People v. LaFaire

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People v. LaFaire

State: Illinois

Court: 3rd District Appellate

Docket No: 3-06-0235 Rel

Case Date: 07/23/2007

Preview:No. 3--06--0235 Filed July 23, 2007. IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2007 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM LAFAIRE, Defendant-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 12th Judicial Circuit Will County, Illinois Nos. 04--DT--367 & 04--TR--25247

Honorable Marzell Richardson Judge, Presiding

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the court: MODIFIED UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and driving in the wrong lane of traffic. He demanded a speedy trial and subsequently moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The circuit court denied his motion. After defendant moved to reconsider, however, the court reversed its ruling and scheduled a hearing on the speedy trial issue. The court ultimately granted defendant's motion. The State filed this appeal, and we affirm. BACKGROUND Defendant was charged by uniform traffic citation on February 28, 2004. He posted bond and was released that day, with his first appearance set for April 12, 2004.

On March 19, 2004, defense counsel filed his appearance and made a written demand for a speedy trial. On April 12, 2004, defendant was arraigned. A pre-trial hearing and a summary suspension hearing were set for May 10, 2004. On May 10, 2004, the cause was continued to June 14, 2004. On June 14, 2004, the cause was continued to August 3, 2004, per defendant's motion. On August 3, 2004, the cause was continued to September 22, 2004, per defendant's motion. On September 22, 2004, the cause was continued to November 17, 2004, per defendant's motion. On November 17, 2004, a trial was set for January 10, 2005, by agreement of the parties. On December 8, 2004, the State moved to continue the trial beyond January 10, 2005, because Officer Drumm (witness) was scheduled to attend police training between January 3 and March 25, 2005, and was thus unavailable to testify during that period. The circuit court heard the State's motion on December 16, 2004, and continued the trial to April 11, 2005, over defendant's objection. On January 10, 2005, a hearing occurred where the State advised that the trial had already been continued to April 11, 2005. On April 11, 2005, both parties announced that they were ready for trial. However, defendant requested leave to file a motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial right. His request was granted.

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In finding that defendant's speedy trial right was violated, the circuit court determined that 169 days had run against his demand. Those days were March 19, 2004, to April 12, 2004, and November 17, 2004, to April 11, 2005. DISCUSSION Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date the defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant. 725 ILCS 5/103--5(b) (West 2002). The speedy trial term is computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is a Sunday or a holiday, in which case it is also excluded. People v. Shaw, 24 Ill. 2d 219 (1962). Our standard of review is abuse of discretion. People v. Williams, 272 Ill. App. 3d 868 (1995). The first period in question is from defendant's speedy trial demand on March 19, 2004, to his arraignment on April 12, 2004. This period amounts to 24 days. The State argues that none of these days should apply for speedy trial purposes because the speedy trial clock did not begin running until defendant was arraigned. To support its argument, the State cites People v. Speight, 72 Ill. App. 3d 203 (1979), for the proposition that personal jurisdiction is obtained over a criminal defendant by his appearance in court. Extrapolating from this proposition, the State reasons: "[I]t is illogical to conclude that the speedy-trial term can begin running prior to a defendant's first appearance and his arraignment. Until the defendant's first appearance and arraignment, the court does not have jurisdiction over the defendant and the defendant has not elected whether to plead guilty or to plead not guilty and proceed to trial." We disagree. Speight is factually distinguishable inapposite because it dealt with a different jurisdictional question (involving the tolling of a defendant's probation period by his 3

appearance in court on the State's petition to revoke). Moreover, we have found no authority supporting the State's present extrapolation from Speight for the proposition that a defendant's speedy trial period does not begin until arraignment. According to People v. Sharos, 24 Ill. App. 3d 265 (1974), a defendant's speedy trial period begins when he makes his speedy trial demand, not subsequently at arraignment. Cf. People v. Makes, 103 Ill. App. 3d 232 (1981) (noting that the right to a speedy trial attaches when criminal prosecution begins, such as by arrest, and that the defendant could have demanded a speedy trial when he was placed on bail even though he was not charged until 30 months later). This observation is consistent with the speedy trial statute, which states that a defendant's speedy trial term begins on "the date he was taken into custody" (for those in custody) or "the date [he] demands trial" (for those out on bail or recognizance). 725 ILCS 5/103

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