David Laake underwent a statutory summary suspension of hisdriver's license in connection with a DUI arrest. He filedmotions to quash his arrest and rescind the summary suspension. The circuit judge conducted a hearing and denied both motions (aswell as Laake's motion to reconsider). Laake then filed thisappeal, claiming the motions should have been granted because thearresting officer obtained the State's DUI evidence through anunreasonable seizure. He has consolidated an appeal from his DUIconviction. We affirm.

The evidence from the hearing on Laake's motions iscontained in an agreed statement of facts. Deputy Tim Chastain,from the Rock Island County Sheriff's Department, was the onlywitness to testify at the hearing.

Chastain testified that on December 17, 2002, atapproximately 3 a.m., he received a report from police dispatchof a possible intoxicated driver heading south on Route 150 fromRoute 6. The motorist who had called to make the reportidentified the suspect vehicle as a dark-colored passenger car,possibly a Chevrolet Celebrity (although the motorist was notpositive about the make and model). When Chastain received thereport from police dispatch, he was located near Route 150 andthe Henry County line. Thus he headed northbound on Route 150and checked all the way to Route 6. He did not see any vehiclesin that area. Then he checked 104th Street south of Route 150and observed a dark green Saturn vehicle stopped on the shoulderof the southbound lane with its brake lights on. He located thevehicle at approximately 3:16 a.m.

Chastain pulled in behind the vehicle, stopped his squadcar, and activated the car's overhead emergency lights. Hetestified that his purpose in stopping behind the Saturn was tocheck on the welfare of its driver. He acknowledged that thedriver would have been able to see the flashing emergency lights,and that he (Chastain) activated the lights as a precaution toalert other motorists of his squad car. The area was isolatedand not well lighted. The area was also near a curve, althoughit was not in the curve's immediate proximity. In addition tooverhead emergency lights, Chastain's squad car was equipped withflashing hazard or warning lights.

Chastain approached the Saturn and identified the driver asDavid Laake by his Illinois driver's license. Chastain testifiedthat during his initial contact with Laake, he detected a strongodor of an alcoholic beverage coming from inside the Saturn. Healso noticed that Laake used slurred speech and had glassy,bloodshot eyes. The front passenger-side tire of the Saturn wasflat, and Chastain asked Laake if he hit something in theroadway. Laake said he did not know; he was simply drivingsouthbound on 104th street when the tire suddenly went flat. Chastain asked Laake how long he had been sitting on theroadside, and he said approximately 5 to 10 minutes. Chastainasked if he had been on Route 6 in front of the airport beforedriving to his current location, and Laake said yes. ThenChastain mentioned the report of a possible intoxicated driver,and he asked how much alcohol Laake had consumed that evening. Laake said he had consumed a couple of drinks.

At that point Chastain had Laake step out of the Saturn forsome field sobriety tests. He conducted the horizontal gazenystagmus test, the one-leg-stand test, and the walk-and-turntest. According to Chastain's testimony, Laake failed all threetests. Chastain also performed a portable or preliminary breathtest, which produced a reading of 0.149. He consequentlyarrested Laake for driving under the influence of alcohol.

After hearing this evidence, the judge found that Chastaininitiated legitimate interaction with Laake, and thus that theensuing discovery of DUI evidence was valid. Accordingly, thejudge denied Laake's motions to quash and rescind. Duringsubsequent trial proceedings, Laake was found guilty of DUI. These consolidated appeals followed.

A judge's ruling on a petition to rescind a statutorysummary suspension is entitled to deference and will not bereversed unless it is against the manifest weight of theevidence. People v. Carlson, 307 Ill. App. 3d 77 (1999); Peoplev. Gerwick, 235 Ill. App. 3d 691 (1992) (applying the manifestweight standard where the parties submitted an agreed statementof facts). A ruling is against the manifest weight of theevidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent from therecord. Carlson, 307 Ill. App. 3d 77.

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitutiondeclares that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in theirpersons, *** against unreasonable searches and seizures, shallnot be violated." U.S. Const., amend. IV. Accordingly, Illinoiscourts have generally limited permissible police-citizenencounters to three circumstances: (1) an arrest supported byprobable cause; (2) a brief investigatory stop based on areasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and(3) interaction for purposes of community caretaking or publicsafety. People v. Hinton, 249 Ill. App. 3d 713 (1993). Thecommunity caretaking function does not apply if the citizen isdetained or subjected to criminal investigation. See Hinton, 249Ill. App. 3d 713.

Deputy Chastain's initial encounter with Laake does not fitinto the first or second categories. By Chastain's own admissionhe initiated the encounter for community caretaking purposes. Laake claims, however, that the encounter does not qualify ascommunity caretaking because Chastain effected a detention fromthe outset by activating his overhead emergency lights. InLaake's words: "it is almost universally understood by operatorsof motor vehicles that the police officer's activation of theoverhead emergency lights, when apparently directed at theindividual driver, is a command to stop or remain stopped."

The standard for determining whether a detention hasoccurred during a police-citizen encounter is: "whether areasonable, innocent person in the circumstances would believethat he or she would be free to leave." People v. Woodson, 220Ill. App. 3d 865, 873 (1991). If the answer is no, the citizenwas detained for fourth amendment purposes. Courts must evaluate"all of the circumstances surrounding the incident" when makingthis determination. People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 517(1999).

We agree with Laake's contention that a police officer's useof overhead emergency lights, when directed at a particularperson, would be interpreted by that person as a command to stayput. This view accords with decisions from at least three otherjurisdictions. See State v. Morris, 72 P.3d 570 (Kan. 2003)(officers activated emergency lights behind a vehicle parked withits engine running on a rocky, jetty-breaker area of a lake);State v. Donahue, 742 A.2d 775 (Conn. 1999) (officer activatedflashers behind a vehicle that pulled into the parking lot of aclosed business); and State v. Burgess, 657 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1995)(officer activated emergency lights and approached a vehicle in alawful "pull-off area").

The State's contrary argument stems from the fact that Laakehad a flat tire. According to the State, a reasonable personwith a flat tire would equate a police officer's arrival withroadside assistance, not a detention. But Laake's flat tire wason the front passenger side of his vehicle, and thus a reasonableperson could rightly wonder if the approaching officer even knewabout it. Additionally, the record is devoid of any facts thatwould have signaled the flat tire to Chastain (e.g., hazardlights, or the motorist out on the roadside changing the tire). Furthermore, the record shows that Chastain's flashing emergencylights were particularly directed at, and visible to, Laake. Under these circumstances, we conclude that a reasonable personin Laake's position would have felt compelled to stay put forChastain's inquiries.

This conclusion, however, does not end our analysis. Although Laake was technically detained, the detention did notviolate the fourth amendment unless it was unreasonable. U.S.Const., amend. IV; c.f. People v. Smith, No. 2--02--0882 (January30, 2004) (finding an emergency exception to the requirement thata seizure be supported by either probable cause to arrest or areasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Chastain testifiedthat his purpose in stopping behind the Saturn was to check onthe welfare of its driver. We see nothing wrong with thispurpose. Police officers routinely provide roadside assistancein addition to conducting criminal investigation. Suchassistance is designed to ensure public safety, and we do notbelieve that any concomitant technical detention is unreasonable.

Laake doubts the genuineness of Chastain's asserted purpose,arguing that Chastain really stopped behind him to conduct aninvestigation. The trial judge considered this argument andultimately found that Chastain's purpose was to check on Laake'swelfare. Having reviewed the record, we cannot say that anopposite conclusion is clearly apparent.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Rock IslandCounty circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

SLATER and SCHMIDT, JJ., concur.