FACTS

On September 4, 2003, Kline was charged with unlawful possession with intent to delivercannabis on school grounds pursuant to 720 ILCS 550/5.2(d) (West 2003). On September 25, 2004,Kline filed a motion to suppress evidence on the basis that the evidence obtained was a result of anunlawful seizure by Officer Michael Sottos of the Moline Police Department and Dean Thomas ofMoline High School.

During the evidentiary hearing on Kline's motion, the parties stipulated to the following facts. That on September 2, 2003, at approximately 2:10 p.m., Officer Sottos received a tip from CrimeStoppers regarding alleged cannabis possession at Moline High School. The anonymous tip statedthat Kline was in possession of approximately one-half an ounce of cannabis, and he was carrying thecannabis in his left front pants pocket. The tip additionally stated that the cannabis was viewed justprior to the tip's receipt by Crime Stoppers. Officer Sottos relayed this information to Dean Thomas,the Dean of Students at Moline High School. Both the dean and Officer Sottos proceeded to Kline'sclassroom and instructed Kline to "come with" them. (The facts do not state whether Officer Sottoswas in uniform at this time.) Kline was taken to the closest office, where the dean told Kline thesubstance of the Crime Stoppers tip. Kline denied having possession of the cannabis and stated, "Youcan search me."

Following the evidentiary hearing, the court found that a seizure occurred when Kline wasretrieved from his classroom by the dean and Officer Sottos and taken to another office. The courtfurther found that the dean required reasonable suspicion in order to remove Kline from his classroomfor questioning. Lastly, the court found that the anonymous Crime Stoppers tip, which wasuncorroborated by both the dean and Officer Sottos, lacked the requisite indica of reliability thatwould provide reasonable suspicion to seize Kline from his classroom. Accordingly, the trial courtgranted Kline's motion to suppress. The People filed this timely interlocutory appeal.

ANALYSIS

The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting Kline's motion tosuppress. This court will accord great deference to the trial court's factual findings, and will reversethose findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence; however, we will reviewde novo the trial court's ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425,431, 752 N.E. 2d 1078, 1083 (2001).

The People argue that the trial court's ruling is incorrect for several reasons. First, the Peoplecontend that the trial court incorrectly found that Kline was seized when the dean and Officer Sottosremoved Kline from his classroom and escorted him to a separate office for questioning. Second, thePeople allege that the trial court erroneously applied the reasonable suspicion standard whenanalyzing the legality of the seizure. Lastly, the People argue that even if this court finds that areasonable suspicion standard applies under these facts, this standard was met based upon theanonymous tip received by Crime Stoppers.

We begin by addressing the People's first argument. The People contend that a schooladministrator, such as the dean in the instant case, should be able to remove a student from aclassroom for questioning regarding an alleged school violation without such a removal constitutinga seizure for purposes of the fourth amendment. The People argue that because Kline's removal wasprimarily carried out by the dean, rather than Officer Sottos, this removal was merely a disciplinaryproceeding and not a seizure.

The fundamental purpose of the fourth amendment is to safeguard the privacy and securityof individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d 195,201, 661 N.E. 2d 310, 315 (1996). The fourth amendment, through the due process clause of thefourteenth amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers. New Jerseyv. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334, 105 S. Ct. 733, 738, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1984); Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2dat 202, 661 N.E. 2d at 315. The United States Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.325, 334, 105 S. Ct. 733, 738, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1984), held that the fourth amendment prohibitionon unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials. Aperson is seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment when, by a show of authority or the useof physical force, his or her freedom of movement is restrained. United States v. Mendenhall, 446U.S. 544, 553, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980); People v. Parker, 284 Ill. App. 3d860, 862, 672 N.E. 2d 813, 815 (1996). A seizure occurs "whenever a police officer accosts anindividual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868,20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968).

In the instant case, the facts readily indicate that Kline was seized within the meaning of thefourth amendment. Both the dean and Officer Sottos entered the classroom where Kline was locatedand told Kline to come with them. This retrieval displays a clear show of authority by both the deanand Officer Sottos over Kline. Kline was then escorted to a nearby vacant office, where he wasfurther questioned by the dean. During this encounter, Kline's freedom of movement was certainlyrestrained.

However, the People stress that a different result should follow because Kline's removal fromthe classroom was primarily carried out by the dean and not Officer Sottos. We first note that it isunclear from the facts adduced at the evidentiary hearing what level of involvement Officer Sottos had. It is not known whether the officer actively participated in Kline's removal, or even if the officerwas in uniform at the time. Yet even assuming Officer Sottos played no role in Kline's removal, thefourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to public schoolofficials even when those officials are acting alone and on their own authority. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at341 n. 7, 105 S. Ct. at 743 n. 7, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720; Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d at 206, 661 N.E. 2d at 316-17. The T.L.O. decision did not make the application of the fourth amendment to school officialsdependent upon the presence of a police officer. Therefore, even if the dean acted independentlywhen he removed Kline from the classroom, the dean, as a public school official, was still requiredto conform his actions within the limits of the fourth amendment. Accordingly, the trial courtcorrectly found that the removal of Kline by the dean and Officer Sottos constituted a seizure withinthe meaning of the fourth amendment.

We now address the People's argument regarding the proper standard to be applied whenanalyzing the legality of Kline's seizure. The People contend that in Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton,515 U.S. 646, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1995), the United States Supreme Court loosenedthe reasonable suspicion requirement for school officials under the fourth amendment. The Peopleargue that the dean of students, like the school officials in Vernonia, should be given wider latitudein order to maintain discipline and order in the high school, and his actions should be upheld as one"a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake." 515 U.S. at 665, 115 S. Ct. at 2396-97, 132 L.Ed. 2d 564.

While the Supreme Court's holding in Vernonia does provide an expansion of the T.L.O.decision, the basic rationale from T.L.O. has not been overruled in the process. In T.L.O., theSupreme Court noted that a student has a legitimate expectation of privacy both in his person and inthe personal possessions he carries. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-40, 105 S. Ct. at 740-42, 83 L. Ed. 2d720. School officials, when carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions in furtherance ofschool policies, cannot claim a parent's immunity from the restrictions of the fourth amendment. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-37, 105 S. Ct. at 740, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720. However, because the school hasa legitimate need to maintain an environment conducive to learning, the Court recognized that aschool setting requires some "easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities areordinarily subject." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720. Therefore, theCourt held that school officials do not need a warrant before searching a student and the legality ofsuch a search is based upon reasonableness, rather than probable cause. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42,105 S. Ct. at 742-43, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720.

Subsequently in Vernonia, the Court considered whether a high school policy that authorizedrandom urinalysis drug testing of students who participated in school athletic programs wasconstitutional under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 515 U.S. at 646, 115 S. Ct. at 2387, 132L. Ed. 2d 564. The Court first considered the nature of the students' privacy interest at issue, notingthat public school officials are subject to constitutional constraints. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-55,115 S. Ct. at 2391-92, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564. The Court concluded that student athletes have aparticularly lesser expectation of privacy with regards to medical examinations and procedures andcompliance with rules of conduct as established for a given sport. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656-57, 115S. Ct. at 2392-93, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564. The Court additionally found that the school's interest indeterring drug use was important enough to justify the relatively unobtrusive testing, specifying thatathletes are more at risk to suffer immediate harm as a result of drug consumption and, further, thatathletes as "role models" may influence drug use among the student population. Vernonia, 515 U.S.at 661-64, 115 S. Ct. at 2394-96, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564.

In conclusion, the Court held that the school's drug policy was reasonable under thecircumstances, and therefore constitutional. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65, 115 S. Ct. at 2396, 132L. Ed. 2d 564. The Court cautioned, however, "against the assumption that suspicionless drugtesting will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts." Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665, 115 S.Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564. The Court noted that the most significant element taken intoconsideration was that the drug testing policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government'sresponsibilities as guardian and tutor of the children entrusted to its care. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665,115 S. Ct. at 2397, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564. The Court further stated that "when the government acts asguardian and tutor the relevant question is whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian andtutor might undertake." Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665, 115 S. Ct. at 2397, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564.

The People's argument in the instant case interprets this last element of the Court's decision,that the drug testing policy was a search "that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake," inisolation from the remainder of the Vernonia opinion. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665, 115 S. Ct. at 2397,132 L. Ed. 2d 564. First, nothing in Vernonia purports to overrule the Court's holding in T.L.O.. Therefore, the People's contention that the reasonable suspicion standard no longer applies toseizures conducted by school officials is unsupported. Second, the Court made clear that its holdingwas based upon a specific combination of factors, which included the lesser expectation of privacyof student athletes and the unobtrusiveness of the particular method of drug testing. Vernonia, 515U.S. 664-65, 115 S. Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564. In the instant case, Kline did not have any lesserexpectation of privacy than any other student in his classroom. Vernonia offers no justification forthe search or seizure of any student by a school official, without that official having reasonablesuspicion to do so. Rather, Vernonia involved particularized testing of a subsection of students,specifically voluntary participants in school athletic programs. Because Kline's seizure isdistinguishable from the specific drug testing policy at issue in Vernonia, we see no reason to adopta lesser standard than reasonable suspicion when analyzing the legality of Kline's seizure.

Because we find that the trial court properly applied the reasonable suspicion standard, wenow turn to the People's final argument. The People contend that the reasonable suspicion standardwas met in this case based upon the anonymous tip received by Crime Stoppers. The People arguethat it was unnecessary for the dean or Officer Sottos to corroborate the anonymous tip because anycorroboration would have elevated the reasonable suspicion standard to probable cause.

A reasonable suspicion is the "sort of common sense conclusion about human behavior uponwhich practical people - including government officials - are entitled to rely, rather than an inchoateand unparticularized suspicion or hunch." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346, 105 S. Ct. at 745, 83 L. Ed. 2d720; Parker, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 672 N.E. 2d at 817. Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause,is dependent upon both the content of information possessed and its degree of reliability. Alabamav. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301(1990). Both factors, qualityand quantity, are considered in the totality of the circumstances when evaluating whether there isreasonable suspicion. White, 296 U.S. at 330, 110 S. Ct. at 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301. Therequirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty; sufficient probabilityis the touchstone of reasonableness under the fourth amendment. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346, 105 S.Ct. at 745, 83 L.Ed. 2d 720; Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d at 215, 661 N.E. 2d at 320-21.

Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be heldresponsible if his or her allegations turn out to be fabricated, "an anonymous tip alone seldomdemonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity." Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270,120 S. Ct. 1375, 1378, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000), quoting White, 296 U.S. at 329, 110 S. Ct. at2415-16, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301. However, an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, may providereasonable suspicion to justify a seizure, so long as the information exhibits some indicia of reliability. J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 120 S. Ct. at 1378, 146 L. Ed. 254, quoting White, 496 U.S. at 329-31, 110S. Ct. at 2415-16, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301. In determining whether the substance of a tip, standing alone,may provide reasonable suspicion, courts will consider the detail of the tip, whether the tip establishedthe informant's basis of knowledge, whether the informant indicated he or she witnessed any criminalactivity, and whether the tip accurately predicts future activity of the suspect. See People v. Yarber,279 Ill. App. 3d 519, 529, 663 N.E. 2d 1131, 1137 (1996).

In the instant case, the anonymous tip received by Crime Stoppers stated that Kline was inpossession of approximately one-half an ounce of cannabis, he was carrying the cannabis in his leftfront pants pocket, and the cannabis was viewed just prior to giving the tip. Although the informantdid indicate that he or she witnessed the criminal activity at issue, he or she provided no otherinformation that exhibits any indicia of reliability. We disagree with the People's contention that theanonymous tipster must have been a student or member of the faculty at Moline High School becausethe call was received during school hours. On its face, the tip provides no additional specific detailthat would readily indicate its veracity to either the dean or Officer Sottos. The general allegationthat Kline had cannabis in one of his pockets could have easily been made by anyone. Simply becausethe information about the drugs turned out to be correct does not mean that it provided the dean andOfficer Sottos with a reasonable basis for suspecting Kline of unlawful conduct. See People v.Sparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d, 786, 794-95, 734 N.E. 2d 216, 223 (2000).

The anonymous Crime Stoppers tip further provided no details of criminal activity that eitherthe dean or Officer Sottos were able to corroborate prior to removing Kline from his classroom. SeeSparks, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 795, 734 N.E. 2d at 223. They did not observe any bulge in Kline's frontpants pocket, where the tip alleged the cannabis was placed. Additionally, Kline was not acting inany suspicious manner prior to being seized. Rather, Kline was in class, exactly where he wassupposed to be at that time of day. Therefore, under these facts, we find that the information in theanonymous tip did not exhibit any sufficient indicia of reliability to give rise to the reasonablesuspicion necessary to justify Kline's seizure.

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order granting Kline's motion to suppress isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

MCDADE, J. concurring and SLATER, J. specially concurring.

My point is that "reasonableness," for purposes of the fourth amendment and TLO, must varyaccording to the intrusiveness of the challenged action. A search of a student's belongings, beingfairly intrusive, requires something approaching reasonable suspicion. See People v. Dilworth, 169Ill. 2d 195, 661 N.E.2d 310 (1996) (equating TLO "reasonableness" standard with reasonablesuspicion). A much less intrusive Terry type seizure, on the other hand, would require significantlyless justification. I believe the tip in this case, although anonymous, was sufficiently detailed towarrant such an investigation by school officials. However, because of the police officer'sinvolvement in this case, reasonable suspicion was required. Based on Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,146 L. Ed. 2d 254, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000), I agree that standard was not met. I therefore concur.