petition.

Ordinary statutes of limitation present procedural bars thatmay be asserted as an affirmative defense or waived. See Peoplev. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 723 N.E.2d 230 (1999). Fairnessdictates that affirmative defenses that are neither pled norargued at a hearing on the merits may not be raised later in amotion to reconsider. Harmon Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Thorson,226 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 590 N.E.2d 920 (1992).

By contrast, time limitations contained in statutes whichconfer subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court based onthe timely filing of a pleading pose jurisdictional bars whichcannot be waived. Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 592 N.E.2d 977(1992). If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because acause is not filed within a jurisdictional time limitation, thecourt's judgment may be attacked at any time as a void judgment. Eckel v. MacNeal, 256 Ill. App. 3d 292, 628 N.E.2d 741 (1993).

The question before us is whether failure to comply with the90-day period for filing a request for a hearing under section 2--118.1 is a jurisdictional bar or a procedural defect that may bewaived. This is apparently a question of first impression;however, our supreme court, considering a four-year limitationperiod under the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/14(West 2000)), recently provided guidance to resolve the issue.

In Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334-35, 770 N.E.2d 177, 184 (2002), thecourt stated:

"'[S]ubject matter jurisdiction' refersto the power of a court to hear and determinecases of the general class to which theproceeding in question belongs. [Citations.] With the exception of the circuit court'spower to review administrative action, whichis conferred by statute, a circuit court'ssubject matter jurisdiction is conferredentirely by our state constitution. [Citations.] Under section 9 of article VI,that jurisdiction extends to all 'justiciablematters.' Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,